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Competition Policy and Comparative Corporate 
Governance of State-Owned Enterprises 
D. Daniel Sokol 
ABSTRACT 
The legal origins literature overlooks a key area of corporate 
governance—the governance of state-owned enterprises (“SOEs”). There 
are key theoretical differences between SOEs and publicly-traded 
corporations. In comparing the differences of both internal and 
external controls of SOEs, none of the existing legal origins allow for 
effective corporate governance monitoring. Because of the difficulties of 
undertaking a cross-country quantitative review of the governance of 
SOEs, this Article examines, through a series of case studies, SOE 
governance issues among postal providers. The examination of postal 
firms supports the larger theoretical claim about the weaknesses of SOE 
governance across legal origins. In itself, the lack of effective corporate 
governance would not be fatal if some of the SOE’s inefficient and 
societal-welfare-reducing behavior could be remedied under antitrust 
law. However, a review of antitrust decisions on the issue of predatory 
pricing by SOEs reveals that antitrust is equally ineffective in its 
attempts to monitor SOEs. This Article concludes by identifying a 
number of devices to reduce the current inadequacies of both antitrust 
and corporate governance of SOEs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Beginning ten years ago, an article by Rafael La Porta, Florencio 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer, and Robert Vishny (commonly 
referred to as “LLSV” even though some subsequent articles have 
had a slightly different cast of characters) transformed the debate on 
corporate governance by coding at the country level the amount of 
investor protection provided under corporate law.1 They found that 
 
 1. I would suggest that the transplant effect/legal origin of many systems is not very 
clean and changes over time. For example, countries may in certain areas base their company 
law on the UK, their trusts and estates law on Germany, and their antitrust law based on the 
EU. What then is the legal origin of the country? In other cases, the law on the books does not 
reflect law in practice. For example, Argentine antitrust law was modeled on the EU but its 
analytical approach for many years followed the U.S. antitrust tradition of the Chicago 
School. Germán Coloma, The Argentine Competition Law and Its Enforcement, in LATIN 
AMERICAN COMPETITION LAW AND POLICY 95–98 (Eleanor M. Fox & D. Daniel Sokol eds., 
2009). Moreover, in practice I would see some of the U.S. common law approach 
incorporated into the fabric of deals involving Latin America, where the origin seemed a hybrid 
of the host Latin American country and N.Y. law in part because Latin American practitioners 
had spent time in the offices of N.Y. firms like Cleary Gottlieb, Sullivan & Cromwell, and 
Shearman & Sterling as well as studied for LLMs in the United States. One practitioner in 
Chile told me, “I specialize in Chilean-N.Y. law and in the area of corporate law. I think that 
this is the dominant approach in the country.” 
LLSV makes certain assumptions about history and political economy in legal origins 
that are not supported by the underlying historical record. Holger Spamann, The ‘Antidirector 
Rights Index’ Revisited, REV. FIN. STUD. (forthcoming). A number of scholars have attacked 
LLSV on these grounds. Nevertheless, LLSV does have an intuitive appeal. In many ways, the 
results are what you would expect if you were to individually attempt to rank countries based 
on investor protection or other similar features. More importantly, a number of the variables 
that LLSV use are a bit squishy, but given the limitations of cross-country quantitative analysis, 
this may be the best available approach thus far. 
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the level of investor protection of the underlying rules varied 
systematically based upon the origin of the legal system. LLSV 
concluded that common law jurisdictions were more protective of 
outside investors than civil law jurisdictions.2 In a series of papers in 
the subsequent decade, the LLSV team extended this initial research 
to determine that legal origin had an impact in the area of law and 
finance.3 Additional LLSV articles found that legal origins could 
explain outcomes in areas as diverse as bank ownership,4 legal 
formalism,5 government ownership of media,6 and regulatory 
schemes that created barriers to entry.7 
Though the LLSV literature addresses a number of important 
issues regarding legal origin, corporate governance, government 
ownership, and economic growth, LLSV did not ask an important 
question—under which legal origin is it most effective to limit 
distortions in the economy caused by state-owned enterprises 
(“SOEs”)? Stated differently, the legal origins literature overlooks a 
key area of corporate governance—the governance of SOEs, which 
are a significant part of most countries’ economy. The issue of SOEs, 
their governance and their impact in the world economy has taken 
on a particularly important role as a result of the worldwide 
economic crisis. In many countries, nationalization of industries has 
 
From a policy perspective, the key to changing various bottlenecks to economic growth 
requires not merely a top-down approach in the change of the legal system, but also a bottom-
up approach by the users of these legal systems to overcome regulatory distortions. Over time, 
the common law/civil law distinction will be seen as a rather false dichotomy. Instead, 
countries may end up being ranked based on their ability to respond to local and changing 
conditions. 
 2.  Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Law 
and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998). 
 3. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, 
Investor Protection and Corporate Valuation, 57 J. FIN. 1147 (2002); La Porta, Lopez-de-
Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny, Law and Finance, supra note 2; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-
de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Legal Determinants of External Finance, 52 J. 
FIN. 1131 (1997); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, What Works 
in Securities Laws?, 61 J. FIN. 1 (2006); Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, A Survey of 
Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737 (1997). 
 4. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, Government 
Ownership of Banks, 57 J. FIN. 265 (2002). 
 5. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
Courts, 118 Q.J. ECON. 453 (2003). 
 6. Simeon Djankov, Caralee McLiesh, Tatiana Nenova, & Andrei Shleifer, Who Owns 
the Media?, 46 J.L. & ECON. 341 (2003). 
 7. Simeon Djankov, Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 
The Regulation of Entry, 117 Q.J. ECON. 1 (2002). 
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either occurred or is at the forefront of policy discussions in areas 
such as the financial sector. However, the potential effects of 
nationalization, and of increased state control more generally, have 
not been fully realized in policy circles. 
There are important theoretical differences between SOEs and 
publicly-traded corporations. In a number of substantive areas, it is 
typically more difficult to effectively monitor SOEs than private 
firms. This Article claims that in comparing both internal and 
external controls of SOEs, neither common nor civil law legal origin 
regimes effectively monitor SOE corporate governance at the same 
level as private firms. 
Key theoretical insights a half century ago from Alchian and 
Stigler suggest that managerial slack is less likely in competitive 
industries.8 Competition, therefore, can be a substitute for good 
corporate governance. Empirical work suggests that the inverse is 
also true. In industries that are not competitive, corporate 
governance seems to have little impact.9 This is not to suggest that 
competition and corporate governance are perfect substitutes. 
Indeed, LLSV make such an observation.10 Where there is no 
competition within an industry, good corporate governance is less 
necessary than in situations where there is robust competition. One 
might imagine that because of the imperfect substitutability of 
corporate governance and competition policy, jurisdictions may need 
only chose one form of regulation to ensure economic gain for 
society. However, as this Article will illustrate, neither corporate 
governance nor competition law as practiced for SOEs seem 
particularly effective as currently constituted. 
Good corporate governance may provide firms with an edge over 
competitor firms. It may also improve resource availability within the 
firm, and “better” corporate governance may lead to improved 
performance.11 There are two strands of research on the topic. One 
 
 8. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. 
ECON. 211 (1950); George J. Stigler, The Economies of Scale, 1 J.L. & ECON. 54 (1958). 
 9. Xavier Giroud & Holger M. Mueller, Does Corporate Governance Matter in 
Competitive Industries?, 3 (European Corporate Governance Inst., Finance Working Paper No. 
185, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1006118. 
 10. Shliefer & Vishny, supra note 3, at 738 (“While we agree that product market 
competition is probably the most powerful force toward economic efficiency in the world, we 
are skeptical that it alone can solve the problem of corporate governance.”). 
 11. René M. Stulz, Globalization, Corporate Finance, and the Cost of Capital, 12 J. 
APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 13–15 (1999). 
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strand finds that better corporate governance is exogenous (or 
generated from outside).12 A second strand suggests that better 
corporate governance is endogenous (or produced from within).13 
Given the disagreement between the exogenous or endogenous 
nature of good governance, there is not clear causation that good 
corporate governance leads to better performance. We tend to 
believe causation as a matter of faith rather than as a matter of 
evidence. This Article assumes that better corporate governance will 
improve corporate performance. Given this assumption, important 
differences emerge in terms of the incentives and structures of SOEs 
and private firms, which lead to dissimilar outcomes in corporate 
governance and efficiency. 
In itself, the lack of effective corporate governance would not be 
fatal if antitrust law remedied some of the SOE anti-competitive 
distortions. However, a review of antitrust decisions across 
jurisdictions on the issue of predatory pricing by SOEs reveals that 
antitrust law is equally ineffective in its attempts to monitor SOE bad 
behavior.14 This Article does not suggest that better corporate 
governance will necessarily cure the type of anti-competitive behavior 
that antitrust remedies. Rather, it makes the point that SOEs, from a 
standpoint of efficiency, create problems and that improved 
corporate governance or effective competition policy are substitutes 
that could lead to more efficient outcomes regarding SOEs. 
 
 12. Bernard Black, The Corporate Governance Behavior and Market Value of Russian 
Firms, 2 EMERGING MARKETS REV. 89 (2001); Art Durnev & E. Han Kim, To Steal or Not to 
Steal: Firm Attributes, Legal Environment, and Valuation, 60 J. FIN. 1461, 1487–89 (2005); 
Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, Endogenously Chosen Boards of Directors and 
Their Monitoring of the CEO, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 96, 97–98 (1998); Randall Morck, Andrei 
Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Ownership and Market Valuation, 20 J. FIN. 
ECON. 293, 311–14 (1988). 
 13. Audra L. Boone, Laura Casares Field, Jonathan M. Karpoff & Charu G. Raheja, The 
Determinants of Corporate Board Size and Composition: An Empirical Analysis, 85 J. FIN. 
ECON. 66 (2007); N.K. Chidambaran, Darius Palia & Yudan Zheng, Does Better Corporate 
Governance ‘Cause’ Better Firm Performance? (Whitcomb Ctr. for Research in Fin. Servs., 
working paper series WCRFS: 06–19, 2006), available at http://business. 
rutgers.edu/download.aspx?id=1192; John E. Core, Wayne R. Guay & Tjomme O. Rusticus, 
Does Weak Governance Cause Weak Stock Returns? An Examination of Firm Operating 
Performance and Investors’ Expectations, 61 J. FIN. 655 (2006); Harold Demsetz & Belén 
Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, 7 J. CORP. FIN. 209, 211, 230–31 
(2001). 
 14. The tax literature suggests that better corporate governance means that firms are less 
likely to engage in aggressive tax strategies. See Nicola Sartori, Corporate Governance Dynamics 
and Tax Compliance, 1, 20 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch. Law and Econ., working paper No. 
1361895, 2008), available at http://ssrn.com/ abstract=1361895. 
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Predatory pricing is only one of the anti-competitive behaviors in 
which SOEs engage. However, it is an area that illustrates a gap 
between how laws generally apply to all firms without taking into 
account the different dynamics between private and state ownership. 
This Article does not make the claim that good corporate 
governance will prevent antitrust violations.15 The linkage between 
corporate governance and antitrust is more indirect. Both are 
possible legal/regulatory tools to address SOE inefficiencies.16 
Because of the inability to obtain quantitative data to determine 
the full extent of the costs of SOEs worldwide, this Article employs a 
qualitative rather than quantitative research method. In such 
circumstances, a case-study approach may be the most effective way 
to ground analysis in experience rather than mere theory.17 This 
Article uses multiple qualitative case studies to illustrate the impact 
of the difficulty of applying corporate governance and antitrust laws 
to address anti-competitive behavior by SOEs. Case studies provide 
an explanatory theory that has high construct validity and 
accommodates complex causal relations. Multiple case studies 
provide for more meaningful comparisons across cases and for better 
generalizations.18 This Article focuses on the United States 
experience in greater detail to better contrast it with both common 
and civil law jurisdictions around the world. Furthermore, it 
undertakes a study of the postal sector as an SOE industry for three 
reasons: (1) a majority of postal providers around the world remain 
in state hands, (2) the postal sector is a network industry with 
significant competition issues, and (3) there are related services 
where there is competition so that the governance and competition 
in the postal sector affects a number of critical areas in the economy. 
In many countries, government ownership of postal providers has 
shielded the postal sector from both effective regulatory and antitrust 
review. The historically large role that the postal service has played in 
 
 15. But see Graham v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 188 A.2d 125, 129–31 (Del. 1963) 
(involving a now superseded oversight case regarding the potential liability of directors for 
losses due to non-compliance with antitrust law). 
 16. However, antitrust and other violations might be more likely than with bad 
corporate governance in which directors are reckless. 
 17. GARY KING, ROBERT O. KEOHANE & SIDNEY VERBA, DESIGNING SOCIAL INQUIRY: 
SCIENTIFIC INFERENCE IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH 67 (1994). 
 18. Christopher H. Achen & Duncan Snidal, Rational Deterrence Theory and 
Comparative Case Studies, 41 WORLD POL. 143, 146 (1989). A danger of case studies is the 
possibility of selection bias. 
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government and the economy accounts for part of the reason it has 
been shielded. If postal providers (and their various non-postal 
subsidiaries such as insurance, banking, and express delivery service 
companies) were to be publicly traded in their country, they would 
be among the largest publicly-traded firms in their respective stock 
markets based on market capitalization and revenues. In numerous 
countries, the postal regulator holds a cabinet-level position.19 The 
examination of the regulation of corporate governance and of 
competition policy of postal firms supports the larger theoretical 
claim about the weaknesses of SOE governance and competition 
across legal origins. 
Section II provides an analysis of the difference between public 
(government) and private (generally publicly listed) ownership in 
terms of incentives and mechanisms of control of corporate 
governance. Section III provides an understanding of the underlying 
economics of the postal sector. Section IV offers a review of 
corporate governance of postal SOEs. Section V analyzes the 
competition policy in those same countries and analyzes predatory 
pricing tests that could limit the potential anti-competitive harm that 
SOEs might create. Section VI concludes and offers a series of 
recommendations on improved corporate governance and 
competition law and policy of SOEs, regardless of the legal origin. 
II. PRIVATE VS. GOVERNMENT CONTROL OF FIRMS 
A. Setting the Stage 
SOEs are, as the name suggests, controlled by the state rather 
than by private actors. This Article uses the World Bank definition 
for an SOE: “government owned or government controlled 
economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues from 
selling goods and services.”20 According to a number of empirical 
 
 19. This for a time was also true in the United States, where the Postmaster General was 
a cabinet-level position. John C. Panzar, Interactions between Regulatory and Antitrust Policies 
in a Liberalized Postal Sector, 2 (Aug. 22, 2009) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.econ.canterbury.ac.nz/research/pdf/Paper_Panzar.pdf. 
 20. WORLD BANK, BUREAUCRATS IN BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS AND POLITICS OF 
GOVERNMENT OWNERSHIP 26 (1995) (drawing from Leroy Jones, Public Enterprise and 
Economic Development: The Korean Case (1975) (thesis, Harvard Univ.) (on file with Korea 
Development Institute)). 
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studies, SOEs tend to be less efficient than similar private firms 
because of the incentives associated with government ownership.21 
SOEs are an important part of global economic activity but 
remain under-explored in the academic literature, particularly the 
legal literature. Recent empirical work associates SOEs with lower 
economic growth in the developing world.22 “[S]potty and relatively 
old data” hamper systematic analysis of current trends in SOE 
involvement in the economy.23 Nevertheless, recent work by the 
World Bank concludes that SOEs play a critical role in the economy, 
particularly in the Middle East, Africa and Asia.24 SOEs are part of a 
larger set of issues regarding state control over the economy. In 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the public sector share 
of GDP varies from as little as around twenty percent (Czech 
Republic, Slovakia and Hungary) to as much as eighty percent 
(Belarus). Twenty of twenty six transition countries were in the 
range of twenty to forty percent of GDP for the state sector share of 
GDP.25 These numbers do not reflect changing developments 
 
 21. See, e.g., WILLIAM L. MEGGINSON, THE FINANCIAL ECONOMICS OF 
PRIVATIZATION (2005); La Porta et al., supra note 4, at 267–68; Wei Li & Lixin Colin Xu, 
The Political Economy of Privatization and Competition: Cross-Country Evidence from the 
Telecommunications Sector, 30 J. COMP. ECON. 439 (2002). But see, Daniel F. Spulber, 
Discovering the Role of the Firm: The Separation Criterion and Corporate Law, 16 (N.W. Law 
& Econ., Research Paper No. 08-23, 2008) (going so far as to refuse to classify SOEs as firms 
since there is no separation between the transactional interests of the firm and its owners). 
 22. Allen N. Berger, Iftekhar Hasan & Mingming Zhou, Bank Ownership and Efficiency 
in China: What Will Happen in the World's Largest Nation?, 1 (Working Paper, 2006), 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=924246. 
 23. Sunita Kikeri & Aishetu Fatima Kolo, Privatization Trends and Recent 
Developments, 15 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3765, 2005), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=849344. A World Bank study estimated 
that worldwide, SOEs account for between eight to ten percent of GDP in countries that are 
classified as either upper-middle-income or industrialized. In low income countries, SOEs 
account for a fourteen percent share in GDP. WORLD BANK, supra note 20, at 32–33. There 
are problems to the methodology of this report including the selection of certain sectors for 
study and the countries picked. See generally Ravi Ramamurti, Why Haven’t Developing 
Countries Privatized Deeper and Faster?, 27 WORLD DEV. 137 (1999). 
 24. Sunita Kikeri & Aishetu Kolo, State Enterprises, WORLD BANK PUB. POL’Y J. 304 
(2006), available at http://rru.worldbank.org/PublicPolicyJournal/Summary.aspx?id=304 
(noting the prevalence of SOEs around the world); Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, The Quality of Government, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
222, 261–62 (1999) (noting that SOEs are more common in countries which have a French 
civil code or Socialist legal origin). 
 25. World Bank, ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION: AN OED EVALUATION OF WORLD BANK 
ASSISTANCE 15 (2004). 
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around the world where financial crisis has caused a number of 
countries to nationalize some struggling firms. 
The prevalence of SOEs around the world and the outcomes of 
SOE behavior may cause a resource misallocation in society. As this 
Article will discuss in greater detail, government ownership may 
facilitate rent-seeking behavior by interest groups to undertake 
certain types of state support through regulatory mission creep and 
through increased regulatory barriers to entry. Government 
ownership adds to inefficiency and increases transaction costs.26 Such 
barriers to entry may have a significant negative effect on a country’s 
economy given the critical role the private sector plays in a country’s 
global competitiveness.27 
That SOEs exist at all and that they exist in such large numbers is 
perhaps surprising. After all, as recently as 2001, Hansmann and 
Kraakman suggested that we had reached the end of history for 
corporate law28 because of worldwide convergence based on a 
number of factors: 
(1) full legal personality, including well-defined authority to bind 
the firm to contracts and to bond those contracts with assets that 
are the property of the firm, as distinct from the firm’s owners; (2) 
limited liability for owners and managers; (3) shared ownership by 
investors of capital; (4) delegated management under a board 
structure; and (5) transferable shares.29 
According to their analysis, there was little appeal to a heavy-handed 
state in corporate affairs.30 However, SOEs have not followed the 
path toward global convergence in corporate law, even before the 
current period of global financial crisis. 
In one sense, Hansmann and Kraakman are correct about an end 
of history of corporate law. SOEs are outliers. They are less efficient 
than private firms. Empirical work suggests that when benchmarked 
 
 26. Anne O. Krueger, The Political Economy of the Rent-Seeking Society, 64 AMER. 
ECON. REV. 291 (1974). 
 27. See Ziya Öni, The Logic of the Developmental State, 24 COMP. POL. 109, 124–25 
(1991). 
 28. This is a take-off on Kant’s idea of the end of history and on the best-selling book 
from the 1990s, FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992) 
(arguing that liberal-democracy had won in the marketplace of ideas). 
 29. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89 
GEO. L.J. 439, 439–40 (2001). 
 30. Id. at 447. 
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against similar private firms, SOEs perform worse.31 Yet, in spite of 
the end of history for corporate law as articulated by Hansmann and 
Kraakman, we live in a world full of SOEs. In fact, due to the world-
wide financial crisis, the number of SOEs around the world seems to 
be increasing. Therefore, scholars need to address how to improve 
the effectiveness of SOEs. 
A series of studies suggest that a relatively modest improvement 
in the efficiency of SOEs of five percent in a given country could free 
up financial resources of approximately one to five percent of a 
country’s GDP.32 Conversely, if an SOE is poorly managed, it can 
increase the cost to governments and divert money from other 
priorities. 
This is not a simple dichotomy. The market does not always send 
the right signals and may malfunction. If we assume that the current 
financial crisis is merely a blip, then the market is in fact still better 
relative to the alternatives. We need to think about alternatives, 
specifically about SOEs in sectors that are competitive (or can be) 
and that have network effects.33 
 
 31. Alvaro Cuervo & Belén Villalonga, Explaining the Variance in the Performance 
Effects of Privatization, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 581, 581–83 (2000) (noting that privatized 
firms perform better but with variable performance); Florencio López-de-Silanes, 
Determinants of Privatization Prices, 112 Q.J. ECON. 965, 967–68 (1997); William L. 
Megginson, Robert C. Nash & Matthias van Randenborgh, The Financial and Operating 
Performance of Newly Privatized Firms: An International Empirical Analysis, 49 J. FIN. 403, 
403–05 (1994); Belén Villalonga, Privatization and Efficiency: Differentiating Ownership 
Effects from Political, Organizational, and Dynamic Effects, 42 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 1, 43 
(2000) (providing a literature review of 153 studies on privatization). 
 32. Maria Vagliasindi, Governance Arrangements for State Owned Enterprises, 2 (World 
Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4542, 2008). 
 33. Are market-based metrics right for judging SOEs? This question is worthy of a book 
of its own. This Article does not address all SOEs. There are some that have important 
security, market failure, or altruistic functions. This Article only addresses those SOEs for 
which there is a market competition function rather than a market replacement function. The 
proposals at the end of the Article are general and need to be contextualized to the specific 
situation in a given country based on political, social, and economic factors. This Article does 
not address other ways to think about the role of regulation and the limits of market as 
opposed to other non-market approaches and the extent to which some SOEs might be seen as 
public goods. For this Article, the concern is only for those functions which are also privately 
provided and where issues of civics, prestige, and altruism play a marginal role for SOEs as 
opposed to other goods and services provided by the state. 
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B. Firms Generally 
Before identifying the special characteristics of SOEs, let us begin 
with a basic overview of the purpose of a firm and of corporate law. 
Private firms exist to make a profit. From a contract theory 
standpoint, Easterbrook and Fischel suggest that firm owners 
contract to maximize wealth.34 Though a number of scholars suggest 
that profit making, both as a matter of positive and normative law 
does not require profit maximization,35 the profit making component 
for firms remains the central component for doing business, even if 
not the only motive. To achieve a profit making result, law provides 
for the allocation of residual ownership of the corporation to 
shareholders. 
Corporate law is the body of rules that allow for the creation and 
continuation of the corporate form and for profit creation.36 
Corporate governance addresses the governance mechanisms of the 
firm.37 The first issue that we must address in corporate governance 
is definitional—what do we mean by corporate governance? For 
purposes of this Article, let us define corporate governance as “the 
system of laws, rules, and factors that control operations at a 
company.”38 Jean Tirole explains that, from an economics 
perspective, 
 
corporate governance relates to the “ways in which the suppliers of 
finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on 
their investment.” Moreover, [corporate governance] is 
preoccupied with ways in which a corporation’s insiders can 
 
 34. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1416, 1421 (1989). 
 35. Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 733, 738–40 (2005) (arguing that pure profit maximization would reduce quality of 
corporate governance because it would override social and moral sanctions); Cynthia A. 
Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 1632–33 (2006) (suggesting 
that human rationality and cognitive behavior allow for a more nuanced understanding of the 
process of compliance with law). 
 36. See D. Gordon Smith, Response: The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law, 57 
EMORY L.J. 985, 990 (2008). 
 37. For literature reviews on corporate governance, see Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 3; 
Klaus Gugler, Dennis C. Mueller & B. Burcin Yurtoglu, Corporate Governance and 
Globalization, 20 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 129 (2004). 
 38. Stuart L. Gillan, Recent Developments in Corporate Governance: An Overview, 12 J. 
CORP. FIN. 381, 382 (2006). 
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credibly commit to return funds to outside investors and can 
thereby attract external financing.39 
 
The traditional problem of corporate governance in the United 
States is a vertical problem among shareholders, managers, and 
directors.40 In contrast, given more highly concentrated ownership in 
the rest of the world, oftentimes the major issue of control is 
horizontal among controlling shareholders and outside 
shareholders.41 
One issue that arises in corporate governance is the problem of 
agency costs.42 These costs occur because the separation of 
ownership from management creates manager incentives that may be 
different from those of shareholders.43 There are sub-principal-agent 
situations within a firm at each level of management, and agency 
costs can arise at each of these levels.44 Jensen and Meckling created 
an agency cost model of delegation of decision-making authority 
from the principal to the agent.45 Fama and Jensen suggested that 
agency costs could include “structuring, monitoring, and bonding a 
set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests.”46 In the 
corporate setting, the most important agency cost is the cost of 
monitoring agents by the principal. These costs are not imposed 
merely through direct monitoring. Rather, monitoring costs also 
include various mechanisms by the principal “to ‘control’ the 
behavior of the agent through budget restrictions, compensation 
policies, operating rules, etc.”47 These mechanisms work to align 
 
 39. JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF CORPORATE FINANCE 16 (2006). 
 40. See Mark J. Roe, The Institutions of Corporate Governance, in HANDBOOK OF NEW 
INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS 371, 372 (Claude Menard & Mary M. Shirley eds., 2004). 
 41. See id. 
 42. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 308–10 (1976). 
 43. See ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION 
AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 119–25 (Macmillan Co. 1939) (1932); Ronald J. Gilson & Charles 
K. Whitehead, Deconstructing Equity: Public Ownership, Agency Costs, and Complete Capital 
Markets, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 231, 231–32 (2008). 
 44. See Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42, at 309. 
 45. Id. at 308–10. 
 46. Eugene F. Fama & Michael C. Jensen, Separation of Ownership and Control, 26 J.L. 
& ECON. 301, 304 (1983). 
 47. Jensen & Meckling, supra note 42, at 308 n.9. Some think that the emphasis on 
agency costs underplays the importance of team production that requires inputs from various 
stakeholders. See, e.g., Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Director Accountability and the 
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incentives of the principal and agent to reduce agency costs. Without 
such mechanisms to align the incentives between the two groups, 
managers may attempt to shirk from their duties or steal from the 
corporation. 
Shirking is particularly troublesome in the agency context 
because it is difficult to prove—it is easier to prove that someone is 
stealing rather than shirking (e.g., lack of oversight, care, etc.).48 As 
each individual investor has a high cost to monitor to prevent 
managerial shirking, it can be quite expensive to monitor a firm for 
any particular investor.49 Alchian and Demsetz provide the insight 
that the purpose of management is to monitor the various outputs of 
agents to deter shirking.50 To prevent managers themselves from 
shirking, the shareholder as residual claimant provides oversight over 
managers and directors.51 
To control agency costs, firms often use a nexus of contracts.52 
In the contractual theory of the firm, the firm as a legal entity is 
based upon a set of contracts within the common framework of the 
 
Mediating Role of the Corporate Board, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 403–05 (2001); Margaret M. 
Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Team Production in Business Organizations: An Introduction, 24 J. 
CORP. L. 743, 743–45 (1999). 
 48. Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information Costs, and Economic 
Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972) (arguing that individuals have incentive to 
shirk in their duties to the firm); Roy Radner, Hierarchy: The Economics of Managing, 30 J. 
ECON. LITERATURE 1382, 1405–07 (1992) (providing an account for rational agents to 
shirk). 
 49. Stephen J. Choi, A Framework for the Regulation of Securities Market 
Intermediaries, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 45, 46 (2004) (noting that “[t]hrough the expenditure 
of costly resources, any single investor may monitor and work to discipline underperforming 
managers,” but that any one investor lacks the incentive to provide the optimal level of such 
monitoring). 
 50. Alchian & Demsetz, supra note 48, at 781–82. 
 51.  For example, shareholders as owners have the power to approve major transactions 
and to replace directors. Larry E. Ribstein, Accountability and Responsibility in Corporate 
Governance, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1431, 1439–40 (2006). According to Bainbridge, such 
a solution has a number of shortcomings because it fails to recognize the reality of shareholder 
supremacy. As Bainbridge states, “[i]n general, shareholders of public corporations have 
neither the legal right, the practical ability, nor the desire to exercise the kind of control 
necessary for meaningful monitoring of the corporation's agents.” Stephen M. Bainbridge, 
Director Primacy: The Means and Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 568 
(2003). 
 52. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung & Albert H. Yoon, What Else Matters for 
Corporate Governance?: The Case of Bank Monitoring, 88 B.U. L. REV. 991, 994–95, 1001–09 
(2008); D. Gordon Smith, Corporate Governance and Managerial Incompetence: Lessons from 
Kmart, 74 N.C. L. REV. 1037, 1057–59 (1996) (discussing the contractarian model). Note 
however that agency costs and the contractarian model are distinct. 
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firm.53 The contracts that make up the firm address a number of 
issues such as the source of financing, the nature of residual 
ownership interests in the firm and the division of responsibilities 
with the firm.54 The key insight of the contractual theory of the firm 
is that through contracts, a firm can reduce risks and create 
incentives for management and employees of a firm.55 Yet, contracts 
are not sufficient because of the potential self interest of 
management. This is why statutes and equity were needed to set 
forth basic principles of corporate governance. 
C. SOEs Generally 
SOEs are different from privately-owned firms. SOEs are not 
necessarily profit maximizers,56 they may have goals that conflict with 
those of their de facto owners—the government,57 they do not 
necessarily seek to maximize shareholder value,58 and they may be 
playing on an unlevel playing field relative to their private 
counterparts.59 All of these factors play some role in reducing SOE 
efficiency, and limiting the success of SOEs relative to private 
corporations.60 
SOEs are different from private firms because SOEs are not 
necessarily profit-maximizers.61 Some (or in a number of cases, all) 
SOE functions may be based on non-financial goals. One potential 
problem with state ownership is that it may be used for political 
 
 53. FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 1–39 (1991). 
 54. R. Richard Geddes, Agency Costs and Governance in the United States Postal Service, 
in GOVERNING THE POSTAL SERVICE 114, 116 (Gregory J. Sidak ed., 1994). 
 55. FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY, AND PROFIT (Univ. of Chi. Press 1971) 
(1921) (addressing how contracting can reduce certain types of risk); Bengt Holmstrom & 
Steven N. Kaplan, Corporate Governance & Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense 
of the 1980s and 1990s, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 121, 133–35 (2001) (arguing that incentive-based 
compensation serves as an internal governance mechanism); Jensen & Meckling, supra note 
42, at 305–10 (arguing the firm is a nexus of contracts). 
 56. See infra, notes 62–71 and accompanying text. 
 57. See infra, notes 72–76 and accompanying text. 
 58. See infra, note 77 and accompanying text. 
 59. See infra, notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
 60. See infra, notes 80–83 and accompanying text. 
 61. Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 
116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1426–27 (2003). 
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objectives. Some objectives for SOEs may include employment,62 
social goals,63 or capital formation.64 This is not to suggest there are 
not some situations in which SOEs should play a role in the 
economy.65 The most persuasive defense of state ownership arises 
when state ownership overcomes market failure.66 There also may be 
a need for intervention for social reasons to redistribute to the very 
poor.67 Moreover, SOEs may be desirable if a public good needs to 
be provided and if quality is difficult to specify in a contract.68 These 
goals, however, for the most part, are not based upon an efficiency 
rationale. 
Government may have competing goals and SOE management 
has to determine which of these goals to follow.69 Moreover, 
government interests may not be the same as commercial interests. 
As a result of this tension, government may not provide the 
necessary oversight function for an SOE. The lack of effective 
oversight may result in part from situations in which a number of 
different parts of government oversee the SOE.70 
Some SOEs may not focus on profit maximization because they 
are in regulated industries in which regulators pressure firms to 
undertake certain policies with outcomes to benefit politicians rather 
 
 62. Maxim Boycko, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Theory of Privatisation, 106 
ECON. J. 309, 309 (1996). 
 63. Ronald Wintrobe, The Market for Corporate Control and the Market for Political 
Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 435, 435–36 (1987). 
 64. Armando Labra, Public Enterprise in an Underdeveloped and Dependent Economy, in 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN A MIXED ECONOMY 36, 36–37 (William J. Baumol ed., 
1980). 
 65. See, e.g., David E. M. Sappington & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Privatization, Information, 
and Incentives, 6 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 567, 567 (1987).  
 66. Paul A. Grout & Margaret Stevens, The Assessment: Financing and Managing Public 
Services, 19 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 215, 215 (2003). 
 67. Andrei Shleifer, State Versus Private Ownership, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135 
(1998) (public ownership may be preferred “in a country [where] good contract enforcement 
[is] very limited, and [in] particular cases where soft incentives are extremely valuable and 
competition is very limited”). 
 68. See Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, Government Versus Private Ownership of 
Public Goods, 116 Q.J. ECON. 1343, 1343–45 (2001). 
 69. Where a sector ministry provides regulatory oversight and another ministry exercises 
financial oversight, this may reduce the intra-government conflict of interest. 
 70. David H. Scott, Strengthening the Governance and Performance of State-Owned 
Financial Institutions 7–8 (World Bank Pol’y Research, Working Paper No. 4321, 2007). 
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than shareholders.71 Government must balance its role as regulator 
with its role as the owner of a firm. Bureaucrats may have an 
incentive to protect SOEs from competition when bureaucrats serve 
as both regulators and market participants. Bureaucrats also have an 
incentive to increase the size of bureaucracy (such as an SOE) 
because the increased size and scope of a bureaucracy provides them 
with greater prestige and the ability to advance their careers.72 
The lack of an efficiency rationale changes the incentives for an 
SOE. Since SOEs lack shareholders because they are owned by the 
government, the ultimate shareholder equivalent in an SOE is the 
country’s citizens. Yet, there is a potentially significant agency cost 
problem in the arrangement in which citizens’ interests are not 
aligned with SOE management, directors, and regulatory overseers. 
Behavior of firms in state hands will be less aligned with owner 
welfare because the types of incentives used to align behavior that 
the market provides are either non-existent or more limited when 
dealing with SOEs. 
Owners do not have direct ownership rights in the SOE. 
Therefore they do not receive the proceeds of the firm. Unlike 
ownership rights in private firms, there is a restricted ownership right 
in SOEs. Transferability of shares in private firms means that there is 
exit by shareholders dissatisfied with managerial decision-making. 
This is also an important control mechanism, as a lower share price 
creates a threat to management through the market for corporate 
control, which SOEs do not face, as this Article will discuss. The 
fundamental principal-agent in the SOE context is one that “exists 
between taxpayers and the government rather than between the 
owner, which is actually the government, and the SOEs.”73 Thus, 
this relationship leads to higher agency costs than would exist with 
management and owners of private firms. The various internal and 
external mechanisms that limit agency cost problems in private firms 
 
 71. Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and Top-Management 
Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225 (1990) (suggesting that political pressure affects firm 
decision-making). 
 72. Andre Blais & Stephane Dion, Conclusion: Are Bureaucrats Budget Maximizers, in 
THE BUDGET-MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND EVIDENCE 355 (Andre Blais & 
Stephane Dion eds., 1991); WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, BUREAUCRACY AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS 
(1994). 
 73. Yoichi Takahashi, Does Discipline by SOE Bonds Work?—Japan’s Experience with 
Zaito Reform (OECD, Development Research Center of the State Council of PRC, Asian 
Development Bank), Jan. 18–19, 2000, at 2. 
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are far less effective for SOEs, as the various traditional governance 
mechanisms may not fit an SOE that may be unmotivated by profit. 
SOEs may not exist to maximize shareholder (citizen) value. 
There may be noncommercial activities that an SOE pursues and 
potential political interference in the day-to-day management of 
SOEs. Worse, if the political elements of government decide SOE 
policy, this takes independence and authority away from the SOE 
board of directors. There is a growing literature in the United States 
on shareholder democracy and accountability of boards and 
management.74 Whatever such issues exist among publicly traded 
firms, the accountability problems of board and management are 
more severe in SOEs, yet have received less attention. 
Government may create an uneven playing field in those markets 
where an SOE competes with private firms.75 Government has an 
interest in ensuring that its state owned firms succeed. As such, the 
government as regulator may restrict competition by providing 
various benefits to SOEs that it does not offer to other firms. 
Though this might result in direct preferences, some of the 
preferences might be indirect, such as implicit loan guarantees for 
favorable lending, regulatory preferences such as the creation of a 
large monopoly position in related industries, limitations on foreign 
ownership, or implicit subsidies through a lack of taxation or more 
lax corporate governance requirements vis-à-vis private firms. The 
nature of SOE regulation might be arbitrary where the only 
predictability in regulation may be that government looks to protect 
its SOE over all other goals.76 High barriers to entry limit the ability 
of the market, through competition, to serve as a check on the poor 
decision-making of SOEs. 
Alchian made a theoretical prediction that since private firms 
behaved differently than state-owned firms, the performance of each 
type of firm would vary, with private firms performing more 
successfully than state owned firms.77 The costs of decision-making 
 
 74. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 835 (2005) [hereinafter Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power]; Lucian 
A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1784 (2006). 
 75. See Eleanor M. Fox, An Anti-Monopoly Law for China—Scaling the Walls of 
Government Restraints, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 173, 178–79 (2008). 
 76. Timothy Irwin & Chiaki Yamamoto, Some Options for Improving the Governance of 
State-Owned Electricity Utilities, 7 (World Bank Energy and Mining Sector Board, Working 
Paper No. 11, 2004). 
 77. Armen A. Alchian, Some Economics of Property Rights, 30 IL POLITICO 816 (1965). 
DO NOT DELETE 2/10/2010 1:12 PM 
1713 Competition Policy 
 1731 
remain less concentrated in private firms than in SOEs and there is 
more accountability in private firms based on the outcome of such 
decisions. It is more difficult to constrain public actors than private 
ones because there is less accountability for making a mistake. 
Indeed, there is a risk that management may not have an accurate 
sense of the organizational structure of an SOE (more than of a 
private firm) because of greater principal-agent problems. An SOE 
may have many subprincipal agent problems because of what may be 
an overly complex chain of command. This reduces accountability, 
especially when there are multiple principals (assuming that one can 
always identify the principals). Managers in SOEs are less likely to be 
fired by the board for making a bad decision and the state is more 
likely to bail out a mismanaged SOE. From a theoretical standpoint, 
we should expect to see improved performance of a private firm 
because the incentives between management and shareholders will 
be better aligned for improved performance in firms.78 Empirical 
work on the difference in performance between state-owned and 
privatized firms confirms this theoretical insight.79 For example, 
Shirley and Walsh in their literature review found that among fifty-
two studies they surveyed, in only five of the fifty-two studies did 
SOEs outperform private firms.80 
D. Internal Controls 
1. Corporations 
Firms use internal controls to reduce agency cost problems. 
Internal controls include managerial participation in ownership, 
rewards for management, and the use of the board of directors for 
oversight. These internal controls somehow affect firm performance 
positively. A number of studies attempt to construct indices of the 
quality of corporate governance at the firm level just as LLSV 
literature has tried to do at the country level. The three important 
 
 78. Carl Shapiro & Robert D. Willig, Economic Rationales For the Scope of Privatization, 
in THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION 55, 55–56 
(Ezra Suleiman & John Waterbury eds., 1990); Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 
Privatization and Incentives, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 84, 87–88 (1991) (explaining the 
conventional wisdom in comparing privately-run and publicly-run enterprises); Sappington & 
Stiglitz, supra note 65, at 567. 
 79. Villalonga, supra note 31, at 43. 
 80. Mary M. Shirley & Patrick Walsh, Public versus Private Ownership: The Current State 
of the Debate, 51 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 2420, 2001). 
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firm level indices of the quality of governance are (a) Gompers, Ishii, 
and Metrick;81 (b) Bebchuk, Cohen, and Ferrell;82 and (c) Brown 
and Caylor.83 Each of these indices associates good corporate 
governance with good corporate performance.84 However, studies 
that link good corporate governance to strong corporate 
performance, for the most part, come up short.85 In terms of the 
causality of good governance and corporate performance, perhaps 
none of the indices are satisfactory. In an important work that 
reviews the strengths and weaknesses of the firm level corporate 
governance indices, Bhagat, Bolton, and Romano conclude, “In 
short, there is no one ‘best’ measure of corporate governance: the 
most effective governance institution appears to depend on context, 
and on firms’ specific circumstances.”86 This suggests that 
governance may be endogenous to the firm’s characteristics. 
Undertaking an analysis of individual corporate governance 
controls is somewhat risky because the empirical literature is 
inconclusive at best.87 The present Article is more modest in its 
claims about corporate governance and corporate performance. It 
describes within one particular industry sector in which there are 
many SOEs across countries, how corporate governance mechanisms 
may be limited in effectiveness. Given that these firms are not 
publicly traded, it is more difficult, from the standpoint of data 
collection, to prove that these are well or not well run firms. Even if 
one could collect the data successfully, there might be significant 
endogeneity problems that would limit any conclusions that one 
could draw about SOE governance. 
 
 81. Paul Gompers, Joy Ishii & Andrew Metrick, Corporate Governance and Equity 
Prices, 118 Q.J. ECON. 107 (2003). 
 82. Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Allen Ferrell, What Matters in Corporate 
Governance? 22 REV. FIN. STUD. 783 (2009). 
 83. Lawrence D. Brown & Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm 
Valuation, 25 J. ACCT & PUB. POL’Y 409 (2006). 
 84. Id.; Gompers, Ishii, & Metrick, supra note 81; Bebchuk, Cohen, & Farrell, supra 
note 82. 
 85. Lynn A. Stout, The Mythical Benefits of Shareholder Control, 93 VA. L. REV. 789, 
800 (2007) (“Although dozens of papers have tried to find relationships between particular 
governance practices and corporate performance, most fail to find any strong connection, and 
the few studies that do . . . often are not supported by other researchers.”(internal citation 
omitted)). 
 86. Sanjai Bhagat, Brian Bolton & Roberta Romano, The Promise and Peril of Corporate 
Governance Indices, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1803, 1808 (2008). 
 87. Id. at 1814. 
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2. Managerial ownership and pay 
Jensen and Meckling, in their seminal work on agency costs, 
found that increased managerial ownership led to reduced agency 
costs and thus increased maximization of the firm.88 Work by other 
scholars yields similar conclusions.89 Building from this insight, some 
scholars have qualified the role that management’s ownership of a 
firm plays in improved firm outcomes. Too high an ownership level 
may reduce corporate performance because it may reduce the ability 
to dismiss ineffective management. Yet, some level of corporate 
ownership by management may increase firm performance.90 In 
many cases, SOE managers do not face the types of financial rewards 
of private firms. SOE managers cannot be rewarded additional 
compensation based on an increase of the SOE’s stock price. 
Firms enter into contracts with management that create 
incentives for performance-based pay.91 Pay incentives through 
contracts, if calibrated correctly, align the incentives of management 
to that of shareholders.92 This is not to suggest that too generous a 
pay scheme might not create distortions of its own. Bebchuk and 
Fried are critical about overly generous management compensation. 
They argue that executive compensation is not the product of arm’s 
length bargaining between managers and the board to maximize 
 
 88. Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 89. John J. McConnell & Henri Servaes, Equity Ownership and the Two Faces of Debt, 
39 J. FIN. ECON. 131 (1995); Eric R. Gedajlovic & Daniel M. Shapiro, Management and 
Ownership Effects: Evidence from Five Countries, 19 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 533 (1998); 
Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, The Effects of Board Composition and Direct 
Incentives on Firm Performance, 20 FIN. MGMT. 101 (1991). 
 90. Randall Morck, Andrei Shleifer & Robert Vishny, Management Ownership and 
Market Valuation: An Empirical Analysis, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 293 (1988). 
 91. Kevin J. Murphy, Explaining Executive Compensations: Managerial Power Versus the 
Perceived Cost of Stock Options, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 847, 850 (2002) (questioning the 
managerial power hypothesis by noting that “CEOs hired from the outside with no ties to the 
existing board enjoy especially attractive pay packages . . . .”); see also Randall S. Thomas & 
Kenneth J. Martin, Litigating Challenges to Executive Pay: An Exercise in Futility?, 79 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 569 (2001). 
 92. Guido Ferrarini & Niamh Moloney, Executive Remuneration in the EU: The Context 
for Reform, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL’Y 304 (2005). 
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shareholder value.93 Nevertheless, even such critics do not oppose 
the use of incentive pay, in principle.94 
It is possible to create incentive based compensation for SOEs. 
However, SOE incentives are different from private firms in that the 
choice of managers may be made on a political basis rather than 
merit. Moreover, the goals based upon the incentives may not be 
profit based. Perhaps this explains why in the SOE context, these 
incentive contracts have not met with success.95 This is not surprising 
as, theoretically, such compensation in SOEs will be less effective 
because it will be, by nature, less based on market outcomes than 
private firms.96 
Data from recently privatized firms shows that managerial pay 
increases post-privatization significantly, even when the managers are 
the same.97 The explanation for these findings is that there is a high 
correlation of the increase in salary and potential profits of the 
firms.98 From this, one might conjecture that SOE managers actually 
have reason to maximize their budget rather than efficiency for much 
the reason that other bureaucrats do—to increase their power.99 
 
 93. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Jesse M. Fried & David I. Walker, Managerial Power and 
Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 764–74 
(2002). 
 94. LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE 
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 189–90 (2006). 
 95. Mary M. Shirley & Lixin Colin Xu, The Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: 
Evidence from China (World Bank, Dev. Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper no. 
1919, 1998); Mary M. Shirley & Lixin Colin Xu, Information, Incentives, and Commitment: 
An Empirical Analysis of Contracts between Government and State Enterprises (World Bank, 
Dev. Research Group, Policy Research Working Paper no. 1769, 1997). 
 96. Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 61, at 1428. Political constraints play a role to 
limit the pay of management in regulated industries. Paul L. Joskow, Nancy L. Rose & 
Catherine D. Wolfram, Political Constraints on Executive Compensation: Evidence from the 
Electric Utility Industry, 27 RAND J. ECON 165 (1996). In some settings, this may suggest 
that inefficiencies will exist in both SOEs and private firms in regulated industries will negate 
ownership effects. R. Richard Geddes, Ownership, Regulation, and Managerial Monitoring in 
the Electric Utility Industry, 40 J.L. & ECON. 261, 284 (1997) (“Controlling for firm size, 
managers in government utilities do not have longer tenure in their jobs than their 
counterparts in private firms.”). 
 97. Catherine D. Wolfram, Increases in Executive Pay Following Privatization, 7 J. 
ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 327 (1998). 
 98. Id. 
 99. WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 
36–42 (1971) (explaining the budget maximizing behavior of bureaucrats). 
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3. Board oversight 
A firm has a board of directors rather than an executive who 
rules by fiat because deliberation of a group with complementary 
skills and oversight duties should lead to better business outcomes. 
The board serves to monitor managers on behalf of shareholders. In 
theory, the board protects shareholders from potentially risky and 
costly managerial mistakes in strategy. The board also provides 
oversight to ensure that management does not shirk its 
responsibilities. Some work suggests that independent board 
oversight is central to ensure that managers do not receive 
overcompensation for their work.100 
Just as manager-shareholder incentives may not be aligned, 
director-shareholder incentives likewise may not be aligned. One way 
to reduce the director-shareholder misalignment is through equity-
based compensation for directors. Empirical evidence suggests that 
this approach has been effective in aligning the interests of outside 
directors with shareholders in certain circumstances.101 This is not to 
suggest that it is effective in all circumstances, but that given the 
right amount of incentives (not too much and not too little), equity 
can align the incentives of directors and shareholders. 
Diffuse ownership of shares may present some problems in terms 
of organizing shareholders to reduce the agency costs of ownership. 
Monitoring costs may be high because of diffuse ownership. This 
may allow management to co-opt directors. Shareholders may 
remain passive in their ownership because of the high cost of 
monitoring and potential for free riding off of the work of other 
 
 100. Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, Executive Compensation as an Agency 
Problem, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 71 (2003); see Michael S. Weisbach, Outside Directors and CEO 
Turnover, 20 J. FIN. ECON. 431, 453–55 (1988); Benjamin E. Hermalin, Trends in Corporate 
Governance, 60 J. FIN. 2351, 2371 (2005) (“[I]t is possible that average CEO compensation is 
higher at firms with less diligent boards.”). But see David Yermack, Higher Market Valuation of 
Companies with a Small Board of Directors, 40 J. FIN. ECON. 185 (1996) (finding an inverse 
association between the fraction of outside directors and Tobin’s Q). 
 101. Mine Ertugrul & Shantaram Hegde, Board Compensation Practices and Agency Costs 
of Debt, 14 J. CORP. FIN. 512, 529–30 (2008) (finding that stock and option compensation 
for outside directors is more effective than cash in terms of creating effective monitoring 
incentives); Eliezer M. Fich & Anil Shivdasani, The Impact of Stock-Option Compensation for 
Outside Directors on Firm Value, 78 J. BUS. 2229 (2005) (finding in a sample of Fortune 1000 
firms that those firms that have outside director options have significantly higher market to 
book ratios and profitability metrics than those without outsider director options). 
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larger shareholders. However, corporate law has certain protections 
for minority shareholders.102 
There is criticism about the director-centric approach to 
corporate law.103 Bebchuck has articulated concern that a board of 
directors may not use its powers to maximize the well-being of 
shareholders.104 Even if Bebchuk is correct—if we take the claim 
seriously that institutional investor activism can provide increased 
shareholder control105—then SOE governance is particularly 
problematic. There is near nonexistent shareholder equivalent 
activism in SOEs. There are no institutional investors that can push 
for greater voice for shareholders. That is, in SOEs, the voice of any 
shareholder equivalent (a voter) cannot easily be aggregated the way 
that institutional investors can aggregate votes because of collective 
action problems.106 The organizational costs of most SOEs are larger 
because it is more difficult to fire people in government than in 
private firms—SOEs are less responsive to market forces. 
Other factors distinguish corporate governance of SOEs. 
Property rights in private firms are transferable. An SOE lacks such 
transferability. The only way that SOE shareholder equivalents can 
vote with their feet is indirectly through national elections, where a 
new party might impose a different set of priorities for SOEs. The 
effect is a disconnect between present behavior and future outcome 
that a listed stock provides nongovernment owned firms. Because of 
the non-transferability of ownership, there is less incentive to 
monitor because the principal cannot create more value that she can 
then capture through a sale of the ownership stake.107 Without 
effective monitoring, it is easier for managers in SOEs to make poor 
decisions because of a lack of accountability for the consequences of 
 
 102. Anupam Chander, Minorities, Shareholder and Otherwise, 113 YALE L.J. 119 
(2003); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Re-examined, 89 MICH. L. REV. 520 (1990). 
 103. KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL FLAWS 
AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES (2006). 
 104. Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 74, at 910. 
 105. Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise, 93 VA. L. REV. 675 
(2007); Bebchuck, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, supra note 74; see Lisa Fairfax, 
Making the Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53 (2008). 
 106. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTION ACTION: PUBLIC 
GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press 1971) (1965) (explaining 
collective action problems). 
 107. Louis De Alessi, The Economics of Property Rights: A Review of the Evidence, in 2 
RESEARCH IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 27–28 (Richard O. Zerbe, Jr. ed., 1980). 
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such decisions. SOE managers and directors do not face 
repercussions such as termination for poor decision making.108 
E. External Controls 
External controls refer to elements outside of the firm that limit 
agency costs of managers. Such exogenous elements include the 
market for corporate control, the equity market, the bond market, 
the market for managers, and bankruptcy. 
1. Market for corporate control 
Henry Manne first identified the market for corporate control.109 
Managers may be replaced through takeovers. If management 
decision making is poor, this will be reflected in a depressed stock 
price for the firm. If management is ineffective, the stock price of the 
corporation should fall. A lower stock price due to poor 
management is an invitation for a potential takeover. A takeover is 
more likely because the corporation can be bought on the cheap. 
The possibility of takeover via a hostile acquisition such as a 
tender offer or proxy contest creates incentives for managers within 
the firm. These incentives discipline managerial behavior. In a 
takeover, the new owners are likely to replace poorly performing 
managers. Conversely, if management performs well, the stock price 
of the corporation is more likely to rise. This will reduce the 
possibility of takeover of the corporation because the cost of shares 
increases, which reduces the difference between the potential 
arbitrage of current versus potential share price.110 Managers, 
therefore, should keep their jobs when they perform well. 
The theory of the market as a corporate control has been 
supplemented by empirical work. An unwise acquisition bid by 
management can have a negative effect on an acquirer, including the 
 
 108. Except perhaps in authoritarian regimes where bad decision making by executives of 
SOEs might lead to imprisonment or firing squad. 
 109. Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 
110 (1965). 
 110. JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 119 (2008); Daniel R. Fischel, The 
Corporate Governance Movement, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1259, 1264 (1982) (explaining the 
incentives for management to avoid takeovers in the market for corporate control). 
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acquiring firm becoming a future target itself.111 Nevertheless, the 
market for corporate control is far more limited than theory would 
predict. This is due to various legal mechanisms such as poison pills 
and staggered boards that limit the ability to undertake hostile 
takeovers (at least in the United States). These types of defensive 
mechanisms allow management to become entrenched from 
takeovers, which creates inefficiencies as an expense that the 
shareholders must bear.112 
Though control problems will occur even in private firms, these 
distortions are not as severe as those of government owned firms. 
SOEs are not subject to the same sorts of repercussions from bad 
management. Because of government ownership, SOEs do not face 
acquisition threats from firms that may be able to unlock value from 
the firm through better management. Unlike private firms, SOEs do 
not operate under hard budget constraints. Instead, they operate 
under what economists term “soft” budget constraints.113 These 
constraints are “soft” because another institution (in our case, 
another part of government) will pay the shortfall for 
mismanagement of the SOE. Such firms do not fear the negative 
consequences of bad mistakes because even a chronic loss making 
firm will be bailed out by the state. Managers of the SOE will expect 
this external financial assistance and as such, may not undertake the 
types of sound and profitable strategies of private firms. 
2. Equity 
Publicly traded shares of stock provide information on the 
relative state of a firm. The capital markets provide a signal about the 
valuation based on discounted value of profits of a firm, which is 
based on the current and future state of the management team and 
 
 111. Mark L. Mitchell & Kenneth Lehn, Do Bad Bidders Become Good Targets?, 98 J. 
POL. ECON. 372 (1990); Sara B. Moeller, Frederik P. Schlingemann & Rene M. Stulz, Firm 
Size and the Gains from Acquisitions, 73 J. FIN. ECON. 201 (2004). 
 112. JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: PROMISES MADE, PROMISES 
BROKEN 118–126 (2008); Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize 
Firm Value?: Antitakeover Protection in IPOs, 17 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 88–91 (2001) 
(providing a literature review that supports a management entrenchment hypothesis). 
 113. Janos Kornai, The Soft Budget Constraint, 39 KYKLOS 3 (1986); Janos Kornai, Eric 
Maskin & Gerard Roland, Understanding the Soft Budget Constraint, 41 J. ECON. LIT. 1095 
(2003). There are political economy reasons why soft budget constraints exist. They may keep 
social peace, maintain artificially high levels of employment, or respond to political needs to 
subsidize firms. 
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its decisions.114 We assume that the market appropriately prices the 
value of the ownership right. Even, however, if the market does not, 
it is still a better indicator of the value based on performance than 
measures of public sector performance management. SOEs are not 
publicly traded, so they lack this signal of firm performance that 
equity markets provide. 
3. Debt 
Debt is a mechanism to control and measure the performance of 
the firm. If a firm issues debt, there are consequences on firm 
management. Debt reduces free cash flow. This disciplines 
management because there is less money to spend due to the need to 
service the debt. There is also a signaling function to debt. Firms 
that are poorly managed and are in financial difficulty will have a 
poor debt rating. If a firm has a poor debt rating, it will be more 
expensive for a firm to borrow money since the rating will reflect the 
possibility that the debt may not be repaid. Banks frequently review 
credit decisions. Moreover, a credit rating agency such as Moody’s 
and Standard & Poor’s (“S&P”) rate borrowers and update such 
ratings. These regular recalibrations in the market for debt send a 
signal about the health of a given firm. If a firm’s rating were to 
deteriorate, it would signal to the market that the firm has 
undertaken harmful decisions that have increased firm risk. 
There are limits to the amount of trust to place in credit rating 
agencies as gatekeepers to promote better corporate behavior.115 
Subprime mortgages are one such example of the limits. Rating 
agencies may serve as ineffective gatekeepers because they may 
become complacent with bad management if it serves the purpose of 
the rating agencies.116 Put differently, ratings agencies may have 
mixed incentives. Rating agencies receive payment by the issuer of 
 
 114. KENNETH R. FERRIS & BARBARA S. PÈCHEROT PETITT, VALUATION: AVOIDING 
THE WINNER’S CURSE 74 (2002). 
 115. On the role of gatekeepers in the corporate context, see for example, Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Beyond Liability: Rewarding Effective Gatekeepers, 92 MINN. L. REV. 323 
(2007); Merrit B. Fox, Gatekeeper Failures: Why Important, What to Do, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
1089 (2008). 
 116. Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and the 
Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus Enabling Rules, 81 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 329, 342 (2003). 
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the bonds that the agency rates.117 Moreover, rating agencies create 
pressure on the issuers that they rate to purchase ancillary services 
such as pre-rating advice and consultations.118 
There should be a risk premium associated with borrowing 
money for an SOE. Banks should lend at a higher rate of interest to 
SOEs since SOEs are more likely to be poorly managed relative to 
private firms. However, because the government either explicitly or 
tacitly guarantees this debt (which it does not do for most private 
firms), SOEs have an advantage over their private competitors. In 
November 2004, S&P put out a research paper that identified how 
they analyze debt of SOE postal providers. Ratings reflect the 
corporate governance of the SOE and the general supportiveness of 
the regulatory regime to the interests of the SOE.119 
One critical element to S&P’s analysis was to assess the level and 
intensity of state support of the firm. Where relations with the 
government are not seen as arms length and there is a debt 
guarantee, the credit quality of postal providers reflects the rating of 
the underlying government. If there is not such explicit support, 
S&P will examine whether there has been a history of providing 
financial support to other SOEs of that country. Ratings also reflect 
the possibility of privatization and the effect that privatization might 
have on state support. Perversely, the softer the budget, the weaker 
the punishment of a potential low rating because the greater the 
likelihood that the government will bail out the firm of its debt 
obligations. Such ratings reward inefficiency and create perverse 
incentives for SOEs. 
4. Market for managers 
An informal mechanism to reduce agency costs is the reputation 
of managers. Success or failure at a firm would, in theory, affect the 
ability of managers to negotiate their next contract and therefore 
future wages.120 Therefore, reputational consequences may force a 
 
 117. Frank Partnoy, The Siskel and Ebert of Financial Markets?: Two Thumbs Down for the 
Credit Rating Agencies, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 619, 653–63 (1999). 
 118. Arthur R. Pinto, Control and Responsibility of Credit Rating Agencies in the United 
States, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. SUP. 341, 345 (2006). 
 119. Standard & Poor’s, “International Postal Entities: Influence of Government Support 
on Ratings,” Nov. 22, 2004. 
 120. Eugene F. Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288, 
292 (1980). 
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manager to better run a firm to preserve his or her reputation going 
forward. Moreover, for managers at the end of their career, 
reputation still may be an important factor in leaving behind a 
“legacy” at a firm. This is not to suggest that some managers will be 
willing to risk long term reputation for short term gain. Corporate 
scandals such as Worldcom, Enron, and Tyco teach us otherwise.121 
Rather, in a number of cases reputation does serve to limit agency 
cost problems and the Enrons of the world are most likely outliers.122 
In SOEs, managers may be poorly monitored relative to private 
firms. With SOEs, it is more difficult to measure reputation based on 
performance. Because of the lack of external controls such as access 
to the capital markets for equity and debt, it is more difficult to rate 
the performance of managers.123 However, because the firm may not 
be profit maximizing, managers will be secure in their jobs regardless 
of firm performance. Many potential managers will choose careers in 
the private sector rather than the public sector because of greater 
pay, greater potential upside incentives for increased pay and in terms 
of risk taking and innovation. This is not to suggest that other 
excellent people do not choose government service within an SOE 
out of a sense of civic duty or altruistic motivations. Rather, for those 
managers in SOEs who are inferior to their counterparts in private 
firms, there is greater job security.124 With market based 
accountability in private firms, it is easier to fire under-performing 
managers. At SOEs, it is more difficult to fire under-performers 
because standards are not clear or not important. Reputation matters 
little if you have lifetime employment, particularly because of how 
difficult it is to fire government workers relative to private works in 
 
 121. For a theoretical analysis of such scandals, see OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE 
ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS OF CAPITALISM 138 (observing that managers will risk reputation 
“if the immediate gains are large enough and if they cannot be required to disgorge their ill-
gotten gains”). 
 122. HENRY N. BUTLER & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DEBACLE: WHAT 
WE’VE LEARNED; HOW TO FIX IT 37–42 (2006) (articulating the costly compliance costs of 
Sarbanes-Oxley). 
 123. Trebilcock & Iacobucci, supra note 61, at 1428. 
 124. Likewise, privatizing certain government work may create perverse incentives in 
terms of additional management duties for the most capable of government employees. See 
Mary Jane Angelo, Harnessing the Power of Science in Environmental Law: Why We Should, Why 
We Don't, and How We Can, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1527 (2008). 
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many countries. As such, there is less accountability for poor 
performance and less incentive to provide good performance.125 
5. Bankruptcy 
Forced exit through bankruptcy is a potential outcome for a 
poorly managed firm. Bankruptcy is one mechanism by which firms 
exit the market. It is the legal process through which the exit process 
unfolds for financially distressed firms. The risk of bankruptcy and 
possible liquidation forces many firms to undertake less risk because 
of the potential negative consequences of overly risky strategies. In 
contrast to private firms, SOEs generally do not go bankrupt 
(though countries sometimes do).126 The lack of bankruptcy means 
that SOE managers do not face the same constraints as private firms 
for making mistakes. Without the potential specter of bankruptcy, 
SOEs might expand businesses even if there is not a profit making 
case to do so. 
F. Transparency 
Transparency is important both internally within the firm and 
externally to potential investors. The board of directors and 
shareholders need to understand the financial situation of a firm. 
Transparency is a necessary part of improved corporate governance. 
Usually, corporate governance reformers focus on independent 
boards. Yet, as Adams and Ferreira note, “unless boards are given 
better access to information, simply increasing board [outside] 
independence is not sufficient to improve governance.”127 
Transparency plays a critical role because it allows the board to 
evaluate the business situation and provide effective management 
oversight. Increased transparency and effective corporate governance 
work hand-in-hand to monitor managers against shirking and 
stealing.128 Cross country empirical work suggests that improved 
corporate transparency leads to greater efficiency across sectors.129 
 
 125. Where there are good performers at SOEs, these stars may get poached to the 
private sector, which provides greater financial rewards. 
 126. OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY OF 
OECD COUNTRIES 14 (2005). 
 127. Renée Adams & Daniel Ferreira, A Theory of Friendly Boards, 62 J. FIN. 217, 235 
(2007). 
 128. Richard A. Lambert, Contracting Theory and Accounting, 32 J. ACCT. & ECON. 3, 3 
(2001) (“much of the motivation for focusing on objective and verifiable information and for 
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Externally, the market cannot accurately value a firm if there is 
insufficient transparency.130 Transparency in private firms occurs 
through the reporting regime of securities law. A mandatory 
reporting regime reduces monitoring costs.131 Private firms that trade 
in public securities markets utilize transparent reporting to better 
inform investors/owners about the potential quality of management. 
As Cross and Prentice summarize, “The [U.S.] federal securities laws 
are directed at the basic economic problem of investor risk by 
providing some legal guarantee of disclosure (reducing information 
asymmetry risk and transaction costs otherwise required for 
monitoring) and legal recourse for dishonest representations or 
omissions.”132 Nevertheless, a literature review on disclosure suggests 
that the effect of mandatory transparency remains unclear.133 
Transparency exists not only at the level of securities disclosure 
overall, but at the level of audits that firms must undertake as part of 
compliance. With high levels of transparency (whether mandatory or 
voluntary), it is possible to audit a firm to determine if stated results 
are the same as actual results. Auditing provides a mechanism to 
review the books of the firm to ensure that stated performance 
 
conservatism in financial reporting lies with incentive problems”) (italics added); Paul G. 
Mahoney, The Exchange as Regulator, 83 VA. L. REV. 1453, 1455–56 (1997). 
 129. Jere R. Francis, Shawn Huang, Raynolde Pereira & Inder K. Khurana, Does 
Corporate Transparency Contribute to Efficient Resource Allocation?, J. ACCT. RES. 
(forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 5, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1407065); Art 
Durnev, Vihang Errunza & Alexander Molchanov, Predation and Investment Efficiency: Does 
Corporate Transparency Reduce Growth? (McGill Working Paper Group), available at 
http://web.management.mcgill.ca/Art.Durnev/Corporate%20transparency.pdf. 
 130. Donald C. Langevoort, The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 105 MICH. L. 
REV. 1817, 1828–33 (2007); Cary Coglianese, Legitimacy and Corporate Governance, 32 DEL. 
J. CORP. L. 159, 162–66 (2007). 
 131. Frank B. Cross & Robert A. Prentice, The Economic Value of Securities Regulation, 
28 CARDOZO L. REV. 333, 363–64 (2006) (providing the background for disclosure); Robert 
A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How Wise is 
the Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1858–60 (2007) (discussing empirical “literature 
indicat[ing] that capital markets are improved by vigorous securities regulation featuring 
mandatory disclosure requirements, insider trading prohibitions, strong public enforcement, 
and provision of private remedies for defrauded investors”) (citations omitted). 
 132. Cross & Prentice, supra note 131, at 364. 
 133. Christian Leuz & Peter D. Wysocki, Economic Consequences of Financial Reporting 
and Disclosure Regulation: A Review and Suggestions for Future Research (Mar. 2008), 
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1105398 (“Generally speaking, our survey finds a 
paucity of evidence on market wide and aggregate economic and social consequences of 
reporting and disclosure regulation, rather than the consequences of individual firms’ 
accounting and disclosure choices.”) (manuscript at 2). 
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matches actual performance.134 This assumes, of course, that we trust 
auditors.135 In the SOE context, this also assumes that we trust the 
auditing function of auditing firms over the auditing function of 
another part of government, which perhaps we might trust even less. 
Reputational concerns keep the monitoring function of audits higher 
than government audits because of concerns of managers or public 
perception of the role of the auditors. Poorly done audits will not 
lead to repeat business for the auditing firm in the private sector. 
With all the problems of private auditing firms, we still may prefer 
them to audits by other parts of government that may have even 
more reason to manipulate the results to look the “right” way. 
Not all SOEs have strong transparency that allows for internal 
and external control or for an independent audit. Indeed, a common 
problem among SOEs is the lack of transparency. As a World Bank 
report states, “Internal and external financial and non-financial 
reporting is incomplete and inaccurate, does not provide an adequate 
basis for decision-making by boards and executive managers, and 
misleads government owners, legislatures and the public.”136 Because 
of a general lack of transparency of SOEs, it is oftentimes difficult to 
evaluate their costs relative to private firms.137 
III. POSTAL ECONOMICS 
Having addressed corporate governance of both government and 
private firms in the previous section, this section provides an 
overview of the postal sector, which serves as a case study of 
governance concerns of SOEs. The purpose of postal services is to 
deliver mail from one location to another. Because of the recent 
 
 134. Ronald A. Dye, Auditing Standards, Legal Liability, and Auditor Wealth, 101 J. 
POL. ECON. 887, 908 (1993) (explaining how auditing firms price their services); Srikant 
Datar & Michael Alles, The Formation and Role of Reputation and Litigation in the Auditor-
Manager Relationship, 4 J. ACCT. AUDITING & FIN. 401, 401 (1995) (showing that 
“reputation formation by the auditor serves as a substitute for costly contracting, monitoring, 
and litigation by the owner”). But see John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform: The 
Challenge of Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 302 (2004) (arguing that as 
gatekeepers, auditing firms were asleep at the wheel in some rather large and important 
corporate fiascos). 
 135. See Patrick Bolton, Xavier Freixas & Joel Shapiro, The Credit Ratings Game (Bergen 
Meetings Working Paper, 2009), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1342986 (suggesting 
that we have reason to be suspicious of auditing firm reporting). 
 136. Scott, supra note 70, at 4. 
 137. OECD, DRAFT IMPLEMENTATION GUIDE TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY AND 
TRANSPARENCY IN STATE OWNERSHIP 6 (2008). 
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communications revolution, this delivery system may be somewhat 
anachronistic. However, at present, letter mail remains an important 
part of the information infrastructure. The size of the postal sector 
immunized from direct competition (called the “reserve” sector 
because the monopoly is reserved for this sector) varies from country 
to country. The scope of the postal monopoly affects competition in 
the postal market. Additionally, a monopoly in the reserved sector 
may create additional distortions of competition. In some cases, 
revenues from the reserved sector may be used to anti-competitively 
cross subsidize those parts of business in which the post office must 
compete with other providers.138 Firms that have a postal monopoly 
have immunity from competition in their core business. Corporate 
governance seems to be worse in such firms that lack competition, as 
theory would suggest, as the subsequent sections in this Article 
suggest. Postal SOEs compete in related services such as in express 
delivery services, banking, or insurance. 
This section explains the importance of postal services. Then it 
explains why postal services have been treated as a regulated industry. 
Regulation has led to competition issues and various mechanisms in 
which government has distorted the competitive market to favor its 
postal SOEs. This section then provides an overview of corporate 
governance and antitrust of SOE postal firms in a number of 
jurisdictions before providing a more in depth study of both 
corporate governance and antitrust of the United States to provide 
contrasting approaches. 
 
 138. Cross subsidization was one of the chief concerns of the Department of Justice’s 
Antitrust Division in the AT&T decision. United States v. W. Elec. Co., 894 F.2d 1387, 
1391–92 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Trinko seems to suggest that proper regulatory oversight 
diminishes the need for antitrust to address such concerns. Verizon Commc’ns., Inc. v. Law 
Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398 (2004). The concern of potential cross 
subsidization and monopoly leverage also plays out in a European context. Cross subsidization 
between the postal reserve sector and the competitive sector constitutes state aid. Case C-
39/94 SFEI v. La Poste, 1996 ECR I-3547. It may also allow for claims under abuse of 
dominance provisions. Case COMP/35.141, Deutsche Post AG, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 27. Some 
predation may be possible even with private firms that operate in network industries in which 
there is some additional layer of sector regulation. Sector regulation allows the government to 
assist in predation by private firms. Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable 
Television: Implications for Public Policy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 65 (1990) (addressing how 
government distortions created duplicative networks); James C. Miller III & Paul Pautler, 
Predation: The Changing View in Economics and the Law, 28 J.L. & ECON. 495, 500–02 
(1985). 
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A. Importance of Postal and Express Services 
Services have become an increasingly important part of the global 
economy. Services help facilitate increased specialization and scale 
across a number of fields, thus allowing for increased economic 
growth.139 Postal and related services are among the services that 
underpin the functioning of the global economy. They facilitate the 
movement of goods and services both within a country and across 
countries. Recent theoretical work suggests that problems within a 
production chain can have a significant impact on output reduction 
if inputs enter the production chain in a complementary fashion.140 
For example, an increase in productivity in the transportation sector 
will raise the output in capital equipment. This in turn will raise 
output in the transportation sector.141 Where there is a weak link, 
this has dynamic effects on economic development. Bad corporate 
governance and anti-competitive practices in the larger postal sector 
may be such a weak link to a country’s economic development. 
Distortions in this sector may negatively impact the growth and 
development of alternative forms of information systems and 
communication. This is but one such network industry (banking, 
telecom, energy) that has country-wide implications. 
Postal services are among the least competitive network 
industries in the world. Whereas other network industries, such as 
telecommunications and energy, have been liberalized and opened to 
various levels of competition, postal services remain heavily regulated 
statutory monopoly providers in most countries.142 In nearly every 
country, the government has designated a postal monopoly for a 
portion of services that facilitate the movement of products from one 
 
 139. Joseph Francois, Producer Services, Scale, and the Division of Labor, 42 OXFORD 
ECON. PAPERS 715, 715 (1990); James Melvin, Trade in Producer Services: A Heckscher-Ohlin 
Approach, 97 J. POL. ECON. 1180 (1989); Wilfred Ethier & Henrik Horn, Services in 
International Trade, in THE INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND TRADE POLICY 223, 223 (Elhanan 
Helpman & Assaf Razin eds., 1991). 
 140. Charles I. Jones, The Weak Link Theory of Economic Development, 1 (Berkeley, 
Working Paper, 2007) (on file with author). 
 141. Id. at 5. 
 142. Damien Géradin & David Henry, Regulatory and Competition Law Remedies in the 
Postal Sector, in REMEDIES IN NETWORK INDUSTRIES, COMPETITION LAW AND SECTOR-
SPECIFIC REGULATION (Damien Géradin ed., 2004); Charles Kenny, Questioning the 
Monopoly-Supported Postal USO in Developing Countries, in PROGRESS TOWARD 
LIBERALIZATION OF THE POSTAL AND DELIVERY SECTOR (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. 
Kleindorfer eds., 2006). 
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location to another (the “reserved” sector). In a number of cases, the 
postal sector has been immunized directly from antitrust suits. In 
other settings, the postal sector receives implied immunity from 
antitrust suits because of a preference of sector regulation over 
antitrust where sector regulators may not push competition as much 
as an antitrust agency might. There is an extensive literature of 
regulatory capture that explains why sector regulators may behave 
more favorably to the industries they govern.143 
There are also non-antitrust competition policy distortions in the 
postal sector. The very nature of government ownership provides 
advantages such as lower cost of capital or exemptions from paying 
taxes.144 Thus, SOE postal providers may not have the same capital 
costs as private ones because of these indirect government 
subsidies.145 
B. Regulation of Postal Service 
Generally, a sector regulator provides oversight over the 
regulatory aspects of postal services. In some countries, the same 
regulator may provide financial oversight as well as regulatory 
oversight. In other countries, financial oversight may be a function 
of a different government agency than regulatory oversight. A 
complicating factor in postal sector regulation is that sector 
regulators may need to make trade-offs between goals. Postal services 
have two potentially competing goals. One is a market correction 
function that serves the public interest. A country will regulate postal 
services to ensure service where otherwise there would not be 
coverage. Government does this through the use of universal service 
obligations (USOs). A second function of postal regulation is to 
provide services in a way that limits distortions on competition.146 
Because of potential conflicts between these two goals of postal 
 
 143. See, e.g., JEAN-JACQUES LAFFONT & JEAN TIROLE, A THEORY OF INCENTIVES IN 
PROCUREMENT AND REGULATION 475–514 (1993); DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 
III 523 (2003). 
 144. The USPS does not have to pay taxes but private firms do. J. GREGORY SIDAK & 
DANIEL F. SPULBER, PROTECTING COMPETITION FROM THE POSTAL MONOPOLY 2 (1996). 
 145. OECD, REGULATING MARKET ACTIVITIES BY PUBLIC SECTOR, DAF/COMP 36 
(2004). 
 146. Damien Géradin & J. Gregory Sidak, The Future of the U.S. Postal Service: American 
and European Perspectives After the Presidential Commission and Flamingo Industries, 28 
WORLD COMP. L. & ECON. REV. 163 (2005) (explaining competition policy and postal 
services). 
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regulation, situations may arise that may limit rather than create 
societal welfare. One potential effect of this interaction is to destroy 
the impetus to innovate and create new services that allow consumers 
to get goods from one place to another. Another is that the USO 
may be used to achieve anti-competitive ends. With competing 
interests, a sector regulator may not be as effective as an antitrust 
enforcer to improve efficiency. This is particularly true when the 
sector regulator also has the powers of competition enforcement.147 
C. Potential Anti-Competitive Abuses in the Postal Industry 
The postal sector traditionally has been vertically integrated. This 
leads to problems when government liberalizes only parts of the 
postal sector. When a government introduces competition to a 
vertically integrated industry, there are three potential types of anti-
competitive abuses: discrimination, inflated transfer prices, and cross-
subsidization.148 Price discrimination is not in itself a concern of 
antitrust and occurs when a seller charges different prices to buyers 
for the same product or service.149 Price discrimination can take on 
an anti-competitive effect if a postal service can limit access to its 
network or tie its regulated and unregulated services and thus create 
a loss to consumers.150 
A postal monopolist also may use its monopoly in postal services 
to over-charge itself for inputs through transfer-pricing strategies. 
Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of various inputs within the 
same firm for goods and services. As a vertically integrated firm deals 
between affiliates, it can create a situation in which it prefers to deal 
with itself at inflated prices (which it captures through higher rates 
among its regulated customers) rather than deal with unaffiliated 
 
 147. This is not limited to the postal sector. These same concerns appear in many sectors. 
Italy and Brazil are good examples of this point in relation to banking and insurance. Darryl 
Biggar & Alberto Heimler, An Increasing Role for Competition in the Regulation of Banks, 
ICN 22 (2005). 
 148. Timothy J. Brennan, Should the Flamingo Fly? Using Competition Law to Limit the 
Scope of Postal Monopolies, 50 ANTITRUST BULL. 197, 202–04 (2005). 
 149. 3 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 721b, at 262 
(2d ed. 2002). 
 150. For a recent example of this effect, see Italian Authority Probes Activities of Post 
Office for Abuse of Dominance, BNA ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. DAILY, Apr. 29, 2009. 
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providers.151 This anti-competitive self-dealing allows companies to 
subsidize the upstream market or to create a price squeeze on 
downstream competitors. 
Cross-subsidization occurs where a postal incumbent provider 
uses its network inputs in the regulated sector to compete in the 
unregulated sector. However, the postal incumbent allocates all or a 
disproportionate cost of the network to the regulated sector rather 
than the unregulated sector. When a sector regulator or antitrust 
enforcer does not detect this misallocation and remedy it, a postal 
monopolist can utilize an anti-competitive cross-subsidy.152 Because 
of this misallocation of prices, cross-subsidization allows firms in the 
regulated sector that have a monopoly to exclude in the unregulated 
sector. They do so in part by preventing an efficient entrant from 
achieving economies of scope, which the incumbent has in the 
regulated sector because of its designated monopoly.153 
In some cases, the regulated monopolists may have the means to 
price below marginal cost for a sustained period of time and engage 
in predation.154 This is particularly possible in the case of postal 
SOEs.155 Similarly, postal SOEs may be more likely to be able to raise 
the cost of rivals because of the SOEs’ incentive to be a revenue 
maximizer and increase its output and scale. They also may be able 
to effectively shape government regulation to raise rivals’ costs 
directly by creating an expansive reserve sector. Such behavior limits 
the potential economies of scope and scale of potential rivals.156 Part 
V will elaborate on these issues. 
These three types of problems have two types of effects on postal 
and related markets. Directly, they impact the ability of companies to 
enter and compete in a given country through the erection of high 
 
 151. Alexander C. Larson & Steve G. Parsons, An Economic Analysis of Transfer Pricing 
and Imputation Policies for Public Utilities, in INCENTIVE REGULATION FOR PUBLIC 
UTILITIES (Michael A. Crew ed., 1994). 
 152. OECD, INTERNATIONAL PARCEL DELIVERY, OCDE/GD (97)151, 97 (1997). 
 153. David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, Competition Law for State-Owned 
Enterprises, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 479, 511–12 (2003). 
 154. Case COMP/35.141, Deutsche Post AG, 2001 O.J. (L 125) 27. 
 155. On SOE predation, see generally David E.M. Sappington & J. Gregory Sidak, 
Incentives for Anticompetitive Behavior by Public Enterprises, 22 REV. INDUS. ORG. 183, 199 
(2003). 
 156. Id. at 197–98; see J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, PROTECTING 
COMPETITION FROM THE POSTAL MONOPOLY 18–31 (1996) (discussing the Postal Service’s 
statutory monopoly over letter delivery). 
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entry barriers. Anti-competitive behavior also directly impacts 
companies that compete internationally because of the ability of 
SOEs to use cross-subsidies to expand internationally. This allows for 
the export of anti-competitive conduct into other jurisdictions. 
Domestic antitrust institutions in the foreign markets are ill equipped 
to address anti-competitive conduct by foreign postal services 
because of a lack of an effective supra-national regulatory regime 
(except in the case of the EU). Indirectly, there is an even greater 
harm. Market failure due to government intervention that allows for 
anti-competitive conduct affects exporters from both developing and 
developed countries from using a critical part of delivery 
infrastructure to provide fast shipment of goods and services. 
There is a secondary effect of a concentrated postal market due 
to government preferences that favor incumbent postal SOEs. A 
focus on postal national champions may stymie domestic innovation 
from small and medium sized entities (SMEs) both in postal services 
and in the economy overall. In OECD countries, over 95% of all 
firms are SMEs. Of OECD SMEs, 30–60% can be categorized as 
innovative firms.157 A similar percentage of firms within the 
developing world are SMEs.158 If one believes that SMEs are a 
growth engine for the economy, one should be concerned that the 
dynamic effects of SMEs may be limited because of the inability of 
private firms to offer new services and product and service 
innovations to these SMEs.159 Whereas large firms may function well 
in either a good or bad institutional setting, SMEs require high 
quality institutions to allow for competitive entry into markets.160 
D. Problem of Universal Service Obligations 
An often-made argument by postal incumbents is that the postal 
provision requires antitrust immunities, such as a statutory monopoly 
to serve the USO. Under the USO, the postal service provides all 
 
 157. OECD, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises: Local Strength, Global Reach, OECD 
OBSERVER, June 2000, at 1. 
 158. Marta Kozak, World Bank Small and Medium Enterprise Database, INT’L FIN. 
CORP. (IFC) (last updated Jan. 26, 2007), http://rru.worldbank.org/ Documents/other/ 
MSMEdatabase/msme_database.htm. 
 159. Though there is no empirical evidence for this proposition, this is a function of data 
limitations. 
 160. See generally Thorsten Beck et al., Financial and Legal Constraints to Firm Growth: 
Does Firm Size Matter?, 60 J. FIN. 137 (2005) (concluding that the smallest firms are the most 
negatively impacted when financial and institutional development is weak). 
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consumers with mail service, even those for whom it is not profitable 
to provide such a service, such as in rural areas.161 Incumbent postal 
providers argue that liberalization of postal services would allow for 
potential cream skimming of the most profitable customers. Postal 
incumbents, however, would need to continue to serve unprofitable 
routes as part of a USO. This situation would leave an incumbent 
provider with a graveyard spiral of higher costs and forced rate 
increases as all but the unprofitable customers leave the incumbent. 
Such an outcome would result in the end of the cross-subsidy that 
allows for universal service. 
In a number of cases, these concerns are unfounded.162 For 
example, empirical evidence suggests that there is no urban-to-rural 
cross-subsidy by the U.S. Postal Service.163 Therefore, in a world of 
liberalization or privatization, rural service would continue to 
exist.164 This reduces the argument for a monopoly based on the 
need to preserve a USO. The USO argument does not hold for most 
jurisdictions around the world. Experience in other countries 
illustrates that a USO cross-subsidy can be replaced altogether with 
targeted subsidies for low income and other groups.165 In other 
 
 161. In the developing world, a USO may make even less sense because of the cost of the 
postal monopoly model and its effect on sector development. Many consumers in developing 
countries use postal services infrequently, if at all, and a developing world USO will rarely be 
used to help the poor. This makes a USO not sustainable given the lack of scale economies. See 
generally Charles Kenny, Questioning the Monopoly-Supported Postal USO in Developing 
Countries, in PROGRESS TOWARD LIBERALIZATION OF THE POSTAL AND DELIVERY SECTOR 
75 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2006) [hereinafter PROGRESS (Crew & 
Kleindorfer)] (arguing for a “competitive approach involving universal access” for services the 
poor need). 
 162. USOs are used in a number of liberalized regulatory markets, like telecom. 
 163. Robert H. Cohen et al., The Cost of Universal Service in the U.S. and its Impact on 
Competition, in The Proceedings of Wissenschaftliches Institut fur Kommunikationsdienste 
GmbH (WIK) 7th Köenigswinter Seminar on “Contestability and Barriers to Entry in Postal 
Markets” 5 (Draft 2003), 1–2; RICK GEDDES, SAVING THE MAIL: HOW TO SOLVE THE 
PROBLEMS OF THE U.S. POSTAL SERVICE 3 (2003). 
 164. See Robert H. Cohen et al., Rural Delivery and the Universal Service Obligation: A 
Quantitative Investigation, in REGULATION AND THE NATURE OF POSTAL AND DELIVERY 
SERVICES 170–71 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 1993). Similarly, theoretical 
work suggests that there would be no such graveyard spiral in the United States if it were to 
remove the USPS monopoly of letter delivery. See Robert Cohen et al., An Empirical Analysis 
of the Graveyard Spiral, in COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POSTAL AND DELIVERY 
SECTOR 121–22 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2004). See generally Michael A. 
Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, The Welfare Effects of Entry and Strategies for Maintaining the 
USO in the Postal Sector, in PROGRESS (Crew & Kleindorfer), supra note 161, at 359 
(projecting the potential of small welfare gains in the U.S. with the elimination of the USO). 
 165. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 164–66 (2002). 
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markets where postal markets have been liberalized, these countries 
have not abandoned the USO.166 
An uncompetitive postal sector may create incentives for 
politicians to create a large USO fee. One danger of a USO is that 
the fee will be set too high. An overly high USO allows the 
possibility that a postal provider can use funds from an overly 
generous USO to cross-subsidize into the non-reserve market.167 The 
non-reserve or competitive sector includes related services, such as 
express delivery services, where postal providers compete with 
international express services firms, such as FedEx and UPS. Thus, 
anti-competitive conduct of postal services focuses primarily in 
express delivery services, although it also affects hybrid mail services 
and other services offered by postal incumbents, such as banking and 
insurance. The smaller the reserve sector is in a particular country, 
the less likely anti-competitive conduct will spill over into related 
products and services. 
E. Scope and Problem of SOEs in the Postal Sector 
State ownership may reflect a particular problem in postal and 
related services.168 Unlike other network industries, for the most part 
postal services remain in state hands.169 There are unique challenges 
to this sector because of the nature of state ownership and state 
facilitated restraints on competition. SOEs may be more, rather than 
less, likely to make a market less competitive because of their ability 
 
 166. See generally Anna Lundgren, Sustainability of USO in a Liberalized Postal Market, 
in POSTAL AND DELIVERY SERVICES: PRICING, PRODUCTIVITY, REGULATION AND STRATEGY 
75, 84 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2001) (finding that the USO has proven 
to be sustainable in Sweden); Per Jonsson & Sten Selander, The “Real” Graveyard Spiral: 
Experiences from the Liberalized Swedish Postal Market, in PROGRESS TOWARD 
LIBERALIZATION OF THE POSTAL AND DELIVERY SECTOR 359, 359 (Michael A. Crew & Paul 
R. Kleindorfer eds., 2006) (observing that Sweden’s liberalized postal service has not led to a 
“graveyard spiral” as predicted by Crew and Kleindorfer). 
 167. The calculation of break-even costs for the USO is difficult. See generally, e.g., 
Philippe Choné, Laurent Flochel & Anne Perrot, Allocating and Funding Universal Service 
Obligations in a Competitive Market, 20 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 1247 (2000); John C. Panzar, 
Funding Universal Service Obligations: The Costs of Liberalization, in FUTURE DIRECTIONS IN 
POSTAL REFORM 101, 101 (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2001) (arguing that 
any analysis of the cost of a USO must first give careful consideration to an “unsubsidized 
market scenario”). 
 168. OECD, PROMOTING COMPETITION IN POSTAL SERVICES, DAFFE/CLP(99)22 
(1999). 
 169. D. Daniel Sokol, Express Delivery and the Postal Sector in the Context of Public Sector 
Anti-Competitive Practices, 23 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 353, 370 (2003). 
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to use government to erect competitive restraints to the benefit of 
the SOE. This theoretical claim has support from a number of 
empirical studies.170 Similarly, the government as regulator may 
provide preferences to its own SOEs as market participants.171 
Furthermore, where the state is both a market participant and 
regulator, there is little incentive for a postal incumbent to adopt 
new technologies. Indeed, the postal incumbent may try to block 
innovations if they were to facilitate new entry.172 In the U.S. 
context, the USPS attempted to expand its reach to electronic 
services in the early 1980s in order to regulate the precursor to the 
internet. The USPS took steps that could have resulted in e-mail 
falling within the postal reserve monopoly.173 Only FTC competition 
advocacy prevented such an outcome.174 If left to itself, a postal 
incumbent will attempt to increase the scope of its reserved area and 
its mandate, and engage in cross-subsidization in express delivery 
services.175 
IV. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF POSTAL SOES 
This Part provides a descriptive cross-country analysis of SOE 
corporate governance of postal SOEs. It highlights the main features 
of SOE laws and of postal-specific laws in the countries studied. The 
purpose of this series of case studies is to illustrate the various 
permutations that laws take in addressing SOE corporate 
 
 170. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 155, at 199; R. Richard Geddes, Pricing by State-
Owned Enterprises: The Case of Postal Services, 29 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 575, 587 
(2008) (theorizing that SOEs will raise prices in inelastic markets if profits are weighted 
positively). 
 171. See generally Geoff Edwards & Leonard Waverman, The Effects of Public Ownership 
and Regulatory Independence on Regulatory Outcomes, 29 J. REG. ECON. 23, 51 (2006) 
(finding that governments influence regulatory outcomes in favor of SOEs). 
 172. Edward M. Graham, Approaches to Competition Policy, in TRADE RULES IN THE 
MAKING: CHALLENGES IN REGIONAL AND MULTILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS 423 (Miguel 
Rodriguez Mendoza et al. eds., 1999). SOEs also have an incentive to utilize inefficient 
technology to realize incremental costs lower than competitors in the unregulated market. The 
greater the technological inefficiency, the greater the revenue maximization from expanded 
output. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 155, at 195; see also Timothy Brennan, Entry and 
Welfare Loss in Regulated Industries, in COMPETITION AND THE REGULATION OF UTILITIES 
147 (Michael Crew ed., 1990) (arguing that SOEs may use wasteful spending on R&D as a 
deterrent to new entrants). 
 173. JOHN C. HILKE, IMPROVING RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN COMPETITION POLICY 
AND SECTORAL REGULATION ¶ 46 (2006). 
 174. Id. 
 175. GEDDES, supra note 163, at 1. 
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governance. This Part does not examine the very sparse case law 
underlying these laws. Rather, it analyzes the laws on the books to 
understand how the laws address the theoretical distinctions between 
public and private ownership.176 Legal origins do not explain the 
corporate governance of SOEs. 
All countries have transparency provisions and board-level 
governance provisions. On paper it would seem, therefore, that all 
SOEs should have good governance mechanisms. However, the 
amount of transparency varies across countries (not all provide the 
same level of transparency as those firms that are publicly traded on 
the local stock market). Moreover, not all governance is the same. In 
some SOE laws there is a provision for profit maximization and 
board selection reflects this goal. In other countries, board selection 
rewards political favorites, rather than those with management 
experience. In some countries, such as Korea, the postal SOE is 
directly a part of government and has not been corporatized. 
A. Chile 
The Sistema de Empresas Publicas (SEP) that oversees Correos 
Chile sets up a model of corporative governance to attempt efficient 
and transparent oversight. SEP requires Chilean SOEs to make 
information regarding its management publicly available. To do so, 
Chilean SOEs must submit their financial records to external audits. 
To reduce the possibility of self-dealing, the SEP prohibits board 
members from undertaking business decisions that would affect a 
board member’s personal interests.177 It also places limitations on the 
method of financing for the SEP companies.178 The SEP does not 
contain discussion of an efficiency rationale nor does it address issues 
of soft budget constraints. 
Unless otherwise specifically provided in company by-laws the 
Ley de Sociedades Anónimas (Corporations Act) applies only to such 
SEP-managed companies organized as “sociedades anónimas” (e.g., 
Metro S.A., Zofri S.A., Essbio S.A., Aguas Andinas S.A., etc.). Many 
SEP-managed companies were created by law or by a decree with 
force of law (decreto con fuerza de ley) and as such, they have a special 
 
 176. A study of the law as practiced would be helpful but is not possible given the paucity 
of cases. 
 177. SEP art. 8. 
 178. Id. at art. 12. 
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legal status. This law does not apply to Correos Chile. Article 1 of 
DFL 10/1982 that created Empresa de Correos de Chile provides: 
Créase una persona jurídica de derecho público que se denominará 
“Empresa de Correos de Chile.” La Empresa de Correos de Chile 
será un organismo de administración autónoma del Estado, con 
patrimonio propio, que estará sujeta a la fiscalización de la 
Contraloría General de la República. Se regirá por las disposiciones 
del presente decreto con fuerza de ley y sus reglamentos y, en lo no 
previsto en ellos, por la legislación común.179 
Considering the last sentence, some may argue that the Corporations 
Act would apply to Correos. However a more accurate reading of 
“legislación común” would be to make reference to the Civil Code 
and other laws of general applicability. 
Directors of Chilean SOEs must follow rules based on substance 
and procedure of the Law of Joint-Stock Companies and Law of 
Administrative Probity. Under these laws, directors have a duty of 
conduct, loyalty, and honesty. The Law of Administrative Integrity 
establishes the mechanisms for disqualifying a company’s directors, 
as well as requires directors to provide disclosure of potential 
conflicts of interest.180 
The Chilean Postal Law provides additional guidance concerning 
corporate governance.181 The law includes provisions on the role of 
the board of directors and restrictions to prevent self dealing. This 
includes barring members of political parties and unions that have 
related interests with Correos from board positions.182 There is no 
discussion in the law of how to prevent cross-subsidization from the 
monopoly business to competitive related businesses. 
 
 179. Unofficial translation: A legal person of public right is created that will denominate 
“Company of the Post Office of Chile.” The Company of the Post Office of Chile will be an 
organ of independent administration of the State, with its own patrimony, that will be subject 
to the control of the General Contraloría of the Republic. It will be in force by the dispositions 
of the present decree with force of law and its regulations and, those not anticipated in them, 
by the common legislation. 
 180. Ley 19.653 – Probidad Administrativa (Law of Administrative Probity (Integrity)): 
Article 1 (7) specifies the justifications for transparency in administrative procedures. Similarly, 
Ley 19.880 – Procedimiento Administrativo (Law of Administrative Process), discusses how 
administrative procedures are to be carried out, including the principles that guide 
administrative actions (transparency, expediency, and efficiency) and the rights of the public. 
 181. DFL 10, 30–01–1982 as amended by DFL 22, 02–09–2003, available at https:// 
www.correos.cl/empresa/documentos.php. 
 182. Id. at art. 8. 
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B. New Zealand 
The State-Owned Enterprises Act183 (“SOEA”) governs SOEs 
(called “Crown Companies”) in New Zealand. Under Section 4 of 
the Act, the principal objective of an SOE is to be as profitable as 
comparable businesses that are not state owned. This calls into 
question the need for SOEs in the first place. The answer to this 
Section is that the SOE legislation was created as part of a staged 
privatization.184 It was seen as a nod to public opposition to have a 
special statute, rather than to utilize the Companies Act.185 Including 
express language of “good employer” and “social responsibility” in 
Section 4 added just enough differentiation from firms governed by 
the Companies Act to be politically palatable. While these are barely 
justiciable objects, they are greater than the requirements of the 
Companies Act; being a good employer and acting with social 
responsibility are not express objects of ordinary companies. While 
there is nothing in the Companies Act to prevent directors from 
acting as good employers and with social responsibility, there are no 
affirmative duties as such to do that. Collectively, the New Zealand 
SOE regulatory system creates a system with requirements as close to 
that of private firms as possible. To the extent that governance affects 
performance, it should be the case that the performance of New 
Zealand Post should be among the best performing postal SOEs. 
The SOEA provides a number of transparency provisions. SOEA 
Section 14 provides that SOEs must deliver a statement of corporate 
intent to shareholders,186 whereas SOEA Section 15 mandates that 
SOE deliver annual reports, statements of accounts, and dividends.187 
Under SOEA Section 18, shareholders can make requests of other 
information.188 Sector regulation also mandates transparency. 
Crown Company board duties in New Zealand enumerate the 
expectation of ownership by the state including the ability to 
monitor senior management (e.g., the CEO), undertake compliance 
 
 183. Available at http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1986/0124/latest/ 
DLM97377.html. 
 184. Graham Scott, After the Reforms: Some Questions about the State of the State in 
New Zealand, 4 PUB. Q., June 2008, at 3, 6. 
 185. Companies Act 1993, 1993 Public Act No. 105 (N.Z.). 
 186. State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, 1986 Public Act No. 124 § 14(1) (as at 01 Apr. 
2008) (N.Z.). 
 187. Id. § 15. 
 188. Id. § 18. 
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with statutes, increase shareholder value, and create appropriate 
governance structures.189 New Zealand SOEs must also provide 
Statements of Corporate Intent (“SCI”). New Zealand Post provides 
a three year set of plans as part of this SCI. For example, in the SCI 
that covers 2007-2010, New Zealand Post announced that it will 
seek to keep its postal business profitable, grow its Kiwibank 
subsidiary, and increase the profitability of its express services 
business.190 The SCI provides statistical performance targets for New 
Zealand Post for the three years. A special Crown Companies 
Monitoring Advisory Unit monitors the corporate governance and 
performance of SOEs.191 
Board-level governance under the SOEA provides that as 
representatives of the government, ministers can hold shares in an 
SOE.192 This grants Ministers the power to request information. The 
SOEA provides for management oversight by the board through 
directorships. The SOEA defines the role of the director as a person 
who will help SOEs achieve their principal objectives.193 There is 
some specificity as to what these goals are. Moreover, the SOEA 
creates an arms-length relationship in terms of oversight between 
government and NZP by distancing management tasks from political 
control. 
A sector-specific regulatory framework also applies to New 
Zealand Post. The Postal Services Act of New Zealand (“PSA NZ”) 
removed the New Zealand Post’s delivery monopoly on standard 
letters.194 This sector liberalization has increased competition and it 
may be that the corporatized structure of New Zealand Post is a 
reflection of the need for better governance due to the threat of 
greater competition. So long as a company is registered with the 
 
 189. CROWN COMPANY MONITORING ADVISORY UNIT, OWNER’S EXPECTATION 
MANUAL FOR STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES § 8 (2007). 
 190. NEW ZEALAND POST LIMITED, STATEMENT OF CORPORATE INTENT 1 (2007), 
available at https://www.nzpost.co.nz/NZPost/Images/NZPost/PDF/2007StatementOf 
CorporateIntent.pdf. 
 191. The specific functions of this unit include: ownership environment management, 
performance monitoring, issue management, and governance. See generally CROWN COMPANY 
MONITORING ADVISORY UNIT, STATEMENT OF INTENT (2008), available at 
http://www.treasury.govt.nz/publications/abouttreasury/soi/2008-13/09.htm. 
 192. State-Owned Enterprises Act 1986, 1986 Public Act No. 124 § 10 (as at 01 Apr. 
2008) (N.Z.). 
 193. Id. § 5. 
 194. See Postal Services Act 1998, Public Act 1998 No. 2 § 29 (N.Z.), available at 
http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1998/0002/latest/DLM423258.html. 
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Ministry of Economic Development, it can deliver mail. PSA NZ 
allows for the Governor-General to create regulations to require a 
postal operator to provide information on accounting and 
compliance.195 Specifically, PSA NZ requires that postal providers 
disclose information that relates to service, such as price, frequency 
of service, quantity of service, and quality of service. For example, 
PSA Section 55 requires that regulated firms submit information, 
reports, etc., to the regulator to monitor the efficiency and quality of 
postal services that firms provide.196 The Act also requires disclosure 
of financial statements including profit and loss statements and 
balance sheets.197 
C. United Kingdom 
The Postal Services Act of 2000 (“PSA UK”) established the 
Postal Services Commission (Postcomm).198 The Act requires 
universal postal service at a uniform price throughout the UK and 
promotes competition among providers. Postcomm regulates Royal 
Mail (the SOE) through a number of different mechanisms. 
Postcomm sets quality of service standards and imposes financial 
penalties for failing to meet those standards. Postcomm sets the 
framework for Royal Mail’s prices (with an aim to reach efficiency in 
service standards and to reduce barriers to entry for other market 
participants) and intervenes in situations in which Royal Mail does 
not offer access to its network. 
As part of transparency, the Act requires that postal firms send 
copies of annual audited accounts to the Secretary of State.199 PSA 
UK also requires that postal companies make information available 
upon request to the Treasury regarding public sector finance 
issues.200 It also mandates that the Commission exercise oversight 
functions to promote more effective competition.201 To protect 
against anti-competitive conduct by postal providers, Postcomm has 
 
 195. Id. § 60. 
 196. Id. § 55. 
 197. Id. § 60. 
 198. Postal Services Act, 2000, c. 26, Part 1, § 1 (Eng.), available at http://www.opsi. 
gov.uk/acts/acts2000/ukpga_20000026_en_1.htm. 
 199. Id. § 77.  
 200. Id. § 78. 
 201. Id. § 5. 
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investigation powers to oversee conduct.202 Along with investigatory 
powers, Postcomm has the ability to impose financial penalties for 
violations of license conditions.203 PSA UK assigns such penalties 
based on a reasonableness standard, with a maximum penalty of 10 
percent of the turnover of the postal license holder.204 Because of 
concurrent regulation, the Competition Commission can overrule 
any Postcomm decision that the Competition Commission believes 
to be anti-competitive.205 Royal Mail provides an annual report 
including financial details of performance and information about its 
senior leadership.206 
Royal Mail is a public limited company (PLC), which means that 
the Companies Act governs Royal Mail. The Companies Act imposes 
certain obligations upon directors. They include the submission of a 
director’s remuneration report, a duty of loyalty to the company, a 
duty to exercise independent judgment, board authorization, and 
ratification.207 Listing rules create specific procedural requirements to 
ensure transparency and information flow from listed companies.208 
Because of the involvement of a number of different regulators 
(Treasury, Postcomm, Competition Commission) there are fewer 
opportunities for all regulators to be captured by Royal Mail, as 
might be the case with a single regulator that oversees all financial 
and regulatory functions.209 The various UK governance mechanisms 
make SOEs, including Royal Post, accountable in ways similar to 
private firms. The quality of governance should be good relative to 
other countries’ postal SOEs, particularly given increased 
liberalization within the postal sector. 
European postal regulation adds another regulatory dimension to 
accountability and transparency of postal providers in the UK and 
other EU Member States. Under the European Community Postal 
Directive, tariffs applied to the universal service are to be “objective, 
 
 202. Id. § 57. 
 203. Id. § 30–36. 
 204. Id. § 30. 
 205. See http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/our_role/what_investigate/ 
index.htm. 
 206. The Shareholder Executive Annual Report 2007–08, available at http://www. 
shareholderexecutive.gov.uk/publications/pdf/annualreport0708.pdf. 
 207. Companies Act, 2006, c. 46, §§ 170–77 (Eng.). 
 208. See, e.g., United Kingdom Listing Authority Listing Rules § 7.2.1R (Jan. 2005). 
 209. George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. 
SCI. 3 (1971) (explaining capture). 
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transparent, non-discriminatory and geared to costs.”210 Any postal 
provider with universal service obligation needs to create an 
independently verifiable cost accounting system.211 This system must 
provide transparency in accuracy of cost allocation.212 Further EU 
Postal directives articulate with more specificity the nature of 
transparency and costs: 
[P]roportionality . . . should continue to be applied to any 
financing mechanism and any decision in this area should be based 
on transparent, objective and verifiable criteria. In particular, the 
net cost of the universal service should be calculated, under the 
supervision of the national regulatory authority, as the difference 
between the net costs of a designated universal service provider 
operating under a universal service obligation and not operating 
under a universal service obligation. The calculation should take 
into account all other relevant elements, including any market 
benefits which accrue to a postal service provider designated to 
provide universal service, the entitlement to a reasonable profit and 
incentives for cost efficiency.213 
In addition to transparency and proportionality, the EC Postal 
Directive increases the scope for potential competition by opening 
competition within the postal sector.214 This includes a narrowing of 
the weight limit of postal services that can be reserved as part of the 
postal monopoly, as well as price limits.215 
D. Sweden 
The Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (“SCCG”) is a 
non-binding set of recommendations to improve corporate 
governance for stock market companies and some SOEs, including 
the postal provider Posten.216 The SCCG suggests that corporate 
board provide annual financial reports, stock exchange reports, 
 
 210. Directive 97/67/EC, 1998 O.J. (L 15) 26. 
 211. Id. at 29. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Directive 2008/6/EC, 2008 O.J. (L 52) 29 (amending Directive 97/67/EC 1998 
O.J. (L 52) 7). 
 214. Directive 2002/39/EC, 2002 O.J. (L 176) 21. 
 215. Id. at 16–18. 
 216. Swedish Code of Corporate Governance (A Proposal by the Code Group), art. I, § 
1.2 (Apr. 21, 2004), available at http://www.sweden.gov.se/sb/d/4089/a/26296. 
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reports on corporate governance and internal controls.217 The SCCG 
also suggests mechanisms for internal control.218 
Article III, Sections 3.5.1–.6 of the SCCG address board 
procedures. These sections require that firms must provide annual, 
clear, formal work plans and include standard procedures such as the 
establishment of special committees, and evaluations of the 
performance of managers.219 The Division for State Enterprises of 
the Ministry of Enterprise, Energy and Communications applies 
uniform structures for SOE board nomination processes.220 This 
includes an analysis of the SOE’s current board composition and the 
identified needs that new board members should fill.221 Because 
actual needs drive the board nomination process, the quality of 
board members seems to be better than those of SOE board 
members in other countries (at least in postal), merely based on 
biographical sketches provided of board members of other countries 
studied for this Article. The postal regulator is the Swedish Post and 
Telecom Agency. It ensures that postal operators such as Posten 
meet their license conditions. Since 1994, Posten is structured as a 
100 percent state-owned limited liability company.222 
In Sweden, “‘Board members have the same unlimited 
responsibility as board members of privately-owned companies.’”223 
Swedish SOEs hold annual meetings, which are open to the general 
public.224 Like other Swedish companies, SOEs must submit an 
annual report regarding the board’s work in the previous year.225 
Transparency is not merely an issue of corporate governance, but of 
transparency of government more generally: “For state-owned 
companies, the requirement for an open and professional provision 
 
 217. Id. at art. III, §§ 3.5–8. 
 218. Id. at art. III, § 3.7. 
 219. Id. at art. III, §§ 3.5.1–6. 
 220. Maria Vagliasindi, The Effectiveness of Boards of Directors of State Owned Enterprises 
in Developing Countries, 9 (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 4579, 2008). 
 221. Id. 
 222. In Sweden, the regulatory situation becomes more difficult when Posten mergers 
with Post Denmark, in which both governments will hold joint ownership and, presumably, 
joint regulatory oversight. 
 223. OECD, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES: A SURVEY OF 
OECD COUNTRIES 138 (2005) (quoting Aktiebolagslag [ABL] [Swedish Company Act] 
1975:1385 (Swed.)). 
 224. Id. at 102. 
 225. Id. at 100. 
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of information transparency is a question of democracy since the 
companies are ultimately owned by the Swedish people.”226 For this 
reason, the government of Sweden has, since 1999, published an 
annual report for SOEs.227 The Annual Report of State-Owned 
Companies reveals publicly the balance sheet, income statement, 
cash flow and other financial information of Posten.228 The Report 
also announces a profitability target (“10 percent of net profit in 
relation to average shareholder’s equity”).229 If SOEs have a 
governance structure and set of duties and reporting requirements 
similar to private firms, one must ask why have them state-owned at 
all, at least in those industries that can be competitive. As with New 
Zealand, corporate governance that is very similar to private firms 
suggests that Swedish SOEs and Swedish Post as a case study should 
have among the best governance and performance outcomes of 
postal SOEs. 
E. South Africa 
In South Africa, SOEs are subject to the same legislation as 
privately owned companies, such as the Companies Act.230 Under 
Section 33 of the Companies Act, companies must file an annual 
transparency and accountability report.231 This entails submitting 
yearly financial statements.232 The current Companies Act is general 
legislation regulating companies but does not distinguish between 
state-owned and other companies.233 The new Companies Bill of 
2008 does make the distinction between state-owned and other 
companies but no distinction is made in the context of corporate-
governance rules.234 For example, the Bill codifies fiduciary duties—
duty of loyalty and duty of care.235 These duties, however, apply to 
 
 226. Id. at 98 (quoting Annual Report State-Owned Companies 2003, (Regeringskansliet, 
Sweden), June 2004 at 17). 
 227. Annual Report State-Owned Companies 2007, (Regeringskansliet, Sweden), Oct. 
2008, at 11. 
 228. See id. at 66. 
 229. Id. at 68. 
 230. Companies Act 61 of 1973. 
 231. Id. at § 33. 
 232. Id. 
 233. See id. §§ 2, 19. 
 234. Compare Companies Bill, 2008, Bill 61-2008 (GG), § 9, with part F. 
 235. Id. § 76. 
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all companies.236 In practice, the duties might not always be the 
same. 
The Postal Services Act237 provides that there must be fair 
competition within the postal industry. South Africa Post may have a 
business rationale other than profit. Supporting the lack of profit 
rationale for South Africa Post is explicit language in the Postal Act 
that grants a possible yearly subsidy for South Africa Post.238 
According to the Postal Industry Code of Practice, postal operators 
cannot engage in unfair pricing.239 However, this does not seem to 
refer to predatory pricing. Rather it refers to price discrimination. 
The postal regulator must regulate to provide “equal access for all 
citizens.”240 Among the other mandates under the Postal Act is to 
promote stability.241 Such functions make it more difficult for postal 
operators to pursue a profit strategy.242 Indeed, the law explicitly 
provides for annual subsidies to postal providers.243 Though the 
subsidies must be on specific terms, there is no policing function 
enumerated in the law to prevent a postal company from anti-
competitive cross-subsidization. 
In terms of transparency, the King II Report on Corporate 
Governance mandates formal and transparent procedures for board 
of director nominations.244 Other parts of the Report focus on such 
corporate governance issues as reporting, accounting and auditing, 
and compliance and enforcement. South Africa Post uses an 
independent auditor for a review of its financials.245 
Overall corporate governance provisions for SOEs and for South 
Africa Post are weaker than in other countries that have standards 
akin to those of private firms. For political reasons, South Africa has 
 
 236. Id. 
 237. Postal Services Act 124 of 1998. 
 238. Id. § 29. 
 239. POST OFFICE, CODE OF PRACTICE (FOR SOUTH AFRICAN POSTAL INDUSTRY), 
available at http://www.sapo.co.za/Documents/Code%20of%20Practice%20FINAL.pdf. 
 240. Postal Services Act, § 8. 
 241. Id. § 2(k). 
 242. See id. § 8(1)(f). 
 243. Id. § 29(1). 
 244. KING COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF THE 
KING REPORT 2002, 23 ¶ 2.2.2, available at http://www.nfcgindia.org/kingcommittee 
2002.htm. 
 245. Most recently, the external auditor was KMPG. See POST OFFICE, SOUTH AFRICAN 
POST OFFICE ANNUAL REPORT 2007, 34–35, available at http://www.sapo.co.za/AboutUs/ 
Post%20Office%20AR%20ACC_36432.pdf. 
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chosen to maintain a soft budget constraint, and this should affect 
the overall governance of SOEs. 
F. Canada 
The Canada Post Corporation Act transformed the Canadian 
Post Office Department into a government owned corporation 
(Crown Corporation) in 1981.246 Sections 151 and 152 of the 
Financial Administration Act of 1984 mandate an annual report to 
parliament on the status of Crown Corporations.247 This report 
provides a brief summary of each of the Canadian SOEs, including 
Canada Post.248 Auditing of Canada Post occurs both from a 
government auditor (Auditor General of Canada) and an outside 
auditor (KPMG).249 Canada Post produces an annual report that 
includes consolidated financial statements.250 Nevertheless, 
government reports suggest that there are problems in the corporate 
governance of Canadian SOEs.251 
To ensure the quality of oversight and decision-making of the 
board, the board of Canada Post undertakes regular self-assessment 
surveys. There is a specific corporate governance committee for the 
board. Criteria for joining the board suggest that members hold 
certain skills. A review of the current board shows that board 
members have a number of different backgrounds that potentially 
could bring value to the board. Moreover, the board process is a 
continuous one in that there are opportunities for board members to 
receive additional training opportunities to improve the skills of 
board members.252 
The Canada Post Corporation Act specifies goals about service 
but does not establish an efficiency goal.253 However, Canada Post is 
required to earn a “reasonable” rate of return on equity in a 
 
 246. Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C 10, §§ 1–34 (1985). 
 247. Financial Administration Act, R.S.C., ch. F 10, §§ 151–52 (1984). 
 248. See, e.g., TREASURY BOARD OF CANADA SECRETARIAT, CROWN CORPORATIONS 
AND OTHER CORPORATE INTERESTS OF CANADA 2007, § 2.4, available at http://www.tbs-
sct.gc.ca/reports-rapports/cc-se/2007/cc-setb-eng.asp. 
 249. Id. 
 250. See, e.g., Canada Post, 2007 Annual Report 86–122, available at http://www. 
canadapost.ca/corporate/about/annual_report/pdf/en/Full_ARs/AR_2007_Eng.pdf. 
 251. See OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GENERAL OF CANADA, 2000 DEC. REPORT ch. 18, 
cited in OECD, supra note 223, at 97. 
 252. Id. 
 253. See Canada Post Corporation Act, R.S.C., ch. C 10, § 5 (1985). 
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“commercial” environment, which suggests a profit motive of some 
sort.254 The Act provides typical rules about who can serve as 
members of the board of directors and the length of time of 
service.255 Nevertheless, there are no provisions that explicitly address 
the potential for anti-competitive cross subsidization.256 Academic 
work suggests that Canada Post remains relatively inefficient. 
Competitors complain, for example, of various government-created 
barriers to entry.257 
Canada Post is a case of a firm that is corporatized but not to the 
extent of SOEs in Sweden or New Zealand. Because of its monopoly 
position and state ownership, it takes advantage of a soft budget 
constraint.258 This permits Canada Post to create regulatory barriers 
to entry and to otherwise raise the costs of its rivals. 
G. Korea 
There are three different types of SOEs in Korea: Government 
Enterprises, Government-Invested Enterprises, and Government-
Funded Enterprises. Korea Post is a Government Enterprise, which 
means that it is a government entity (unlike the other forms of 
SOE), and the government runs Korea Post like any other 
government department under Korea’s Ministry of Knowledge 
Economy. This status means that Korea Post lacks managerial 
autonomy that other SOE forms provide. The general regulation 
over enterprises under governmental control is based upon the “Act 
 
 254. CANADA POST CORPORATION STRATEGIC REVIEW SECRETARIAT, CONSULTATION 
GUIDANCE DOCUMENT, § 4.a.4 (2008), available at http://www.cpcstrategicreview-
examenstrategiquescp.gc.ca/CGD-eng.PDF. 
 255. See Canada Post Corporation Act, § 6. 
 256. Because of the lack of a domestic solution, these issues came to play in a NAFTA 
arbitration claim brought by UPS Canada against Canada Post. Although UPS Canada made a 
number of claims about unfair competition, essentially arguing anti-competitive cross 
subsidization from the postal reserve to the express delivery sector, the NAFTA tribunal ruled 
in favor of Canada Post primarily on the grounds of Canada Post operating based on 
commercial, rather than government, interest. The decision made a number of assumptions on 
government decision-making that were not accurate, as the dissent by Ron Cass pointed out. 
See United Parcel Service of America, Inc. v. Government of Canada, International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes, Award on the Merits for an Arbitration under Chapter 11 
of the North American Free Trade Agreement (June 11, 2007), available at 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/assets/pdfs/ 
MeritsAward24May2007.pdf. 
 257. Edward M. Iacobucci, Michael J. Trebilcock & Tracey D. Epps, Rerouting the Mail: 
Why Canada Post is Due for Reform, 243 C.D. HOWE INST. COMMENT. 1, 17–19 (2007). 
 258. Id. at 19–22. 
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on the Management of Public Agencies.” A corporation in which the 
Korean government has more than 50 percent equity is subject to 
the Act. Regulations under the Act include appointment and 
dismissal of the board members, disclosure, and monitoring/audit of 
the corporation. The government also provides detailed rules on 
accounting. 
In some sense, Korea Post board functions include many of the 
functions typical of private firms. Such functions include, for 
example, acquisitions of assets and operational duties involving 
budget, finance, and operations.259 Korea Post publishes an annual 
report that contains balance sheet information and other information 
regarding the strategy of Korea Post, including metrics.260 
Under the Postal Service Act, the Minister of Information and 
Communication oversees the organization for the delivery of mail 
across the country.261 Transparency provisions are not listed. 
Moreover, there are no explicit safeguards against anti-competitive 
conduct. 
Korea recently enacted a Special Law on the Governance of 
Korea Post.262 Some sections of the Act address the issue of the 
effectiveness of management, including sections on management 
autonomy and the creation of an evaluative oversight committee 
within the Ministry of Knowledge Economy to ensure that Korea 
Post is run effectively.263 Oversight duties of this committee within 
the government include standard board functions such as oversight 
of financial affairs and management results.264 To ensure transparency 
and accountability, the findings of the committee must be published. 
Similarly, to address issues of internal control, the head of Korea 
Post must develop an annual management plan for approval of the 
Ministry of Knowledge Economy with objective criteria for 
measuring the success of Korea Post.265 The lack of corporatization 
 
 259. OECD, supra note 223, at 139, table 6.4 (citing Framework Act on the 
Management of Government-Invested Institutions (as amended Jan. 28, 2000), art. 9 
(Korea)). 
 260. See, e.g., KOREA POST, ANNUAL REPORT 2008, available at http://www. 
koreapost.go.kr/eng/news/annual_report.jsp. 
 261. Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions (as 
amended Jan. 28, 2000), art. 2 (Korea). 
 262. Enacted Jan. 30, 2009. 
 263. Framework Act on the Management of Government-Invested Institutions, art. 3–4. 
 264. Id. at art. 5(a). 
 265. Id. at art. 6(a). 
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suggests that a soft budget constraint limits the effectiveness of 
corporate governance provisions. 
H. Japan 
The Japanese government “privatized” Japan Post in October 
2007. In fact, what occurred was a corporatization of Japan Post 
rather than a privatization. This is seen as a first step to eventual 
privatization.266 
Japan Post Group is comprised of five corporations: Japan Post 
Holdings Co., Ltd. (“Holdings”), Japan Post Network Co., Ltd. 
(“Network”), Japan Post Service Co., Ltd. (“Service”), Japan Post 
Bank Co., Ltd. (“Bank”), and Japan Post Insurance Co., Ltd. 
(“Insurance”). Holdings is the holding company and sole 
shareholder (100%) of the other four corporations. The Minister of 
Finance is the sole shareholder (100%) of Holdings. Network 
provides customer services in postal, banking, and insurance 
operations commissioned by Service, Bank, and Insurance. It 
maintains 24,000 post offices. Service engages in postal services, 
including domestic and international mail. Bank, as its name 
suggests, engages in banking services. Likewise, Insurance provides 
life insurance. It has its own outlets, but primarily provides its 
services through Network’s post offices. 
Holdings has adopted the “Committee System” under the 
Companies Act, which requires a Nomination Committee, Audit 
Committee, and Compensation Committee within its Board of 
Directors.267 From the standpoint of board independence, a majority 
of committee members must be appointed from among the outside 
directors. In terms of oversight over directors and management, the 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications consults with the 
Ministry of Finance when approving matters provided under the 
Japan Post Holdings Corporation Act. This includes provisions such 
as Section 8(1) (solicitation of subscribers of share for subscription 
or share option for subscription, or delivery of share or share option 
in share exchange), Section 10 (annual business plan), and Section 
 
 266. See Japanese Government-sponsored study, “The Committee on Japan Post 
Privatization,” (determining how to proceed with the liberalization of Japan Post), available at 
http://www.yuseimineika.go.jp/iinkai/dai51/51gijisidai.html (Japanese). 
 267. Companies Act of Japan § 2(12). Unofficial English version available at http:// 
www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/CA1_4_2.pdf. 
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11 (amendment of the corporate charter, dividend, a merger, a 
company split, and a dissolution of the corporate).268  
Regarding transparency, Holdings and Service must submit their 
balance sheets, profit and loss statements, and business reports 
within three months after the end of the business year to the 
Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications.269 The 
Corporations law requires an annual meeting. Under this law, 
Holdings and Service must provide public notice of the balance sheet 
and profit and loss statement after the conclusion of the annual 
shareholders meeting.270 Balance sheets, profit and loss statements, 
and business reports are not made public. Of course, private 
corporations are not required to make such documents public, but 
Japan Post, though “privatized,” is not yet a private corporation. As 
it still has universal service obligations, elements of Japan Post enjoy 
the benefits afforded a government monopoly but does not incur the 
obligations to make public its internal financial policies and practices, 
nor is it obligated to make transparent the process that governs the 
approval process required when Japan Post enters new business 
ventures. In other words, the processes referred to above are 
transparent only for those within The Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications and Japan Post. 
The duties of directors in terms of duties of care271 and loyalty 
are the same as for private corporations under the Corporate Act. 
However, there is no explicit mandate to operate differently than 
publicly traded firms (i.e., to maximize profits). Rather, the only 
mandate on the Postal Act is for Service to maintain universal postal 
service.272 These statutory requirements make Japan Post behave 
more like private firms. However, unlike New Zealand, there is no 
explicit limit to the soft budget constraint. 
I. United States 
The Postal Accountability and Enhancement Act (the “Act”) 
provides the structure of government oversight of the U.S. Postal 
Service (“USPS”) in the United States. Corporate law is a hybrid of 
 
 268. Japan Post Holdings Corporation Act § 16. 
 269. Japan Post Holdings Corporation Act § 12; Japan Post Service Corporation Act § 
10. 
 270. Companies Act of Japan § 440. 
 271. Corporate Act of Japan § 330; Civil Code of Japan § 644. 
 272. Postal Act of Japan § 70. 
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state and federal law.273 Federal SOEs do not have to incorporate 
under state incorporation laws. Because of the lack of state 
incorporation, corporate governance of SOEs is distinct from that of 
private firms. 
The Act was a significant transformation for postal regulation in 
the United States. To solve the problem of the USPS not being a 
profit maximizing entity, the Act made explicit the need to push for 
greater efficiency. Along these lines, the Act treats the USPS more 
like private firms. To provide for disclosure like private corporations, 
the USPS needs to file quarterly reports containing the information 
that the SEC requires under the 1934 Act274 for 10-Qs275 with the 
Postal Regulatory Commission. Similarly, the USPS must file 
information that the SEC requires in annual reports for 10-Ks and 8-
Ks with the Postal Regulatory Commission.276 It also must comply 
with Sarbanes Oxley requirements and provide detailed financial 
reporting.277 
If on the books the USPS looks like a private firm, in practice 
these similarities begin to vanish. USPS Board members are not 
individuals with significant private sector experience, especially not in 
large and sophisticated logistics, distribution, supply chain 
management, or regulated industries. Some have previous experience 
with the postal service, but none would have the skill set or 
connections one would want on the board of a private competitor 
such as UPS or Fed Ex. It is a warning sign about the quality of 
governance that over half of the USPS board members are politically 
connected lawyers and other operatives. The following chart 
illustrates the difference in the quality of board composition between 
USPS and its competitors among independent directors. Not 
surprisingly, when there is greater accountability to shareholders 
because of profit concerns, there are higher quality members of the 




 273. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1 (2009). 
 274. 15 U.S.C. § 78m, 78o(d) (2006). 
 275. 39 U.S.C. § 3654(a)(1)(A) (2006). 
 276. Id. § 3654(a)(1)(B) & (C). 
 277. Id. § 3654(a)(2); id. §3654(a)(3)(B). 
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CHART 1: OUTSIDE DIRECTORS COMPARISON 
USPS UPS Fed Ex 
Carolyn Lewis Gallagher 
(former CEO of Texwood 
Furniture) 
Duane Ackerman (former 
Chairman, BellSouth) 
James L. Barksdale 
(Chairman and President, 
Barksdale Management 
Corporation) 
Louis J. Giuliano (former 
CEO of ITT) 
Michael J. Burns (former 
Chairman and CEO, Dana 
Corporation) 
John A. Edwardson 
(Chairman and CEO, 
CDW Corporation) 
Mickey D. Barnett (lawyer) Stuart E. Eizenstat (lawyer, 
former senior government 
official) 
Judith L. Estrin (CEO 
JLABS, LLC) 
James H. Bilbray (lawyer 
and former Congressman)  
Michael L. Eskew (former 
chairman and CEO, UPS) 
J.R. Hyde III (Chairman 
GTx, Inc.) 
Thurgood Marshall, Jr. 
(lawyer) 
William R. Johnson 
(Chairman and CEO, H.J. 
Heinz) 
Shirley A. Jackson 
(President, Rensselaer 
Polytechnic Institute) 
James C. Miller III (former 
senior government official) 
Ann M. Livermore (Exec. 
VP, Hewlett-Packard) 
Steven R. Loranger 
(Chairman and CEO, 
ITT Corporation) 
Ellen C. Williams (lobbyist, 
former government official) 
Rudy Markham (former 
CFO, Unilever) 
Gary W. Loveman 
(Chairman and CEO, 
Harrah’s Entertainment) 
 John W. Thompson (former 
CEO, Symantec) 
Susan C. Schwab (former 
senior government official) 
 Carol Tome (CFO, Home 
Depot) 
Joshua I. Smith (Chairman 
and Managing Partner, 
Coaching Group, LLC) 
  David P. Steiner (CEO, 
Waste Management) 




Historically there has been a problem of an ineffective regulator 
of the postal service. Empirical evidence shows that anti-competitive 
cross-subsidization occurred under the old postal regulatory 
regime.278 The old regulator, the Postal Rate Commission, was an 
inadequate regulator that could not adequately check on anti-
competitive practices of the USPS. The old Postal Rate Commission 
lacked the subpoena power over the USPS and the ability to 
mandate that the USPS provide it with data; whatever data the 
Commission received came voluntarily from the USPS.279 This 
 
 278. See generally Geddes, supra note 170, at 575. 
 279. See R. Richard Geddes, Reform of the U.S. Postal Service, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 217, 
219 (2005). 
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differed from most other U.S. federal agencies at the time. More 
importantly, the lack of subpoena power created information 
asymmetries between the USPS and its regulator, which the USPS 
could and did exploit to limit competition.280 The new Act corrects a 
number of these deficiencies. There is now the authority to issue 
subpoenas.281 Anti-competitive cross-subsidization from the reserve 
to the competitive sector is no longer permitted.282 As a result of the 
Act, the USPS is subject to antitrust laws.283 This reflects a legislative 
change as a response to the United States Supreme Court’s decision 
in United States Postal Service v. Flamingo Industries discussed 
below.284 One of the explicit goals of the new regulator, the Postal 
Regulatory Commission, is “[t]o allocate the total institutional costs 
of the Postal Service appropriately between market-dominant and 
competitive products.”285 Appropriate cost allocation will reduce the 
opportunity for the USPS to engage in anti-competitive cross-
subsidization as it has done in the past. As part of this mandate, the 
legal mandate is that “each class of mail or type of mail service bear 
the direct and indirect postal costs attributable to each class or type 
of mail service through reliably identified causal relationships plus 
that portion of all other costs of the Postal Service reasonably 
assignable to such class or type.”286 If followed, this type of cost 
accounting would do much to protect against potential anti-
competitive cross-subsidization. Moreover, the Act explicitly limits 
this anti-competitive cross subsidy in terms of setting rates: 
§ 3633. Provisions applicable to rates for competitive products 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The Postal Regulatory Commission shall, 
within 18 months after the date of enactment of this section, 
promulgate (and may from time to time thereafter revise) 
regulations to— 
(1) prohibit the subsidization of competitive products by 
market-dominant products; 
 
 280. See supra note 236 (providing evidence of cross-subsidization). 
 281. 39 U.S.C. § 504(f)(2)(A) (2006). 
 282. 39 U.S.C § 3633(a) (2006). 
 283. 39 U.S.C § 409(e)(1)(B) (2006). 
 284. 540 U.S. 736 (2004). 
 285. 39 U.S.C § 3622(b)(9) (2006). 
 286. Id. § 3622(c)(2). 
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(2) ensure that each competitive product covers its costs 
attributable; and 
(3) ensure that all competitive products collectively cover what 
the Commission determines to be an appropriate share of the 
institutional costs of the Postal Service.287 
These explicit prohibitions suggest governance mechanisms to solve 
some of the worst competition problems. It is too early to tell 
whether the law will prove effective, but on paper this is certainly an 
improvement over the previous internal and external governance of 
the USPS. 
Competition concerns remain a problem. Like many countries, 
the United States provides a statutory monopoly for mail. The USPS 
has the ability to shape the definition of what can be included in the 
protected sector through size and weight restrictions. The USPS has 
a lower cost of capital than potential private firm competitors 
because of government credit guarantees. Unlike private firms, the 
USPS has the power of eminent domain and self zoning. This 
suggests that soft budget constraints remain, even with the changes 
under the Act. 
An FTC report estimates that the value of government subsidies 
that the USPS allocates to competitive products by virtue of its 
government status to be in the range of $38 million to $113 million. 
The various implicit subsidies include such categories as not having 
to pay parking tickets or tolls.288 The FTC Report does not impute 
some critical categories in terms of advantages for the postal service 
in the competitive sector. For example, it does not impute the 
reduced cost of capital due to what is effectively a U.S. government 
guarantee that determines the USPS rate for debt.289 Moreover, the 
report does not impute the value of the postal monopoly as one of 
the benefits of the USPS. 
This is not to suggest that there are not costs associated with 
being the USPS. The FTC estimates that the current legal regime 
imposed costs on the USPS of $213 to $743 million higher than 
costs might be otherwise if it did not have these extra costs 
 
 287. 39 U.S.C § 3633(a). 
 288. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWS THAT APPLY 
DIFFERENTLY TO THE UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE AND ITS PRIVATE COMPETITORS 57 
(2007), http://www.ftc.gov/os/2008/01/080116postal.pdf. 
 289. Id. at 58. 
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associated with its government mandate.290 These numbers only tell 
part of the story as the FTC provides the disclaimer: “This range is 
based only on estimates of those burdens and benefits that we have 
been able to quantify.”291 However, the FTC does not seem to 
adjust costs based on an accurate baseline. A firm that had a profit 
maximizing mission would not be in the same situation as the USPS; 
it would not have a bloated labor pool that would account for 80 
percent of costs, which is out of line with other postal providers.292 
Most importantly, the current USPS obligations under law exist 
because of the lack of competition. The government has foreclosed 
competition, which saddles the USPS with various regulatory 
obligations that a more efficient competitor could provide. Injecting 
competition and more market pressure to the U.S. Postal market 
should lead to efficiency gains. Thus, an accounting of the implicit 
subsidies would make the USPS a more efficient firm and force it to 
behave more like a private firm. This would also require the USPS to 
act more like a private firm in its corporate governance. A reduction 
or elimination of the postal monopoly could be the impetus for a 
transformative change at the USPS far more than what the Postal 
Accountability Act has created. While it may be possible under 
current U.S. law for a test that imputes these costs to determine the 
true costs, the Postal Rate Commission has yet to devise it.293 
V. COMPETITION AND SOES 
Ex ante, the competition issues involving SOEs can be addressed 
somewhat by corporate governance in terms of structuring the 
incentives of a firm to behave more like private firms, with an 
efficiency rationale. Without soft budget constraints, an SOE cannot 
get away with predatory pricing so easily. Ex post, competitive 
distortions can be solved through antitrust, which provides the 
potential of relief against anti-competition abuses. 
A. Incentives for SOE Anti-Competitive Behavior 
Competition is the foundation for a market economy. Market 
competition profoundly affects firms by eliminating inefficient 
 
 290. Id. at 64. 
 291. Id. at 64 n.287. 
 292. Id. at 80. 
 293. 39 U.S.C. § 3633 (2006). 
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firms.294 Moreover, it can make the monitoring of firms more 
effective.295 
Governments may erect many types of regulatory barriers to limit 
competition.296 For example, bias by the government to protect 
SOEs may take the form of favorable lending rates vis-à-vis private 
firms. SOEs therefore may have a different cost of capital than do 
private firms. This may have an effect of an implicit subsidy for 
SOEs. Government may open its purse to provide for lower 
borrowing rates than market rates. SOEs also may benefit from 
discriminatory regulation. SOEs may not be required to pay taxes or 
may be immune from antitrust. Moreover, SOEs may benefit from 
information asymmetries. Information asymmetries occur where 
SOEs have data that private competitors do not where the 
government collects the data. An SOE can use its economies of 
scope to create high barriers to entry that effectively forecloses 
competition by efficient competitors.297 Because of cost structure and 
incentives of an SOE, SOEs are more successful in their attempts to 
prevent foreign entry than similarly situated private firms.298 This 
Part will explain the postal competition issues present in antitrust 
with the twist that the firms involved in potential anti-competitive 
conduct are SOEs. Because of the soft budget constraint, SOEs do 
not face the same sorts of costs that private firms do in an antitrust 
inquiry. Thus, as this Part will demonstrate, it is possible for SOEs to 
engage in predatory pricing without fear of antitrust liability based 
on existing antitrust methodologies. Likewise, this Part will show 
that it is possible for SOEs to engage in behavior that raises rivals’ 
 
 294. See Armen A. Alchian, Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic Theory, 58 J. POL. 
ECON. 211 (1950). 
 295. See generally Edward P. Lazear & Sherwin Rosen, Rank-Order Tournaments as 
Optimum Labor Contracts, 89 J. POL. ECON. 841 (1981); Barry J. Nalebuff & Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Prizes and Incentives: Towards a General Theory of Compensation and Competition, 14 
BELL J. ECON. 21 (1983) (applying tournament theory of who to promote). 
 296. See Eleanor M. Fox, Economic Development, Poverty, and Antitrust: The Other Path, 
13 SW. J. L. & TRADE AM. 101, 114 (2007); William E. Kovacic, Lessons of Competition Policy 
Reform in Transition Economies for U.S. Antitrust Policy, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 361, 401 
(2000); Timothy J. Muris, Principles for a Successful Competition Agency, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 
165, 170 (2005). 
 297. John C. Panzar, Interactions Between Regulatory and Antitrust Policies in a 
Liberalized Postal Sector, 5 (Northwestern Univ., Univ. of Auckland, Working Paper, 2008). 
 298. Anusha Chari & Nandini Gupta, Incumbents and Protectionism: The Political 
Economy of Foreign Entry Liberalization, 88 J. FIN. ECON 633 (2008). 
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costs with reduced risk of effective antitrust prosecution than 
similarly situated private firms. 
1. Revenue maximization as an SOE goal 
Because of the soft budget constraint, SOEs may have goals 
other than profit maximization such as revenue maximization.299 
Government support of SOEs through government created 
distortions (e.g., a large reserve sector, implicit loan guarantees, 
preferences for zoning) allows SOEs to price below its marginal cost 
due to the explicit and implicit subsidies that governments grant 
SOEs and not their private competitors. This creates a situation, 
unlike the typical U.S. antitrust predation case, which does not 
require recoupment for successful SOE predation.300 
In the postal context the concern is that the postal incumbent 
can exclude based on an anti-competitive cross subsidy to the 
competitive sector from the reserve sector and not have to recoup 
costs because of the soft budget constraint. The ability of SOEs to 
engage in non-recoupment predatory pricing poses an important 
question. If consumers do not see higher prices as a result of the 
predation, is there any consumer harm? When an SOE can pursue a 
successful predation strategy, this reduces the resources of a 
competitor to innovate or operate. The “but for” case is that there 
might have been even lower prices and more innovation. Successful 
predation also may have reputational effects if a firm competes in 
multiple product markets. This reputational effect creates a credible 
threat that allows firms to reap the benefits of predation even in 
markets in which they did not predate. This in turn negatively affects 
the overall market. Paul Milgrom explains: 
Thus, for example, a firm in an industry with rapid product change 
might cut prices sharply in answer to new entry in order to 
discourage the new entrant from continuing an active product 
development programme. Whether the entrant attributes its lack of 
profitability to its high costs, to weak market demand, to 
overcapacity in the industry, or to aggressive behaviour by its 
 
 299. See JOHN R. LOTT, JR., ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE? WHO SHOULD 
THE COURTS BELIEVE? 77 (1999) (“[G]overnment enterprises also face higher returns from 
below-cost pricing since they benefit not only from the long-term reduction in competition, 
but also from the short-term increase in their output required to undertake the below-cost 
pricing strategy.”). 
 300. See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 153, at 522–23. 
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competitor, it will properly reduce its estimate of its future profits. 
If its capital has other good uses, this might lead it to withdraw 
from the industry. If not, it may nevertheless be dissuaded from 
making new investments in and developing new products for the 
industry. At the same time, other firms may be deterred from 
entering the industry. If any of these things happen, the predator 
benefits.301 
When predator firms benefit, this reduces consumer 
welfare.302 Predation must be distinguished from raising a rival’s 
cost.303 Predation in non-SOE settings requires antitrust officials 
to think about short run benefits versus long run costs. In raising 
the cost of rivals, the goal is to increase the price of output for 
rivals rather than decrease price. A successful raising of a rival’s 
cost strategy would be one in which the dominant firm’s average 
costs increase less than the incremental costs of a rival. This 
allows a dominant firm to create an asymmetric impact on costs 
relative to its rivals.304 
The ultimate goal of raising a rival’s cost is different than 
predation. A successful raising rival’s cost strategy does not require 
the firm with higher costs to exit the market, but merely to allow the 
dominant firm to raise its price above the competitive level.305 As 
Sappington and Sidak suggest, “Consequently, even though an SOE 
may value the profit that its anticompetitive activities can generate 
less highly than does a private profit-maximizing firm, the SOE may 
still find it optimal to pursue aggressively anticompetitive activities 
that expand its own output and revenue.”306 Given that an SOE may 
have revenue rather than revenue enhancement objectives, it can 
 
 301. Paul Milgrom, Predatory Pricing, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF 
ECONOMICS 937, 938 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate & Peter Newman eds., 1987). 
 302. An increasing economic literature notes that predatory pricing may be rational in 
other settings for profit maximizing firms as well. See Patrick Bolton, Joseph F. Brodley & 
Michael H. Riordan, Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J. 2239, 
2241 (2000) (describing that “modern economic analysis has developed coherent theories of 
predation that contravene earlier economic writing claiming that predatory pricing conduct is 
irrational” and thus that “the consensus view in modern economics [is] that predatory pricing 
can be a successful and fully rational business strategy”). 
 303. Deborah Cope, Regulating Market Activities in Public Sector, 7 OECD J. 
COMPETITION L. & POL’Y 32, 38–40 (2005); Sappington & Sidak, supra note 153, at 496. 
 304. STEPHEN MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 244–46 (2d ed. 2002). 
 305. Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive Exclusion: Raising 
Rivals’ Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 242 (1986). 
 306.  Sappington & Sidak, supra note 153, at 499. 
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more effectively absorb the cost of raising the costs than its private 
rivals. It can do so because the government acts to constrain rival 
firms.307 When an SOE can pursue an effective raising of a rival’s cost 
strategy, it can expand its scope. Predation or raising rivals’ costs 
takes away the ability for competitors to invest in increase research 
and development and limits the ability to roll out new products and 
services and processes that increase dynamic gains from 
innovation.308 SOEs may have particular incentive to raise the costs 
of its rivals. As the rival’s marginal cost increases, it may be costly to 
the SOE, but it simultaneously increases the demand for the SOE’s 
product or service. Since the SOE is a revenue maximizer, it benefits 
from the increased demand.309 
B. Antitrust Solution 
Monopolization creates a consumer welfare loss. There are a 
number of different cost based tests that antitrust law uses to combat 
predatory pricing abuses.310 In some cases, an antitrust solution is 
impossible because of a direct antitrust immunity for SOEs or for a 
sector such as postal. Public choice explains in part why, a large 
number of postal markets remain closed to competition and why, in 
some cases, antitrust remedies for anti-competitive postal services 
behavior of may not be possible.311 Like other network industry 
incumbents with monopoly privileges, postal incumbents will fight 
attempts to liberalize their markets in the name of the public 
interest, even when private interests might be the true motivation. 
With their large number of voters, postal workers can block 
legislation such as the closure of post offices in small or rural 
 
 307. David T. Scheffman & Richard S. Higgins, Twenty Years of Raising Rivals’ Costs: 
History, Assessment, and Future, 12 GEO. MASON L. REV. 371, 376 (2003). 
 308. Eleanor M. Fox, U.S. and European Merger Policy—Fault Lines and Bridges: Mergers 
That Create Incentives for Exclusionary Practices, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 471, 474 n.14 
(2002) (citing United States v. Microsoft Corp., 253 F.3d 34, 50–53 (D.C. Cir. 2001)). 
 309. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 155, at 196–97. 
 310. Raising rival’s cost is not a judicial antitrust claim but is a theoretical tool to frame 
exclusionary behavior. Oftentimes courts use the theory of raising rival’s costs without explicit 
mention of it. 
 311. MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE 
THEORY OF GROUPS (1965). 
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locations that are too costly.312 For example, there are similar 
numbers of postal employees as lawyers in the United States.313 Since 
SOEs may have an employment maximization goal in addition to a 
revenue maximization goal, this may play into the public choice both 
for the SOE and for elected officials who can satisfy constituent 
groups with increased numbers of jobs.314 
Antitrust may be a possible solution to anti-competitive conduct 
when there is no direct immunity to postal behavior. However, a lack 
of immunity does not entail that antitrust will be an effective tool to 
remedy anti-competitive conduct. In many cases, SOEs may be 
dominant in their relevant markets; certainly this is true in the postal 
sector where statutory monopoly protects the reserve sector. When 
this is the case, SOEs have the potential to monopolize. This makes 
the ability to utilize antitrust effectively more important. Yet, 
domestic antitrust law may not apply the types of analytical tools to 
remedy anti-competitive conduct by SOEs. Part II explored the 
dynamics of SOEs’ incentives other than profit maximization. 
Specific to the antitrust context, the general state of antitrust law 
enforcement in most jurisdictions does not recognize that sustained 
predation below cost is possible without recoupment, because it is 
based on the premise of profit maximizing firms rather than 
employment and/or revenue maximizing firms. Moreover, antitrust 
law is ill-equipped to address predation by SOEs because antitrust 
uses the same cost test for both private firms and SOEs. That is, 
current antitrust tests do not impute the various government 
preferences into the actual costs of SOEs. 
Many antitrust agencies may use one or more of the tests 
depending on the particular industry and factual situation in its 
investigations. This Article focuses on the cost tests used in case law 
developed from fully litigated cases rather than from agencies’ stated 
preferences and use of different tests in investigations.315 It does so 
 
 312. Géradin & Sidak, supra note 146, at 163; Patricia L. Maclachlan, Post Office Politics 
in Modern Japan: The Postmasters, Iron Triangles, and the Limits of Reform, 30 J. JAPAN. 
STUD. 281 (2004). 
 313. GEDDES, supra note 163, at 1. The total number of USPS employees is in the range 
of 700,000 to 900,000. This would make the USPS the second largest private employer in the 
U.S. (between Wal-Mart and McDonalds) and the fourth largest non-military employer in the 
world. Congress Has Mail, WALL ST. J., Dec. 26, 2006, at A12. 
 314. See GEDDES, supra note 163, at 32–33, 83–86. 
 315. A number of agencies have reflected how they view predatory pricing cases in their 
jurisdictions. See INTERNATIONAL COMPETITION NETWORK, UNILATERAL CONDUCT 
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because, from the standpoint of measuring results, it is easier to 
understand and compare cases as outputs rather than investigations 
that may have been dropped by an agency or party for any number 
of reasons. Measuring cases provides for greater predictability even 
though it may not reflect undercurrents in practice in a given 
country based on agency guidelines on agency investigations that 
never result in a decision. Competition laws are broad. Therefore, 
much of the “action” is in case law. This Part surveys the leading 
predatory pricing cases across jurisdictions and notes where there has 
been a predatory pricing case brought against an SOE.316 
1. Average variable cost 
Marginal cost is the cost of the additional production of a unit of 
output based on short run marginal costs. Costs below marginal cost 
would be presumed unlawfully predatory. The problem with using 
marginal cost is that it is difficult to measure. Areeda and Turner 
suggested the use of average variable costs (“AVC”) as a proxy for 
marginal cost.317 Average variable costs are costs that vary depending 
on the level of output produced.318 This test seems to be the most 
popular among U.S. courts. As the leading antitrust treatise notes, 
“[n]umerous decisions have concluded that [average variable cost] is 
at least the presumptive baseline for determining predation.”319 
 
WORKING GROUP QUESTIONNAIRE ON PREDATORY PRICING AND EXCLUSIVE 
DEALING/SINGLE BRANDING AND RESPONSES (2007), http://www. 
internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/index.php/en/working-groups/unilateral-conduct/ 
unilateral-conduct-working-group-and-responses-2007 (antitrust agency responses to a 
questionnaire on predatory pricing). 
 316. To the author’s knowledge, there is no case around the world in which SOE 
predation is treated differently than private firm predation, analytically. 
 317. Phillip Areeda & Donald F. Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices Under 
Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HARV. L. REV. 697, 700–03 (1975). This is the most cited 
law review article in U.S. courts on any antitrust issue. Many foreign courts also cite to it in 
their discussion of predatory pricing. A number of professors have taken issue with Areeda and 
Turner but accept the underlying premise of the AVC test that, in a static world, marginal 
price pricing is optimal. See Daniel A. Crane, The Paradox of Predatory Pricing, 91 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1, 32–35 (2005) (providing a review of the critiques). 
 318. DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL 
ORGANIZATION 29 (4th ed. 2005). 
 319. PHILLIP AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW 425, ¶ 740a (2d ed. 
2002). 
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Nevertheless, a number of other cost based tests are available, and a 
number of writers have shown the limitations of AVC.320 
2. Average avoidable cost 
Antitrust agencies around the world seem to be shifting to the 
average avoidable cost (“AAC”) test.321 Average avoidable costs 
consist of the costs (including variable and fixed costs) that could 
have been avoided had there been no predatory pricing. Average 
avoidable costs exclude sunk fixed costs that preceded the predatory 
pricing.322 This test is advantageous because, by including both fixed 
and variable costs, it reduces classification problems of fixed versus 
variable costs, which are inherent to the use of an average variable 
cost test. The premise behind AAC is that a price below AAC by 
necessity involves a sacrifice of profits and will exclude equally 
efficient rivals.323 
3. Long run average incremental cost 
The final cost test generally used in predation cases is long run 
average incremental cost (“LRAIC”). This test, in contrast to AAC, 
includes sunk fixed costs even when the sunk costs occurred prior to 
the predatory pricing. LRAIC is the “per unit cost of producing the 
predatory increment of output whenever such costs were 
incurred.”324 This test is particularly useful in areas such as software 
or pharmaceuticals because “the average variable costs of computer 
software continuously decline and may approach insignificance as 
sales volume becomes sufficiently high.”325 LRAIC may, in certain 
circumstances, also be the cost test of choice in regulated industries 
in which the predation may occur in related products or services. 
 
 320. See, e.g., Jonathan B. Baker, Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic 
Perspective, 62 ANTITRUST L.J. 585 (1994); Bolton et al., supra note 302, at 2242–62. 
 321. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM 
CONDUCT UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 65 (2008), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.pdf. 
 322. CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 275, at 29 n.27. (“A sunk cost is like spilled milk. 
Once it is sunk, there is no use worrying about it, and it should not affect any subsequent 
decisions. . . . Costs, including fixed costs, that are not incurred if operations cease are called 
avoidable costs.”). 
 323. William J. Baumol, Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test, 39 J.L. 
& ECON. 49, 57–61 (1996). 
 324. Bolton et al., supra note 302, at 2272. 
 325. Id. at 2273. 
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This test has been attacked because of the difficulty of imputing 
costs, its effects on potential pro-competitive price cutting, and 
because the cost cutting might not have an exclusionary effect.326 
The following table explains, by jurisdiction, the various 
predatory price tests employed in case law. Though antitrust agencies 
may utilize different tests in their investigations, this chart limits the 
inquiry to decided cases because it is easier to measure what 
jurisdictions have done. Where there are no cases in which a 
jurisdiction uses a particular test, it is noted with a “No” response. 
 
 
TABLE 1: COMPARATIVE PREDATORY PRICING TEST 







Below AVC Yes Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC 
Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 532 (5th Cir. 
1999); Advo, Inc. v. Phila. Newspapers, 
Inc., 51 F.3d 1191 (3d Cir. 1995); 
Arthur S. Langenderfer, Inc. v. S.E. 
Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1056 
(6th Cir. 1984); Ne. Tel. Co. v. AT&T 
Co., 651 F.2d 76 (2d Cir. 1981). 
 Below AAC Yes United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 
1109, 1115–16 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 Below LRAIC Yes MCI Commc’ns Corp. v. AT&T Co., 
708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1982). 
 Below ATC No McGahee v. N. Propane Gas Co., 858 
F.2d 1487, 1500 (11th Cir. 1988). 
European 
Commission 
Below AVC Yes Case 62/86 AKZO Chemie BV v. 
Commission [1991] ECR I-3359. 
 
 326. Kenneth G. Elzinga & David E. Mills, Predatory Pricing and Strategic Theory, 89 
GEO. L.J. 2475, 2484 (2001). 
 327. The leading Supreme Court case in this area, Brooke Group, does not specify a 
particular test. Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 222 
(1993). 
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 Below AAC328 No  
 Below LRAIC Yes COMP/35.141-Unitel Parcel 
Service/DP AG, 20 Mar. 2001. 




Below AVC Yes Aberdeen Journals Ltd. v. The Office of 
Fair Trading, [2003] CAT 11, 2003 
All E.R. (D) 137, ¶ 380.330  
 Below AAC Yes Cardiff Bus v. The Office of Fair 
Trading [2008].331 
 Below LRAIC No N/A 
 Below ATC No N/A 
Sweden Below AVC Yes Statens Järnvägar MD 2000:2. 
 Below AAC No N/A 
 Below LRAIC No N/A 
 Below ATC No N/A 
Chile Below AVC Yes Decision No. 39, James Hardie 
Fibrocementos Limitada, sentence of 
the Supreme Court of November 29, 
2006, sentence of the Tribunal for the 
Defense of Competition of June 13, 
2006. 
 Below AAC No N/A 
 Below LRAIC No N/A 
 Below ATC No N/A 
South Africa Below AVC Yes Nationwide Airlines and S. Afr. 
 
 328. This test is the current policy preference of the Commission. DIRECTORATE-GEN. 
FOR COMPETITION, EUROPEAN COMM’N, DISCUSSION PAPER ON THE APPLICATION OF 
ARTICLE 82 OF THE TREATY TO EXCLUSIONARY ABUSES 31 (2005), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/comm/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper2005.pdf. 
 329. Many SOEs in the UK will be incorporated as legal company entities and will be 
treated exactly the same as privately owned equivalents. For such companies, competition law 
should apply on exactly the same basis. Non-incorporated SOEs would be regulated by their 
parent departments. It is possible, under such circumstances, that a situation of predation 
would be addressed through administrative hearings. 
 330. The Court mentioned that “the cost-based rules set out in AKZO and Tetra Pak II, 
while providing guidance, are not an end in themselves,” and the guidance therein was “open 
to further development.” Aberdeen Journals Ltd. v. The Office of Fair Trading, [2003] CAT 
11, 2003 All E.R. (D) 137, ¶ 380. 
 331. The OFT noted that “[i]n past cases [AVC and AAC] have been shown to be very 
similar, since any cost that is variable over the period is also avoidable.” Id. at 7.156. 
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Airways (92/IR/Oct00). 
 Below AAC No N/A 
 Below LRAIC No N/A 
 Below ATC No N/A 
South 
Korea332 
Below AVC No N/A 
 Below AAC No N/A 
 Below LRAIC No N/A 








Below AVC No N/A 
 Below AAC No N/A 
 Below LRAIC No N/A 
 Below ATC No N/A 
Canada Below AVC Yes R. v. Hoffmann La Roche Ltd. (1980), 
28 O.R. (2d) 164 (H.C.J.), affirmed 
33 O.R. (2d) 694 (C.A.); R. v. 
Consumers Glass Co., (1981), 33 O.R. 
(2d) 228. 
 Below AAC Yes334 Canada (Director of Investigation and 
Research) v. Air Canada (2003), 26 
C.P.R. (4th) 476. 
 Below LRAIC No N/A 
 Below ATC No N/A 
 
 332. South Korea does not use a cost based test for predatory pricing. 
 333. There is only one case to date (Carter Holt Harvey Bldg. Prods. Group Ltd. v. 
Commerce Comm’n, [2006] 1 N.Z.L.R. 145 (P.C.)). The case is not explicit as to the 
particular price test, though the New Zealand Competition Commission has used both AVC 
and AAC in investigations. This case law is analogous to that of Australia, which New Zealand 
looks to for support. See Boral Besser Masonry Ltd. v. Austl. Competition and Consumer 
Comm’n (2003) 215 C.L.R. 374 (Australian predatory pricing which also does not explicitly 
adopt a particular price test). There is no predatory pricing case specific to New Zealand SOEs. 
 334. In Air Canada, the particular AAC test was statutorily mandated by the law that 
addressed airlines. Since then, the preference for the Competition Bureau is for the AAC test 
more generally. COMPETITION BUREAU, CAN., ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES: PREDATORY 
PRICING 1415 (2008), available at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-
bc.nsf/vwapj/Predatory_Pricing_Guidelines-e.pdf/$file/Predatory_Pricing_Guidelines-e.pdf. 
There have not been any predatory pricing decisions since Air Canada. 
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Japan Below AVC Yes Daikoku 
 Below AAC No N/A 
 Below LRAIC No N/A 
 Below ATC Yes Hamaguchi Petroleum 
 
V. PRICING TESTS BY JURISDICTION  
A. United States 
The basis for monopolization claims under U.S. antitrust law 
derives from Section 2 of the Sherman Act.335 Case law has 
developed regarding the appropriate test to use for predation, 
though at lower court levels the standards are still not exactly 
clear.336 The seminal Supreme Court case in this area is Brooke Group 
v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp.337 Under Brooke Group, two 
factors must be met in a successful predatory pricing claim. First, a 
plaintiff must show that the prices at issue “are below an appropriate 
measure of its rival’s costs.”338 Second, there must be a showing 
“that the competitor had . . . a dangerous probability, of recouping 
its investment in below-cost prices.”339 Two recent Supreme Court 
cases, Linkline340 and Weyerhauser, 341 upheld the Brook Group 
approach. Circuit courts across the United States have interpreted 
the Brook Group case differently.342 For example, in United States v. 
AMR Corp., the Fifth Circuit “decline[d] to dictate a definitive cost 
 
 335. 15 U.S.C. § 2. 
 336. Crane, supra note 317, at 7–9 (also noting that plaintiffs recast predatory behavior 
into other antitrust classifications of harm to overcome courts’ reluctance to find for plaintiffs 
on predation claims). On the interaction of rules and standards generally within antitrust, see 
Daniel A. Crane, Rules Versus Standards in Antitrust Adjudication, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
49 (2007). 
 337. 509 U.S. 209 (1993). 
 338. Id. at 222. 
 339. Id. at 224. 
 340. Pacific Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc’n, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009) 
(supporting the use of predatory pricing tests in the retail cost context of a price squeeze 
claim). 
 341. Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Ross-Simmons Hardwood Co., 549 U.S. 312, 315 (2007) 
(upholding the cost test in predatory buying circumstances). 
 342. Crane, supra note 317, at 4 (stating that the Supreme Court has not resolved circuit 
splits in the lower courts over fundamental predatory pricing issues). 
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measure for all cases” although it used an average avoidable cost test 
in that particular case.343 
One reason that there are few predatory pricing cases is because 
of the Supreme Court’s concern of the potential for type II errors of 
mistake prosecution. As the Supreme Court notes, “mistaken 
inferences in cases such as this one are especially costly, because they 
chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”344 
As such, the Court has created various procedural hurdles for 
plaintiffs in predatory pricing cases. Many of the same behaviors that 
could lead to allegations of predatory pricing are precisely the ones 
that could increase competition, such as price cuts. The Supreme 
Court most recently restated this explicitly in Weyerhaeuser: 
 
The costs of erroneous findings of predatory-pricing liability are 
quite high because the mechanism by which a firm engages in 
predatory pricing—lowering prices—is the same mechanism by 
which a firm stimulates competition, and therefore mistaken 
liability findings would chill the very conduct the antitrust laws are 
designed to protect.345 
1. U.S. Postal Service—a competition policy problem  
There are a number of reasons why SOE antitrust cases are not 
typical in the United States. Many are state action cases that involve 
decisions based on whether or not the state action has been clearly 
articulated rather than on substantive claims of anti-competitive 
conduct. However, there has been a recent Supreme Court case 
regarding not merely an SOE, but a postal SOE. As with other U.S. 
cases involving SOEs, this case was not decided on the merits but on 
whether or not antitrust immunity applied.346 
The Supreme Court found that the Sherman Act did not apply 
to the post office in United States Postal Service v. Flamingo 
 
 343. United States v. AMR Corp., 335 F.3d 1109, 1116 (10th Cir. 2003). 
 344. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 594 (1986). 
 345. Weyerhaeuser Co., 549 U.S. at 312 (citing Brooke Group, 509 U.S. at 226) (“The 
costs of erroneous findings of predatory-pricing liability are quite high because the mechanism 
by which a firm engages in predatory pricing—lowering prices—is the same mechanism by 
which a firm stimulates competition, and therefore mistaken liability findings would chill the 
very conduct the antitrust laws are designed to protect.”). 
 346. U.S. Postal Serv. v. Flamingo Indus., 540 U.S. 736, 739–48 (2004). 
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Industries.347 Among the claims that Flamingo made was that the 
USPS sought to create a monopoly in mail sack production, and that 
it could do so in large part because of its monopoly in the postal 
reserve sector.348 In Flamingo, the Supreme Court stated that the 
USPS was a part of the federal government and therefore not under 
the purview of the antitrust laws of the United States.349 In a 
departure from the prevailing economic literature on SOEs, the 
Supreme Court reasoned that the USPS’ “powers are more limited 
than those of private businesses. It lacks the prototypical means of 
engaging in anti-competitive behavior: the power to set prices.”350 
Under this flawed reasoning, an SOE does not have an incentive to 
drive competitors out of business. As discussed earlier in this Article, 
economic theory suggests that an SOE may have other motivations 
than profit maximization. Even if an SOE does concern itself at times 
with profit, it is also motivated by revenue maximization and by an 
interest in increasing the scope of its services and its number of 
employees.351 The reasoning of the Supreme Court ignores the 
possibility of no-recoupment predation because of government 
ownership and of raising rivals’ cost strategies. 
A second weakness of the Supreme Court decision was its 
reliance on the Postal Commission, the sector regulator, to 
overcome potential anti-competitive behavior by the USPS.352 The 
old Postal Rate Commission lacked a subpoena power and the ability 
to mandate that the USPS provide it with data. Whatever data it 
received came voluntarily from the USPS.353 Such a situation created 
additional information asymmetries between the regulator and the 
regulated industry and makes it more difficult to detect the anti-
competitive cross subsidies between the postal and express delivery 
sectors. 
Because of the weakness of the postal regulator, antitrust would 
have been the only alternative to remedy the anti-competitive 
 
 347. Id. at 736. Since then, the 2007 Act explicitly allows for the application of antitrust 
to the USPS. 
 348. Flamingo, 540 U.S. at 738–39. 
 349. Id. at 739–48. 
 350. Id. at 747. 
 351. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 153, at 479; see also Rick Geddes, Do Vital 
Economists Reach a Policy Conclusion on Postal Reform?, 1 ECO. J. WATCH 61 (2004).  
 352. Flamingo, 540 U.S. at 747. 
 353. Geddes, supra note 279, at 219. 
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behavior. The Postal Commission that existed at the time of the 
decision in 2004 was a weak regulator. Unlike regulators in other 
network industries such as electricity or telecommunications, the 
Postal Commission could not set rates. Rather, it could only 
recommend rate changes, and such recommendations can be 
overridden by the USPS board of directors.354 Yet, somehow, in spite 
of a regulator that lacks the ability to set prices and to have its 
dictates followed, the Court found that regulatory oversight was a 
factor that prevented USPS from monopolization.355 
In any determination of whether to bring an antitrust case, the 
first and perhaps most important issue is one of assembling evidence. 
Even if the USPS was subject to antitrust law at the time, bringing 
such a case would have been very difficult, even if there had been an 
effective measure of cost predation that took into account the 
government advantages granted to the USPS. The existing U.S. 
predatory pricing methodologies, as noted in the previous 
discussion, required recoupment.356 While this might make sense for 
private firms that operate based on profit, a cost based test is 
ineffective for government owned firms with soft budget constraints 
that might maximize revenue rather than profit. 
Flamingo also underscores how important the predation and 
raising rival’s cost claims are in terms of understanding the potential 
anti-competitive harm on the part of the postal service. Since the 
USPS defines the size of its reserve sector broadly, it has an incentive 
to increase the definition of the reserve sector to reduce 
competition.357 This limits the potential scope and scale of 
competitors in the non-reserve and related sectors.358 The USPS also 
has a unique monopoly over the mailbox itself, a monopoly found in 
no other nation.359 
 
 354. 39 U.S.C. §§ 3625, 3628. These statutes have been repealed as of Dec. 20, 2006. 
 355. Flamingo, 540 U.S. at 740–41. 
 356. See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 300 and accompanying text. 
 357. Compare the U.S. reserve sector to the EU’s postal liberalization, which 
significantly reduces the reserve sector. EUR. PARL. ASS., Directive 97/67/EC, as amended by 
Directive 2002/39/EC (1997). 
 358. This is particularly true when the SOE exhibits cost complementarities in its 
production technology. See Sappington & Sidak, supra note 155, at 198 n.39. 
 359. See U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981); 
R. Richard Geddes, Anticompetitive Behavior in Postal Services, in COMPETING WITH THE 
GOVERNMENT: ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 88 (R. Richard 
Geddes ed., 2004); Géradin & Sidak, supra note 146, at 163. 
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Under the Postal Act in place at the time of Flamingo,360 the 
U.S. government offered the USPS credit guarantees through direct 
borrowing from the Federal Financing Bank. The credit guarantee 
allowed the USPS to provide a 12.5 basis point premium for its debt 
above the U.S. Treasury bond rate.361 Furthermore, this financing 
provided lower rates for the USPS than private firms. The Supreme 
Court failed to understand that the USPS has the power of eminent 
domain. It also has the power to self zone, while express delivery 
competitors must apply for local zoning permits.362 Private firms 
must go through the costly and time consuming process to set up an 
effective distribution network. 
Competition in postal and express delivery was not robust under 
the old Postal Act. Evidence suggests that the USPS used its 
monopoly over delivery to cross subsidize its express delivery service 
where it faced competition.363 This behavior can be traced to the 
1970 Postal Reorganization Act. The Act increased cross subsidies to 
the competitive mail classes.364 For example, the rate increase of first 
class post to twenty-five cents occurred while the Postal Service 
decreased the price of next day express service, even though the 
express service arm was already in the red.365 This postal rate increase 
coincided with a reduction in the amount charged on foreign express 
delivery by the USPS from $18 to $8.75.366 As a result, the USPS 
shipped 66% more express mail packages than it had the year 
before.367 
B. European Union 
Article 82 is the Treaty of Rome article that addresses the abuse 
of a dominant position under EC law and, therefore, the basis for a 
predatory pricing claim. A number of different elements make up the 
 
 360. The new Postal Reorganization Act of 2007 was in part a consequence of Flamingo. 
 361. R. Richard Geddes, Case Studies of Anticompetitive SOE Behavior, in COMPETING 
WITH THE GOVERNMENT: ANTICOMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES 30–31 
(R. Richard Geddes ed., 2004). 
 362. Id. at 34. 
 363. Geddes, supra note 359, at 93–97. 
 364. GEDDES, supra note 163, at 5. 
 365. JOHN R. LOTT, ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE? WHO SHOULD THE 
COURTS BELIEVE? 69 (1999). 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
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criteria for a predatory pricing case for purposes of EC law. These are 
sacrifice, anti-competitive foreclosure, and efficiencies.368 A 
“sacrifice” by a firm may be predatory if, through evidence, a 
plaintiff can show that conduct entails a sacrifice (loss) for the 
dominant firm, which the firm undertakes deliberately.369 Sacrifice 
does not require any single cost benchmark. Rather, such a sacrifice 
occurs, according to the new EC Dominance Guidance paper, when 
a firm (a) charges a lower price for some portion or all of its output 
over the relevant time period at issue; or (b) expands its output over 
the relevant time period; or (c) such that it incurs avoidable losses.370 
The first cost benchmark that begins current EC analysis is average 
avoidable cost. The Commission’s thought is that AAC is often the 
same as AVC (since it is the variable costs that can be avoided).371 
Pricing below AAC is therefore seen as sacrifice. The EU courts have 
yet to use the AAC benchmark. 
EC case law supports the sacrifice approach currently undertaken 
by the Commission. The seminal case of AKZO Chemie v. 
Commission, involving chemical products, held: “A dominant 
undertaking has no interest in applying such prices except that of 
eliminating competitors so as to enable it subsequently to raise its 
prices by taking advantage of its monopolistic position, since each 
sale generates a loss . . . .”372 In AKZO, the pricing strategy 
undertaken by AKZO Chemie which required a sacrifice of profits, 
involved pricing at below the average total cost. The ECJ finds a 
sacrifice when (a) prices are below AVC; or (b) prices are below ATC 
but above AVC, and it is possible to prove that the firm has intended 
to eliminate competitors. A line of cases has further developed this 
approach. In Tetra Pak II,373 a case involving the manufacture of 
aseptic and non-aseptic cartons, and in France Télécom,374 a case 
 
 368. COMM’N OF EUR. CMTYS., Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in 
Applying Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings 20, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/guidance.pdf [hereinafter EUR. COMM’N]. 
 369. Id. 
 370. Id. ¶ 63. 
 371. Note however that when AVC and ACC are dissimilar the Commission believes that 
ACC is a better indicator of avoided costs. Id. at 20 n.40. 
 372. Case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie v. Commission, 1991 E.C.R. I-3359. 
 373. Case C-333/94, Tetra Pak Int’l SA v. Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., 1996 E.C.R. I-
05951. 
 374.  Case C-202/07 P, France Telecom SA v. Comm’n of the Eur. Cmtys., 2007, 
available at http://curia.europa.eu. 
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involving the charging of below-cost prices for ADSL high-speed 
Internet services, the European Court of Justice held that the 
Commission could use two separate cost measures. In France 
Télécom, the court reaffirmed a lack of recoupment for institutional 
reasons.375 The court reasoned that to demonstrate recoupment 
would increase the evidentiary burden upon plaintiffs.376 This 
reasoning provides an opening that might allow for cases against 
SOEs to be successful, though it does not recognize that SOEs 
might never need recoupment in the first place. 
France Télécom also discusses, however, that recoupment may be 
entertained where prices are below Average Total Cost (ATC) and 
above AVC.377 In such circumstances, proof of recoupment may 
show eliminatory intent.378 The Commission entertains predation 
claims between AVC and ATC because “[s]uch prices can drive from 
the market undertakings which are perhaps as efficient as the 
dominant undertaking but which, because of their smaller financial 
resources, are incapable of withstanding the competition waged 
against them.”379 This Commission belief in the importance of 
protecting less efficient competitors goes to the idea embodied in 
Article 82 of protecting the competitive process.380 
The above cases all dealt with situations in which there was only 
a single product market. In Deutsche Post AG, the Commission 
examined different product markets in which it used Long Run 
Average Incremental Costs for those non-common fixed costs.381 
Deutsche Post AG is also the case most on point regarding predatory 
pricing. This case involved the European Commission’s investigation 
of Deutsche Post AG (“DPAG”) for abuse of a dominant position in 
Germany. At the time of the initial complaint against DPAG, DPAG 
was a one hundred percent SOE. The Commission found that 
because of the excess revenue produced from the reserve area, the 
reserve area could serve as a “likely and permanent source of 
 
 375. Id. ¶ 76. 
 376. Id. 
 377. Id. ¶ 14. 
 378. Id. ¶ 111. 
 379. AKZO, ECR I-3359, ¶ 72. 
 380. ALISON JONES, BRENDA SUFRIN & BRENDA SMITH, EC COMPETITION LAW 337 
(3d ed. 2007). 
 381. Case COMP/35.141, Deustche Post AG, 2001 O.J. (L 125). 
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funding” for cross subsidization, because the revenues in the reserve 
sector exceeded the costs.382 
The Commission held that between 1990 and 1995, DPAG’s 
revenue was below its incremental cost of providing mail order parcel 
services. This allowed DPAG to successfully pursue predation. It did 
so through the cross subsidization of activities in the competitive 
sector by revenues from the reserve sector.383 The Commission also 
discovered a longer lasting (1974-2000) anti-competitive fidelity 
rebate scheme.384 The cross subsidization of DPAG enabled it to tie 
its fidelity program for mail parcel services, even though the parcel 
services was less efficient than its competitors.385 The fidelity rebates 
prevented entry into the parcel services market by other firms 
through tying.386 New entrants could not generate a critical mass 
necessary to sustain entry into the market.387 This is an 
understanding of raising rival’s costs even though it is not explicit.388 
Because of the lack of critical mass, it was not possible for mail order 
traders to set up an alternative delivery network infrastructure to that 
of DPAG.389 The cost structure of the DPAG parcel services market 
was such that between 1990 and 1995, every DPAG sale presented a 
loss. In the medium term, this was not in the economic interest of 
DPAG. In the long term, continuing this line of business prevented 
entry by competitors.390 The Commission fined DPAG $24 million 
and forbade any such conduct in the future.391 It also imposed a 
structural remedy to separate DPAG’s commercial parcel services 
 
 382. Id. ¶ 6. More recently, the Commission has suggested that cross-subsidies may be 
predatory, even in situations where the predator firm is not dominant in the predation market. 
(“The Commission may also pursue predatory practices by dominant undertakings on 
secondary markets on which they are not yet dominant. . . . While the dominant firm does not 
need to predate to protect its dominant position in the market protected by legal monopoly, it 
may use the profits gained in the monopoly market to cross-subsidize its activities in another 
market and thereby threaten to eliminate effective competition in that other market.”). EUR. 
COMM’N, supra note 368, at 20 n.39. 
 383.  Case COMP/35.141, Deustche Post AG, 2001 O.J. (L 125) ¶ 6. 
 384. DPAG had entered into standard form contract fidelity agreements in which firms 
had to entrust all mail order parcels to DPAG. Id. ¶ 34. 
 385. Id. 
 386. Id. ¶ 35. 
 387. Id. ¶ 37. 
 388. Id. ¶ 38. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. ¶ 42. 
 391. Id. ¶ 52–53. 
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from its reserved sector services.392 Given that the cost of the penalty 
was less than the gains of anti-competitive conduct, it is unclear that 
this remedy created a chilling effect on anti-competitive behavior. 
Because the case did not need to get to particulars of what 
constituted a “cost” for purposes of LRAIC cost methodology, we 
lack an understanding on whether a different cost test would have 
been used for SOEs. 
C. United Kingdom 
Section 18 of the Competition Act 1998 lays out the test for an 
abuse of dominance under UK law.393 Guidelines by the Office of 
Fair Trading (“OFT”) provide a more detailed explanation of when 
pricing may be below cost.394 The trend in the UK is, like in the EU, 
toward AAC, although AVC and AAC may be the same in a number 
of cases.395 In Cardiff Bus, the Office of Fair Trade examined alleged 
predation by Cardiff Bus regarding starting a no frills bus service in 
response to a competitor on the same times and routes, running at a 
loss and then existing after the competitor exited the market.396 The 
OFT found that the actions taken by Cardiff Bus abused a dominant 
position because of its exclusion, which did not allow for 
competition on the merits.397 This was the first prohibition decision 
in five years, but the reasoning would not suggest a way to treat SOE 
predation, given the highly favorable and idiosyncratic facts in the 
case. 
 
 392. Id. 
 393. Competition Act, 1998, c. 2, §18, available at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/acts/ 
acts1998/ukpga_19980041_en_1. 
 394. UNITED KINGDOM OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, ASSESSMENT OF CONDUCT: DRAFT 
COMPETITION LAW GUIDELINE FOR CONSULTATION (Apr. 2004), http://www. 
oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/business_leaflets/competition_law/oft414a.pdf. 
 395. See UNITED KINGDOM OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, DECISION NO. CA98/01/2008: 
ABUSE OF A DOMINANT POSITION BY CARDIFF BUS §§ 7.156–7.157, http://www. 
oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/ca98_public_register/decisions/cardiffbus.pdf (“In past cases these 
two bases have been shown to be very similar, since any cost that is variable over the period is 
also avoidable. Often the AAC benchmark will be the same as the AVC benchmark, because in 
many cases only variable costs can be avoided. However, where the dominant company makes 
specific investments, such as expanding capacity in order to predate, then the fixed or sunk 
investments made for this extra capacity will be included within AAC, causing AAC to exceed 
AVC.”). 
 396. Id. §§ 1.1–1.4. 
 397. Id. §§ 1.1, 1.14. 
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Aberdeen Journals is one of the very few decisions using the 
abuse of dominance prohibition. It relies on the AVC test, although 
it provides some wiggle room. As the Competition Appeal Tribunal 
(CAT) noted, “[i]n our view, the cost-based rules set out in AKZO 
and Tetra Pak II, while providing guidance, are not an end in 
themselves and should not be applied mechanistically.”398 In 
Aberdeen Journals, the CAT analyzed what costs should be included 
within an AVC test as a price floor in a case involving predation by a 
newspaper and stated that recoupment was not necessary.399 In some 
instances, the CAT found that pricing below AVC might be lawful if 
there is an objective justification for such pricing.400 It also noted 
that prices above AVC but below ATC might be predatory assuming 
that pricing below ATC forces exit from the market of an equally 
efficient competitor.401 The pricing issues in question in Aberdeen 
Journals went to questions of what was fixed versus variable but do 
not provide insights as to what is a cost in the case of a firm that has 
soft budget constraints. 
D. South Africa 
South Africa’s abuse of dominance provisions can be found in 
Section 8(d)(iv) of the South African Competition Act 89 of 1998, 
specifically “selling goods or services below their marginal or average 
variable cost . . . .” In spite of a specific test in the statute, South 
African case law from the Competition Tribunal explains that other 
cost based tests may be used beyond that of MC and AVC.402 The 
elements for a successful predation claim include a showing of 
dominance based on market share and market power that the goods 
or services are sold below MC or AVC and that efficiency defenses 
 
 398. ABERDEEN JOURNALS LTD & THE OFFICE OF FAIR TRADING, COMPETITION 
APPEAL TRIBUNAL, [2003] CAT 11, para. 380, http://www.catribunal.org.uk/files/ 
JdgFinal2AJ230603.pdf. 
 399. See id. ¶ 358. 
 400. Id. ¶ 357. 
 401. See id. ¶ 445. 
 402. Nationwide Airlines and S. African Airways (92/IR/Oct00) (“[T]he complainant is 
not bound to follow the prescribed cost formula suggested in 8(d)(iv). In other words if a 
complainant, relying on section 8(c), can show that a respondents costs are below some other 
appropriate measure of costs not mentioned in the section it may prevail provided it adduces 
additional evidence of predation beyond mere evidence of costs. To determine what that 
should be we need to examine the phenomenon of predatory pricing and then examine some 
of the approaches taken in other jurisdictions.”). 
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do not outweigh competitive harm.403 The Commission has 
addressed frequent challenges recently against SOEs for unfair 
competition and abuse of their dominant market position. One case 
addresses predatory pricing by an SOE, South Africa Airways. In that 
case, the Competition Tribunal of South Africa ruled against the 
plaintiff based on an AVC test.404 The Tribunal noted that it was 
open to the use of other tests. However, there was no explicit 
discussion of cost based tests for SOEs and whether it would be 
different for non-SOEs. 
E. South Korea 
There are two bases for a predatory pricing claim under Korean 
law, called the Monopoly Regulation and Fair Trade Act. Article 3-2 
prohibits the abuse of dominant positions, and Article 23 of the Act 
that prohibits unfair business practices and applies to predatory 
pricing by non-dominant firms. Unlike other jurisdictions, Korea 
does not utilize a cost based test for predation. Rather, Korean 
predatory decisions focus on whether or not the alleged predatory 
pricing was “fair.” According to Korea’s predatory pricing test, price 
can be above average total cost and still be predatory. Intent is 
relevant, and there must be market foreclosure or consumer harm. 
A series of examples of Korean case law provides a sense of what 
constitutes unfair competition. In the Cadland case, the Korea Fair 
Trade Commission (“KFTC”) argued that Cadland purchased 
software from an American company but then bid at one won to 
provide Korean Electric with thousands of copies of this software 
(though the case does not specify the amount of the U.S. purchase, 
presumably it was at an amount greater than one won).405 The KFTC 
argued that Cadland was willing to do this because once Korean 
Electric started using its software, Cadland would have locked in 
future business worth millions, making the contract essentially a long 
term deal.406 Such underbidding conduct, according to the KFTC, 
constituted unfair and anti-competitive practice.407 This line of 
reasoning holds for other Korean predatory pricing cases, such as 
 
 403. See South African Competition Act 89 of 1998 § 7. 
 404. See Nationwide Airlines and S. African Airways (92/IR/Oct00). 
 405. See KFTC v. Cadland Co., [1996] KFTC 96-18. 
 406. Id. The KFTC estimated that the winner of this bid would be guaranteed to get 
about 3 billion won, or about $2.2 million, worth of future business. 
 407. Id. 
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Samsung Tesco,408 and predatory bidding cases such as Ahnkook, 409 
Lucky, 410 and Sangyong. 411 
In Samsung Tesco, Samsung Tesco paid Coca Cola 984 won 
(approximately $0.73 per 1.5 liter) to distribute Coca Cola in its 
stores from August 30, 2000 through November 2, 2000.412 
However, Samsung Tesco sold Coca Cola below its cost at 390 won 
to 890 won (approximately $0.25 to $0.65) in order to attract more 
customers.413 KFTC concluded that this was anti-competitive.414 The 
case does not offer specifics as to whether or not there was some sort 
of short term price cutting defense that might have been part of 
some sort of loss leader promotion. A pro-competitive defense is 
possible under Korean predatory pricing law although the case does 
not mention if Samsung Tesco made such a defense. 
The Korean Supreme Court ruled against predatory pricing in a 
claim that the KFTC brought in Hyundai Information Technology 
Co.415 In Hyundai, the city of Incheon offered a contract for 
software with an estimated price of 972 million won (approximately 
$700,000).416 Three companies bid.417 Hyundai Information 
Technology Co. bid at 29 million won (approximately $21,000), 
Daewoo Information Systems Co. bid at 195 million won (about 
$141,000), and Samsung SDS bid at 330 million won 
(approximately $240,000).418 Daewoo and Samsung complained to 
the KFTC and the KFTC intervened.419 The parties litigated the 
case, and it went to the Korean Supreme Court,420 which held for 
Hyundai.421 It ruled that Hyundai’s bid of 29 million won did not 
violate Korea’s competition law because: 1) all other bidders bid 
 
 408. See KFTC v. Samsung Tesco Co., [2001] KFTC 2001-31. 
 409. See KFTC v. Ahnkook Co., [1994] KFTC 94-328. 
 410. See KFTC v. Lucky Brands Co., [1983] KFTC 83-12. 
 411. See Letter from KFTC to Sangyong Co., Case No. 9512.1241 (instructing 
Sangyong to cease and desist). 
 412. KFTC v. Samsung Tesco Co., [2001] KFTC 2001-31. 
 413. Id. 
 414. Id. 
 415. See Hyundai Info. Tech. Co. v. KFTC, [1999]. 
 416. Id. 
 417. Id. 
 418. Id. 
 419. Id. 
 420. Id. 
 421. Id. 
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below the City’s estimated price, and 2) the contract was for a 
software system that did not have any entrenched derivative benefits 
attached to it.422 The second factor distinguished it from the fact 
pattern in Cadland. 
 
F. Chile 
Article 3ºc of the Chilean Competition Act prohibits predatory 
practices.423 So far, there has been only one predatory pricing case in 
Chile’s antitrust jurisprudence, James Hardie Fibrocementos 
Limitada.424 The Tribunal held with fixed assets that produced both 
products, each product was above AVC.425 Moreover, there was no 
recoupment in another market.426 On appeal, the Supreme Court 
reversed and held that James Hardie conducted predatory pricing in 
the first market by selling below ATC and then recouped its losses in 
the second market.427 This case involved a private firm rather than an 
SOE.428 The issue of what constituted a cost did not come up in 
terms of the analysis of either the Tribunal or the Supreme Court; 
they merely discussed the allocation of costs as to AVC.429 Chilean 
case law is therefore silent on what outcome would be likely for a 
predatory firm with a soft budget constraint. 
G. Canada 
The Competition Act governs Canadian competition law.430 
Predatory pricing analysis is a sub-section of abuse of dominance, 
Section 79(1) of the Act.431 Moreover, Article 50 provides for 
 
 422. Id. 
 423. Competition Law, art. 3ºc, 2005, http://www.fne.cl/descargas/normativa/ 
competition_law.zip (Chile). 
 424. See generally James Hardie Fibrocementos Limitada, sentence of the Supreme Court 
of Nov. 29, 2006; sentence of the Tribunal for the Def. of Competition of June 13, 2006. 
 425. Id. 
 426. Id. 
 427. Id. 
 428. Id. 
 429. Id. 
 430. Competition Act, R.S.C. ch. 34 (1985). 
 431. See Canada (Comm’r of Competition) v. Air Can., [2003] 26 C.P.R. 4th 476 
(Comp.Trib.) (Can.); see also Canada (Dir. of Investigation and Research) v. Tele-Direct 
(Publ’ns), Inc., [1997], 73 C.P.R. 3d 1 (Can.). 
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penalties for unreasonably low prices under Section 50 of the Act.432 
In 2008, the Canadian Competition Bureau published its Predatory 
Pricing Enforcement Guidelines, which present state of the art 
thinking on Canadian predatory pricing policy.433 The most recent 
Canadian predatory pricing case is Air Canada, which utilized an 
AAC test.434 Air Canada marked a shift from the AVC test 
previously adopted under R. v. Hoffmann La Roche Ltd.435 In Air 
Canada, the litigation focused on what constituted an avoidable cost 
for an airline route. For example, starting an unprofitable route 
might make economic sense because revenues might increase on 
other routes. This might add value to the network due to an increase 
in travelers. Whether to count such routes, called those “beyond 
contribution,” as an avoidable cost would impact whether such 
conduct could be shown as predatory.436 The Tribunal held that Air 
Canada had engaged in predatory pricing below AAC on two routes. 
However, the Commission ultimately dropped the case because of 
Air Canada’s bankruptcy and other changes in Canada’s airline 
sector. As the cost based tests all deal with private firms, it is unclear 
how soft budget constraints might be counted as costs. However, 
the Air Canada decision suggests that judicial administrability might 
have been a factor in how costs are to be calculated because of the 
fear that plaintiffs would be unable to carry out complex cost 
calculations.437 
H. New Zealand 
The generic prohibition against the abuse of dominance under 
the Commerce Act is in Section 36. There is only one case to date 
on predatory pricing, Carter Holt Harvey Building Production Group 
 
 432. See R. v. Hoffmann La Roche Ltd., [1980] 28 O.R.2d 164 (H.C.J.) aff’d, 33 
O.R.2d 694 (Can.); R. v. Consumers Glass Co., [1981] 33 O.R.2d 228 (Can.). 
 433. Competition Enforcement Bureau, Predatory Pricing Enforcement Guidelines 
(2008), http://www.cb-bc.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/vwapj/Predatory_Pricing_Guidelines-e. 
pdf/$file/Predatory_Pricing_Guidelines-e.pdf. 
 434. Edward Iacobucci, Predatory Pricing, the Theory of the Firm and the Recoupment 
Test: An Examination of Recent Developments in Canadian Predatory Pricing Law. 51 
Antitrust Bull. 281 (2006) (providing in depth treatment of the case). 
 435. Compare Hoffmann La Roche, 28 O.R.2d at 164, with Air Can. 26 C.P.R.4th at 
476. 
 436. Air Can. 26 C.P.R. 4th at 476, ¶ 301. 
 437. See Cyril Ritter, Predatory Pricing Law in Canada, Australia and New Zealand: 
Recent Developments, 2005 EUR. COMP. L. REV. 48, 52. 
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Ltd. v. CC.438 The case involved differentiated products in the 
building insulation markets.439 The case is not explicit as to the 
particular price test, though in investigations the New Zealand 
Competition Commission has used both AVC and AAC.440 This case 
is analogous to one in Australia, to which New Zealand looked for 
guidance in its antitrust jurisprudence.441 In the Australian case, 
Boral Besser Masonry Ltd. v ACCC, the court did not explicitly adopt 
a single price test.442 There is no predatory pricing case specific to 
New Zealand SOEs. However, it is unlikely that it would be possible 
to win such a case in New Zealand as the Privy Council stated that 
recoupment is a requirement in a successful claim of predatory 
pricing.443 
I. Sweden 
Under Article 19 of the Swedish Competition Act, a firm may 
not abuse a dominant position. The Swedish Market Court, the 
highest Swedish Court in competition law cases, has decided one 
predatory pricing case. This was a case where a small competitor, BK 
Tåg, sued the Swedish state owned railways, Statens Järnvägar 
(“SJ”).444 The Market Court found that SJ had a dominant position 
in the Swedish market for operation of passenger traffic on railway 
and that SJ had committed a breach of Section 19 of the Swedish 
Competition Act in a bidding contest for operation of regional 
passenger traffic on railway.445 In its analysis, the Market Court used 
the Akzo test.446 The court found that SJ in its tender had priced 
below AVC.447 The court also found that there was a presumption of 
 
 438. [2006] 1 N.Z.L.R. 145; [2004] 11 T.C.L.R. 200 (P.C.). 
 439. CC v Carter Holt Harvey Bldg. Prods. Ltd (2000) 9 TCLR 535, Supplementary 
Judgment of Professor Lattimore, para. 51 (“INZCO could recoup the cost of the Wool Line 
special pricing arrangement if the scheme meant that NWP was constrained from expanding in 
the market or eliminated from it. The recoupment would take the form of maintaining the list 
prices of Pink Batts at levels that were otherwise threatened by NWP, and at the same time 
increasing its market share for Pink Batts and other INZCO products.”). 
 440. See N.Z. Commerce Comm’n, 2008 Unilateral Conduct Working Group 
Questionnaire submission to the ICN (on file with author). 
 441. Id. 
 442. [2003] 195 A.L.R. 609; [2003] 215 C.L.R. 374. 
 443. Id. at 469–70. 
 444. Marknadsdomstolen [MD] [Market Court] 2000-02-01 (Swed.). 
 445. Id. 
 446. Id. 
 447. Id. 
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exclusionary intent; a presumption SJ did not successfully rebut.448 
SJ’s fine amounted to eight million Swedish crowns.449 On one hand, 
the outcome of this test might signal that an SOE can be found 
guilty under an AVC test. However, a closer examination of 
competition policy in Sweden suggests all is not well regarding anti-
competitive conduct by SOEs. 
Specific to the area of competition in the postal sector, a report 
by the Swedish Postal and Telecom Agency suggested significant 
limitations for competition law to improve competition in the postal 
sector. Its report stated,  
The Swedish incumbent has been very active in defending its 
former monopoly and that is reflected in the many legal disputes. 
The Swedish Competition Act, which is the implementation of the 
EC rules on competition, does not appear to be well suited for a 
transition from monopoly to a market solution.450  
The report suggested that the agency understands the weakness 
of the current antitrust jurisprudence regarding SOEs on predation 
issues, an area affected by this transition. 
J. Japan 
Two sets of provisions under the Japanese Act Concerning 
Prohibition of Private Monopolization and Maintenance of Fair 
Trade address predatory pricing. The first is the Article 3 prohibition 
against monopolization. The second is Article 19, which prohibits 
unfair trade practices. Section 6 of Article 19 proscribes predatory 
pricing. According to Section 6, “excessively below the cost incurred 
in the said supply” is interpreted as below AVC, and “a low 
consideration” is interpreted as below ATC.451 Judicially, the AVC 
standard has been recognized in the private action Daikoku 
 
 448. Id. 
 449. Stefan P. Lindeborg & Tommy Pettersson, Comments on a Swedish Case on 
Predatory Pricing—Particularly on Recoupment, 22 EUR. COMPETITION L. REV. 75 (2001) 
(providing analysis of the case). 
 450. NAT’L POST AND TELECOM AGENCY, THE LIBERALISED SWEDISH POSTAL 
MARKET—THE SITUATION 14 YEARS AFTER THE ABOLITION OF THE MONOPOLY, Mar. 2, 
2007, available at http://www.pts.se/upload/Documents/EN/Postal_liberalisation 
_2007_march 07.pdf. 
 451. DESIGNATION OF UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, (1982), available at http://www. 
cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/hourei/data/utp.pdf. 
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decision452 whereas the Hamaguchi Petroleum decision recognized 
above AVC but below the ATC test.453 
A private suit, Yamato v. Japan Post, concerned predatory pricing 
by Japan Post. 454 Both the Tokyo District Court and Tokyo High 
Court rejected Yamato’s claim made pursuant to Article 24. The 
Tokyo High Court rejected the assertion by the plaintiff that Japan 
Post’s cost in commercial parcel delivery should be calculated on a 
“stand-alone” basis (separated from Japan Post’s regulated postal 
delivery). The court opined that it is economically rational for an 
enterprise, when it enters into new business, to make use of its 
resources in its existing business. Separate from the case, the Japan 
Federal Trade Commission (“JFTC”) published its opinion on the 
case as a study group report in 2006. The JFTC study group opinion 
was hostile to the position of Japan Post, advocating a “stand-alone” 
basis (at least regarding Japan Post pre-privatization) should be the 
method used to allocate common fixed costs when a monopolist in 
market A entered market B.455 The Tokyo High Court in Yamato 
rejected the idea of a stand-alone basis because the stand-alone cost 
method was not mature as a legal test. As a general matter, the 
JFTC’s regulatory standard on low pricing is that pricing below 
purchase price is illegal when it harms competition.456 One problem 
in the Yamato case was a lack of evidence because the JFTC did not 
first bring a case of its own. Yamato could not obtain necessary cost 
data of the Japan Post to prove its sales-below-cost arguments. 
Therefore, it had to rely on unfair advantage, such as the tax exempt 
status the Japan Post enjoys relative to private companies. 
There have been some other SOE predatory pricing cases in 
Japan. All of them were private suits. Nearly all of the decisions held 
for the defendants.457 The only exception was the Tokyo District 
 
 452. Tokyo High Court decision, case no. 1413, 2002 (Ne), (Sept. 29, 2004). 
 453. JFTC remedy order, 53 SHINKETSUSHU 867–68 (May 16, 2006). 
 454. Tokyo High Court decision, case no. 1078, 2006 (Ne), LEXIS 28140088 (Nov. 
28, 2007). 
 455. See JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, ISSUES CONCERNING POSTAL SERVICES AND 
COMPETITION POLICY COINCIDING WITH THE ENACTMENT OF THE LAW OF THE 
PRIVATIZATION OF THE POSTAL SERVICES (2006), available at http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-
page/pressreleases/ 2006/July/060721.pdf. 
 456. See JAPAN FAIR TRADE COMMISSION, GUIDELINES CONCERNING UNFAIR PRICE 
CUTTING UNDER THE ANTIMONOPOLY ACT 2–4 (Nov. 20, 1984), translation available at 
http://www.jftc.go.jp/e-page/legislation/ama/pricecutting.pdf (last visited Nov. 25, 2008). 
 457. Postcard case (Osaka High Court in 1994); Bus for Aged Citizens case (Yamaguchi 
District Court Shimonoseki Branch in 2006). 
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Court decision in the Slaughterhouse case.458 The Supreme Court 
opined in that case that the Antimonopoly Act was applicable to low 
pricing by the Tokyo Municipal Slaughterhouse that cross-subsidized 
its sales. Nevertheless, the district court found the low pricing to be 
legal since the pricing did not harm fair competition. 
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
SOEs remain an important part of economic life in many 
countries. This Article suggests that where SOEs face competition 
from other firms and where their advantages provided from the state 
are minimal, the corporate governance of such SOEs tends to be 
stronger than in situations in which SOEs face competition and 
behave as much as possible like private firms, such as in Sweden and 
New Zealand. SOE corporate governance seems to be better when 
there is more accountability. There is more accountability when SOE 
governance statutes reflect those of private firms. This result holds 
across legal origins. Indeed, some of the most un-competitive postal 
SOEs are in common law advanced economies such as Canada and 
the United States which tend to score highly in the LLSV literature. 
Antitrust solutions to SOE anti-competitive behavior seem to hold 
across jurisdictions regardless of legal origin. Predatory pricing 
jurisprudence does not distinguish between private and government 
firms even though the incentives may be different given the soft 
budget constraints of government firms. 
The next stage in research in the area of competition and 
corporate governance of SOEs is to undertake a full cross country 
comparison and to do so across a number of different types of SOEs. 
This analysis would examine all cases and determine how the law in 
practice matches the law on the books for both corporate and 
antitrust laws. This is a significant task. The government oversight 
across SOEs varies both across and within countries. In some 
countries there are sector regulators or multiple regulators (sector, 
financial, etc.) to overview the SOEs. In other countries there is a 
general SOE law. With the creation of such a database, it would be 
possible to undertake cross country quantitative analysis to learn 
more about some dynamics of SOEs. 
 
 458. The Supreme Court: Tokyo Municipal Slaughter House decision Supreme Court 
decision, 43 (12) Minshu 2078, 2083 (Dec. 14, 1999). 
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Below are a number of recommendations that would improve 
competition and corporate governance regardless of the legal origin 
of SOEs. 
A. Improved External Oversight 
An annual performance review beyond annual reports may be 
necessary to encourage good corporate governance of SOEs. This 
would benchmark the SOE relative to other SOEs in the same sector 
in other countries and establish how well the corporation is meeting 
its target relative to similar entities elsewhere.459 The benchmarking 
would include specific metrics to measure financial, management, 
and service aspects of the SOE relative to other SOEs.460 
Benchmarking across countries is made difficult by the various goals 
that SOEs might have in different countries. 
Separate oversight functions for financial and management 
regulation across government agencies would reduce opportunities 
for regulatory capture. Other types of oversight include mandating 
accounting of SOEs by private auditing firms rather than by another 
part of government. This would reduce the possibility of government 
self dealing that might limit a full discovery of the condition of SOEs 
in auditing results. Part of an improvement in oversight would 
include an increase in effective penalties for poor oversight and 
management, particularly when SOEs engage in anti-competitive 
actions. There is a need for personal sanctions for bad behavior on 
the part of SOE managers such as the loss of job for SOE executives 
and barring work from other parts of government for a set time 
period after they are fired from SOE management. Another potential 
penalty would be for an SOE that is caught engaging in unlawful 
anti-competitive behavior or poor corporate governance to enter 
 
 459. E.g., Maria Luisa Corton & Sanford V. Berg, Benchmarking Central American 
Water Utilities, 17 UTIL. POL’Y 267 (2009); Céline Nauges & Caroline van den Berg, 
Economies of Density, Scale and Scope in the Water Supply and Sewerage Sector: A Study of Four 
Developing and Transition Economies, 34 J. REG. ECON. 144 (2008). 
 460. See Antonio Estache, Serigio Perelman & Lourdes Trujillo, Infrastructure 
Performance and Reform in Developing and Transition Economies: Evidence from a Survey of 
Productivity Measures (World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 3514, 2005) 
(providing a framework for benchmarking); Céline Nauges & Caroline van den Berg, 
Economies of Density, Scale and Scope in the Water Supply and Sewerage Sector: A Study of Four 
Developing and Transition Economies, 34 J. REG. ECON. 144 (2008) (using panel data for cross 
country benchmarking). 
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into a process of structural separation between the statutory 
monopoly business and the competitive business.461 
Another possibility is to forbid the SOE to compete in the non-
regulated related field. The potential problem with such an outcome, 
at least in the postal sector, is that the postal SOE will be unable to 
use its economies of scope to offer products and services in related 
markets. The advantage of utilizing the economies of scope would 
be that such economies keep the price down for a number of goods 
and services that are basic to the regulated part of the business. 
Another way to think about structural separation would be to ensure 
that SOEs separate the profit-making and non profit-making goals 
into separate firms. Codes of conduct should be established and 
enforced between regulated and unregulated entities. Where SOEs 
could compete based on efficiency concerns, they should not be 
allowed to potentially utilize funds from non-profit making functions 
in anti-competitive ways. 
Another method of external oversight is through the capital 
markets. Governments should make SOEs go to capital market for 
loans. This will encourage SOEs to be disciplined to pay back the 
loans, so long as there are no soft budget constraints. If governments 
implicitly guarantee loans, this solution is not viable because the 
worse the governance of the firm, the better the rate, because the 
government is more likely to guarantee repayment of the loans. 
B. Improve Internal Corporate Governance 
It is important to improve the quality of internal corporate 
governance of SOEs. The corporate social responsibility movement 
and the shareholder democracy movement have been issues of 
significant attention in both academic and policy circles.462 If we are 
to take the corporate social responsibility movement seriously, it is 
particularly necessary to do so with regard to SOEs. Governance is 
more opaque and less responsive to shareholders of SOEs than of 
publicly traded firms. This would entail greater penalties for a 
fiduciary breach on the part of the SOE board. This should include 
 
 461. But see MARK A. JAMISON & JAMES SICHTER, PUBLIC UTILITY RESEARCH CTR., 
BUSINESS SEPARATION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS: LESSONS FROM THE U.S. EXPERIENCE 
(2008), http://ssrn.com/abstract=1384582 (noting the difficulties of separation in the U.S. 
telecom context). 
 462. See, e.g., Michael Siebecker, Trust & Transparency: Producing Efficient Corporate 
Disclosure Through Fiduciary-Based Discourse, 87 WASH. U. L.R. (forthcoming 2009).  
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steep financial penalties for managers and directors that breach their 
duties. Governments should strive to increase the use of non-
governmental appointed directors on the board of SOEs. The state 
should reduce the number of political appointments on SOE boards 
and increase the number of directors who have previous business 
experience that would be useful in running a company. There might 
be some informal norms such as shaming that might improve 
corporate governance. For shaming sanctions to be successful, there 
needs to be enough transparency for information about bad 
corporate governance of SOEs to emerge and a sense in a given 
country that the lack of accountability is something for which one 
should be ashamed. 
A problem that SOEs face more than private firms is soft targets 
for performance. Whereas performance contracts might work for 
private firms, the incentives are different for public firms and 
therefore performance contracts are not as successful. Because of the 
asymmetry of information between managers and shareholders (or in 
the case of SOEs, the government officials acting on the public’s 
behalf), management will try to create performance contracts based 
on easily achievable targets. However, what separates performance 
contracts in private and state firms is that private firms can reduce the 
problem of soft targets and information asymmetry by creating stock 
options and by using benchmarking for performance to better align 
management interests with those of shareholders. 
C. Corporatization of SOEs 
Some countries have shifted the nature of SOE governance to a 
more corporatized form of governance. In postal delivery, most EU 
countries’ postal operators have a corporatized form.463 SOE 
management and directors may be mandated to have specific skills 
and/or experience.464 Creating a competency profile provides a set of 
standards by which government can require effective managers. 
Policy targets, including financial goals, would create quantifiable 
targets for the SOE to meet. The failure to meet such targets could 
lead to the ouster of SOE leadership. This process would better align 
 
 463. WIK CONSULT, STUDY FOR THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, MAIN DEVELOPMENTS 
IN THE POSTAL SECTOR (2004–2006) 3 (2006), http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/post/ 
doc/studies/2006-wik-final_en.pdf. 
 464. Scott, supra note 70, at 4. 
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management’s interest with residual owners’ because management 
would have an incentive to create a more efficient SOE. 
Corporatization has proven to be an intermediate step for SOEs 
that reduces some incentives for mismanagement due to soft budget 
constraints and a lack of internal and external accountability by 
making the SOE act more like a private firm.465 Corporatization 
forces firms to ask if there are better ways to achieve lower costs. If 
an SOE is in a corporatized form, it is easier to keep track of the 
performance because of better and more information. Some 
empirical work supports the proposition that corporatization can 
improve the efficiency of SOEs.466 In most cases, this is a second best 
solution. If there are strong concerns about managerial incentives of 
SOEs, corporatization is not equivalent to privatization.467 However, 
if privatization is not possible politically, corporatization may be a 
second best solution or an intermediary step to privatization, such as 
in New Zealand for the New Zealand Post. 
Where SOE postal incumbents have been commercialized and 
corporatized, SOEs behave more like private companies. Generally, 
this has been successful and not surprisingly, it is successful in 
precisely those countries that provide for greater competition.468 
Thus, competition and good corporate governance indeed seem to 
be somewhat substitutable. A successful commercialization provides 
an example of how to limit some of the impulse of an SOE postal 
incumbent to raise the cost of rivals. 
Let us examine the case of New Zealand. Prior to its 
transformation, New Zealand Post had a statutory monopoly with its 
large reserve sector based on parcels with a weight of less than 500g. 
 
 465. José A. Gómez-Ibáñez, Alternatives to Infrastructure Privatization Revisited: Public 
Enterprise Reform from the 1960s to the 1980s, at 25–27 (World Bank Policy Research, Working 
Paper No. 4391, 2007). 
 466. Varouj A. Aivazian, Ying Ge & Jiaping Qiu, Can Corporatization Improve the 
Performance of State-Owned Enterprises Even Without Privatization?, 11 J. CORP. FIN. 791 
(2005) (analyzing corporatized Chinese SOE performance). 
 467. Shleifer, supra note 67, at 137–38 (claiming that private ownership is superior to 
government ownership because private ownership creates incentives to reduce costs while 
government officials have incentives to supply monopoly rents); see Besley & Ghatak, supra 
note 68 (arguing that government ownership should be limited only in situations where the 
SOE project creates primarily public goods and the government values those goods more than 
anyone else). 
 468. Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer, Developing Policies for the Future of the 
United States Postal Service, in COMPETITIVE TRANSFORMATION OF THE POSTAL AND 
DELIVERY SECTOR (Michael A. Crew & Paul R. Kleindorfer eds., 2003). 
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On April 1, 1998, New Zealand removed the statutory monopoly on 
all letters, regardless of weight. New Zealand Post was given, for the 
most part, equal treatment with all other postal operators including 
full application of competition laws. By the end of the year, there 
were seventeen registered postal operators within New Zealand. The 
majority of these competitors were small local businesses. 
Corporatization of the SOE in New Zealand between 1987 and 
1998 increased transparency and accountability of New Zealand 
Post. Staff became more productive (a staff decrease of 40%, fewer 
handles, and an increase of business of 20%), New Zealand Post 
more profitable (a $NZ37.9 million loss became a profit of $NZ47.7 
million), prices lower (the basic letter price was at the same nominal 
price in 1987 and 1998), and service delivery quality improved.469 
New Zealand closed a third of the country’s post offices. This led to 
remarkable results: 100% increase in labor productivity, 30% increase 
in mail volume and a 30% decrease in both the real price of postage 
and of costs. These changes all occurred while maintaining state 
ownership of New Zealand Post.470 One can tell a similar story in 
Sweden. The loss of the postal monopoly in Sweden was a significant 
reason that Posten become more efficient and eliminated many 
redundant post offices and centers even while maintaining its 
universal service mission.471 
Corporatization is not an end solution. Even if the goals of 
private and public firms were the same, the behavioral outcome of 
such firms would be different. As Alchian explains, “[E]ven with the 
same explicit organizational goals [between public and private firms], 
the cost-rewards system impinging on the employers and the 
‘owners’ of the organization are different.”472 Not surprisingly, 
therefore, some corporatized SOEs do very poorly, even those in 
common law jurisdictions. Both USPS and Canada Post are 
 
 469. ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, PROMOTING 
COMPETITION IN THE POSTAL SECTOR, DAFFE/CLP(99)22, 247–52. 
 470. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, supra note 288, at 79. 
 471. It is possible that contestable markets theory might apply in the liberalized postal 
sector. See generally WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT D. WILLIG, 
CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982). Contestable 
market theory is based on a number of assumptions and may not hold outside of these 
assumptions. See, e.g., Fabio Domanico, The European Airline Industry: Law and Economics of 
Low Cost Carriers, 23 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 199 (2007); Joseph Farrell, Cheap Talk, 
Coordination, and Entry, 18 RAND J. ECON. 34 (1987). 
 472. Alchian, supra note 77, at 817–18. 
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corporatized but both maintain a significant reserve sector. Perhaps 
the better lesson about corporatization is the more an SOE actually 
looks corporatized, with director control rather than government 
control, and the more competition it faces to ensure that 
corporatization actually matters, the more SOE outcomes may reflect 
those of private firms. 
D. Increase Competition 
Competition means the elimination or at the very least a 
significant reduction of the reserve sector, such as what the EU has 
undertaken. It also means a limit upon incumbent firms to abuse the 
universal services requirement for anticompetitive purposes. As noted 
earlier in this Article, liberalization creates competitive pressure that 
will eliminate poor governance from firms. Liberalization is 
politically difficult.473 This is especially true in the current period of 
world-wide economic crisis. The rhetoric of liberalization has not 
matched the reality of liberalization, where in fact some liberalization 
efforts are merely a different and perhaps only somewhat less 
restrictive form of regulation. However, when these half hearted 
liberalization schemes fail, there may be significant public resentment 
and then pushback against liberalization.474 Even in the developing 
world, postal competition has proved sustainable. One example is 
Tanzania where total mail volume since liberalization increased from 
0.87 letters per capita per year to 1.2 per capita per year.475 
Competition may have other effects. It might create a bypass for 
certain parts of an industry by alternative means. For example, the 
internet has changed the way in which people send messages to each 
other. This has made the mail system susceptible to a death spiral in 
which the high end customers leave the system and firms raise costs 
to make up for these departures, thereby leading to more departures. 
E. Privatization 
Privatization eliminates the soft budget constraint because firms 
have to rely upon the market, which creates a level of financial 
 
 473. See, e.g., Edward Iacobucci, Michael Trebilcock & Ralph A. Winter, The Canadian 
Experience with Deregulation, 56 U. TORONTO L.J. 1 (2006). 
 474. Fox, supra note 296, at 216–17. 
 475. Kenny, supra note 142, at 77. 
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discipline.476 One legislative response to the problem of SOEs has 
been to privatize these enterprises.477 During the 1980s and 1990s, 
countries privatized over 100,000 firms around the world, 
particularly in Latin America, East Asia, and the former Soviet 
block.478 SOEs are less efficient than private firms. Therefore the 
overall performance of SOEs vis-à-vis private firms compares 
poorly.479 Where privatization has not led to greater efficiencies, in 
many cases, it has been a result of the failure of the architects to 
introduce liberalization in conjunction with privatization. Put 
differently, when privatization fails, it seems to be because of flawed 
design and implementation.480 That is, there are potential risks to 
privatization when there are situations of market failure and where 
there is inadequate regulation to protect the market function. 
Empirical work in Russia suggests that privatization without 
adequate regulation can lead to corporate looting.481 Similarly, 
Carlos Slim became the world’s richest man because he bought the 
telecom incumbent in Mexico when it was privatized and allowed to 
maintain its statutory monopoly in fixed line telephony.482 
A difficult situation may emerge where, if there is no 
privatization and liberalization in the near term, the yearly 
government bailout will create an even bigger problem in the long 
term. At that time, the effect of trying to create cost controls on 
 
 476. See Emmanuelle Auriol & Pierre M. Picard, Infrastructure and Public Utilities 
Privatization in Developing Countries, 23 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 77, 80 (2009) 
(providing a literature review). 
 477. In many cases, successful liberalization has proceeded with efforts at privatization of 
SOEs. John Nellis & Nancy Birdsall, Privatization Reality Check: Distributional Effects in 
Developing Countries, in REALITY CHECK: THE DISTRIBUTIONAL IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION 
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 12 (John Nellis & Nancy Birdsall eds., 2005). These findings 
support earlier empirical studies suggesting that privatized firms outperformed SOEs and 
increased their efficiency. See Megginson, Nash & van Randenborgh, supra note 31, at 405; 
Shleifer, supra note 67, at 134–41. 
 478. Nellis & Birdsall, supra note 477, at 3, 11–12 (arguing that those privatizations that 
were pro-competitive addressed the equity concerns regarding the distribution of the benefits 
of privatization). 
 479. Simeon Djankov & Peter Murrell, Enterprise Restructuring in Transition: A 
Quantitative Survey, 40 J. ECON. LIT. 739 (2002) (studying the effects of privatization). 
 480. Harry M. Trebing & Sarah P. Voll, Infrastructure Deregulation and Privatization in 
Industrialized and Emerging Economies, 40 J. ECON. ISSUES 307, 311 (2006). 
 481. Bernard Black, Does Corporate Governance Matter? A Crude Test Using Russian 
Data, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 2131, 2133 (2001). 
 482. See D. Daniel Sokol, Barriers to Entry in Mexican Telecommunications: Problems and 
Solutions, 27 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 1 (2001). 
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SOEs may come at a higher cost. Addressing this situation means 
overcoming significant public choice problems not merely from 
SOEs but from vested private interests that benefit from the status 
quo. Though competition advocacy on the part of antitrust agencies 
may help, competition advocacy has its limits as agencies are subject 
to political retribution from legislators who might not want a pro-
competitive message.483 For example, while the FTC has had a strong 
advocacy program,484 it has never questioned why there should be a 
state action exemption, nor did it discuss, in the postal context, the 
possibility of privatization of the USPS. 
F. Create an Effective Antitrust Test 
One problem with antitrust approaches to predatory pricing 
cost-based tests is that they do not account for the government-
created distortion in creating a revised baseline for how to measure a 
cost.485 One conclusion from the cross-country analysis is that 
antitrust has been ineffective, across legal origins, in accounting for 
the nature of SOEs in cost-based tests to determine predatory 
pricing. Incremental cost tests may not detect potentially anti-
competitive behavior by SOEs. As Panzar suggests, “Because a 
revenue maximizing SOE wishes to offer below cost prices on a 
continuing basis, it may find it optimal to alter its strategic 
investment policies so as to distort the outcome of any incremental 
cost test to which its rates may be subject.”486 However, current 
predatory pricing tests do not account for this difference. 
This Article suggests that antitrust predatory pricing tests require 
an imputation of the various costs and benefits of government 
ownership and government support of SOEs. This test would 
measure the various indirect benefits that SOE providers receive 
from their governments in terms of assessing the cost floor. Part of 
the reason for the lack of the use of such a test may be that, in 
practice, an SOE often incurs both advantages and disadvantages 
from its state-owned status, and some of these disadvantages (e.g., 
loss of managerial control) may be difficult to quantify. 
 
 483. D. Daniel Sokol, Limiting Anti-Competitive Government Interventions That Benefit 
Special Interests, GEO. MASON L. REV. (forthcoming 2009). 
 484. See James C. Cooper, Paul A. Pautler & Todd J. Zywicki, Theory and Practice of 
Competition Advocacy at the FTC, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1091 (2005). 
 485. Sappington & Sidak, supra note 153, at 518. 
 486. Panzar, supra note 297, at 21.  
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Administrative ease is certainly an important practical concern. 
Some rough rules of thumb might be proposed on these grounds. 
The most appropriate rule of thumb (and rule generally) will depend 
upon the relevant social objective. Is it clear what this objective 
should be? If the social objective is efficiency through the use of 
antitrust law, then the contours of such a test might be based on an 
imputation test for SOEs. 
One imprecise analogy would be to cost imputation in TELRIC 
pricing in telecommunications. The cost imputation of TELRIC 
pricing of the 1996 Telecom Act seems to have been 
unadministrable for quite some time in the United States, New 
Zealand, and other jurisdictions. However, there are also differences 
between SOE cost imputation and TELRIC cost imputation. 
TELRIC methodology was adopted primarily because of the issue of 
selling inputs to retail competitors. This issue, and thus the TELRIC 
methodology, may be less germane in many relevant settings. While 
TELRIC served primarily to keep the incumbent’s (wholesale) prices 
relatively low, pricing restrictions for SOEs may serve primarily to 
keep the incumbent SOE’s (retail) prices relatively high. 
Many antitrust systems are concerned with the potential of false 
positives in prosecution.487 This is particularly a concern in predatory 
pricing cases when low prices may support competition even if they 
harm competitors. Compounding the issue of what might go into an 
SOE predatory pricing test is the concern that courts may not be 
able to handle such complexity. That is, legal rules must be 
administrable. As Hovenkamp notes: 
[T]here is relatively little disagreement about the basic proposition 
that often our general judicial system is not competent to apply the 
economic theory necessary for identifying strategic behavior as 
anticompetitive. This makes the development of simple antitrust 
rules critical. Antitrust decision making cannot consider every 
complexity that the market presents.488 
Accordingly, it is better to have an easier-to-administer test of 
predation for SOEs than a complex test if the error cost for the 
 
 487. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits of Antitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (1984) 
(discussing the greater harms of false positives over false negatives). 
 488. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE ANTITRUST ENTERPRISE: PRINCIPLE AND 
EXECUTION 47 (2005). 
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complex test would be too high.489 Administrability is particularly a 
concern regarding a predatory pricing test that would treat one form 
of entity differently than another and would require a complex 
imputation test. 
What is not clear is whether or not a separate SOE predatory 
pricing test is administrable in either common law or civil law 
jurisdictions. Such a test would require a sense of the costs of an 
efficient entrant. To determine this cost, there would need to be a 
way to determine what costs are due to the soft budget constraint of 
the SOE based on its governance structure and the special privileges 
that the government grants it. Based on the general concern of 
administrability of predatory pricing, it is not clear that such a 
specific test—if it could be devised—might be understood and 
administered by courts. Antitrust case law would need to catch up to 
economic thinking on SOEs and on government support for firms. 
Courts across the countries surveyed have yet to be able to show an 
ability to grapple with these issues effectively and seem to have some 
trouble even with cost-based tests involving private firms. An 
antitrust solution needs more work both at the theoretical level and 
in terms of implementation within antitrust doctrine. 
The purpose behind much of antitrust analysis is to determine 
what an efficient competitor would do. However, in the case of 
SOEs, the problem is that an efficient new entrant would never have 
created the type of network that many SOEs have. European state 
aids jurisprudence recognizes this point but most countries lack a 
state aids regime.490 
G. Final Thoughts 
Overall, SOE competition and governance issues are difficult 
questions. Unfortunately, the prospects for a simple, neat rule for 
SOE pricing seem limited. Competition law is inadequate at present 
given a lack of an effective test to measure predation by SOEs as well 
as administrability problems. A larger competition policy may or may 
not be inadequate—privatization is clearly not palatable and 
competition advocacy to liberalize markets may be a non-starter 
during the current global crisis. Public choice concerns limit 
regulatory liberalization and these concerns must be overcome. 
 
 489. On error costs, see Easterbrook, supra note 487. 
 490. Chronopost SA v. UFEX, C-341/06 P and C-342/06 P, ¶ 38 (Dec. 6. 2007). 
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Some SOEs matter more than others, particularly those in critical 
network industries (e.g., transport, finance, utilities). In these areas 
sector regulators have serious capture problems. Perhaps the world-
wide macro-economic crisis leading to a reinvigorated IMF that 
demands liberalization might be the only way to create more 
competition. Better corporate governance, akin to the requirements 
of corporate governance for publicly traded firms, might help. A key 
role of price floors for SOEs is to limit “empire building” by SOE 
managers. Perhaps empire building can be limited more effectively in 
practice via internal governance reform; the ideal rules for SOE 
pricing may well be sector-specific.491 These are themes worth 




 491. Mark Armstrong & David E.M. Sappington, Regulation, Competition, and 
Liberalization, 44 J. ECON. LIT. 325, 326 (2006) (“[T]here is no single set of directions that 
can guide the challenging journey from monopoly to competition in all settings.”). 
